Foreign Policies

It is only natural that political France should have been anxious about the result of the British Elections on which the future of the Entente to some extent depends, but that the defeat of Premier Baldwin's protection program should have been seen as a rebuke to Lord Curzon's foreign policy was not so evident. Le Temps, one of the many semi-official journals of Paris, said: "The greatest obstacle to the reconstruction of Europe as an economic market for British goods has been Lord Curzon's foreign policy. Lord Curzon believed that the political interests of England made it imperative to encourage German resistance in the Ruhr. He believed that the political interests of England entailed opposition to the action of France in the Rhineland, though it would have been perfectly simple for him to join us and cooperate. He believed that the political interests of England would be best served if the question of the interallied debts remained unsettled and was held over the heads of the Continental peoples as a permanent threat to their currencies.

"His mistakes have cost Mr. Baldwin dear as Mr. Lloyd George's did him. It is to be hoped that Mr. Baldwin's successors will learn their lesson from his experience. There is nothing to be gained by breaking up the Entente. Without unity there is no safety."

Le Temps, again inspired by the uncertainty of the British Elections and also by President Coolidge's message to Congress, saw France as the redeemer of Europe. The statement made by Le Temps can be taken virtually as official, and, from this standpoint, it is important to note the distinct, but as yet hypothetical, change of attitude in French foreign policy. The reason may be fear of the next British Government, fear of the consequences of U. S. nonparticipation in European affairs, fear of the combined effects of the policies of these two nations on the French election next April. At any rate Le Temps stated concisely the problem confronting France: "The problem for France may be expressed thus: To conceive and propose a program which on the basis of the present situation will permit any British Government to collaborate in the stabilization of the money of Germany. ... It would be also profitable if the Allied Governments were in accord on the directions which should be given to the experts with regard to currency reform in Germany. . . . Why, then, should not the French Government take the initiative in exposing its ideas on the manner of stabilizing the money or moneys of the Reich?

"Objection may be made that it would be best to wait for the advice of the United States. But we think on the contrary that it would be rather embarrassing to the American Government if Washington were asked for preliminary advice.

"In his Presidential message Mr. Coolidge refused to countenance any annulment of debts. He laid down the principle that every engagement ought to be fulfilled, and France will not try to contest this principle. She invokes it every day. But President Coolidge said also: 'We recognize thoroughly our obligation to help others, reserving to the decision of our own judgment the time, the place and the method.'

"Toward the United States France has therefore a double duty; to obtain the recovery of her debts so as to be able finally to pay America, and give some day to the American Government the occasion spontaneously to furnish the generous aid envisaged by President Coolidge. By giving her help and hastening the money stabilization of Germany the French Government can fulfill this double duty. It can maintain Franco-American friendship while re-establishing Franco-English cooperation."