Arms and the Nation*

"This the first history of the United States Army ever published," begins the blurb. Let a reader not mistake Major Ganoe's volume for a history of U. S. military feats--a story of battles and trials at arms. In a way it is that, but only incidentally. In the 600 pages of the volume (200 of which are devoted to appendices and index), the battle of Gettysburg is described in just one sentence: "The three days' fighting so well known in American history resulted, after Pickett's charge, in the defeat of the Southern army."

A portion of the book equal to if not greater than that devoted to battles is devoted to the description of drill regulations and the organization of the body military. These things are not of primary importance except to military men, yet there is plenty of interest in the book for the general reader. In military affairs we have too often been the plaything of chance. Hear a few stories of our past which we too little know:

1776. Every school child knows the prowess of George Washington, but few grown men know what a fortunate accident he was. The Continental Congress chose him to head our Armies only as a matter of politics. His military record was unknown. John Hancock and Artemus Ward wanted to command but, to appease the South, George Washington, the "quiet husband of the richest woman in America," was chosen, regardless of qualifications, to lead our Armies. Similarly, LaFayette was made a Major General for his zeal, his illustrious family, his connections.

P: The soldiers before Boston at the beginning of the Revolution were most of them enlisted for only three months, and kept walking out at crucial moments. The officers, most of whom were elected by the men, were not only incompetent, but many of them were cowardly. One of the greatest causes of casualities was that the men used to try to stop rolling British cannon balls with their feet.

P: Not until Baron von Steuben, a Prussian from the court of Frederick the Great, came to Valley Forge, did the Army have either discipline or self-respect. He was the old type of Prussian, not the new. Democratic and kindhearted, he had difficulty in impressing officers, who believed themselves above such duties, that they should both drill and care for their men. He issued regulations in which he said: "His [the officer's] first object should be to gain the love of his men by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity."

1812. By the War of 1812, Baron von Steuben's lessons were forgotten. Bungling began at once. When war was declared, Canada was politely informed of the fact, but our troops in the West were not -- were attacked unawares. Political Generals bungled horribly and troops walked out or fled before inferior forces of the enemy.

1846. Against Mexico the procedure was repeated. General Zachary Taylor, with his eye on the Presidency, although personally brave, was completely incompetent. He did not even reconnoitre to discover the whereabouts of the enemy. As it was, his two sons-in-law, one of them his capable Adjutant, Bliss, the other a Colonel under his command, Jefferson Davis, saved him from complete failure. Fortunately, there was General Winfield Scott who, by his great ability, pulled our country through in spite of short-term enlistments, untrained men, political Generals and interference from Washington.

1861. When the Civil War began, although it had been rumbling in the offing for a year, the Army had just 13,000 men, all but 600 of whom were in the West holding the Indians at bay. At once the Union tried its old farce of three months' enlistments. Lincoln, although earnest in his endeavors, did not understand military exigencies until he had learned by hard experience to place his trust in one capable man, to put through a Draft Law and to go about the War in a businesslike manner.

1898. After the Civil War, the Army was pared to the bone, split up and sent out to hold the frontier again. Consequently when the Spanish War broke out, the entire farce was repeated. The expeditionary force to Cuba contained 14 regiments which had never been under fire. In one regiment, 300 men had never fired a gun. Once in Cuba, after a terribly disorganized passage, the Army was in a precarious state because of inadequate supply facilities. The artillery was almost nil; one regiment could not be used because its guns were no good.

1917. The last war of all, which Major Ganoe treats in a brief epilogue of 30 pages, found the U. S. little better prepared than it had been for its previous struggles; but, having observed the blunders of England and other foreign countries for three years, it had learned some lessons which were immediately put into service and proved invaluable. The Draft Law supplanted the three months' enlistment practice. For once the U. S. meant business. But the infinite complexity of the problem of preparation in the age of machinery, and the mere sprinkling of trained men available to train the undisciplined multitudes were a nightmare to those who knew what was required. Yet, among all our wars, the last stands out as brilliant against the background of exquisite bungling which preceded it.

Nowadays historians are inclined to scoff at military history. "What force have battles," they cry, "when the economic and racial causes which bring about wars are much greater, much more compelling?" The answer is that, in a great measure, military history is the personification of these causes. It is general history intensified and materialized. In a few minutes of battle the economic forces of a century may settle their differences for all time. An error of judgment on the part of one man, a failure of preparation on the part of a nation, the cowardice or momentary vacillation of a General, may put off, or greatly alter the whole course of World History.

* THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY -- Major William Addleman Ganoe, U. S. Ini.--Appleton ($5.00),