Naval Parley

INTERNATIONAL

How much will come out of th pockets of U. S. citizens next yea to buy new war boats? This expense has stood at less than $3 per citizen for the past five years--$320,000,000 per year in all. Is that too much? Might less be spent with safety? These questions, affecting many a pocket, car only be answered on the basis of negotiations which began last week in Geneva, Switzerland. There, in the Palace of the League of Nations, assembled the Naval Limitations Parley (TIME, Feb. 21), convoked by U.S. President Coolidge. Chief Delegates. Because France and Italy refused invitations to participate (TIME, March 7), the parley was made up last week of delegations representing the U. S., Britain, Japan. The three chief delegates were, respectively: 1) Hugh Simpson Gibson (now U. S. Ambassador to Belgium); 2) Admiral William Clive Bridgeman (first Lord of the British Admiralty) ; 3) Admiral Viscount Minoru Saito (since 1919 Governor-General of Korea). What, exactly, had these very august gentlemen and their staffs of naval experts to discuss? Tabooed Subjects. The delegates did not meet to talk about limiting the number of capital ships or aircraft carriers. That problem was solved at the Washington Conference of 1922.* Moreover the U. S. delegation let it be known last week that discussion of U. S. naval bases or of proposals to internationalize the Panama Canal for naval shipping would be considered taboo. The Naval Limitations parley met, in fact, to limit just three classes of ships: 1) cruisers; 2) destroyers; 3) submarines. Significance. While the delegates were getting down to their preliminary jockeying last week, certain facts loomed with enough significance almost to forecast what decisions may be arrived at. 1) The nonparticipation of France and Italy (both powers which rely on the submarine as their trump naval arm) will make it impossible "scrap" or even seriously to limit either that arm or arms used to combat it. 2.) The Washington Conference limited cruiser tonnage to 10,000 and cruiser guns to eight-inch calibre; but did not limit cruiser numbers. This "limitation" has therefore resulted in the development of a new type of super-cruiser costing about $10,000,000, mounting eight-inch guns capable of firing five shells each per minute, and with a fighting speed close to 40 miles per hour (35 knots).* At present the U. S. has only two such ships, both under construction, the Pensacola and the Salt Lake City. Britain already has 14, Japan 4, France 3, Italy 2. Thus, if a 5-5-3 cruiser ratio be negotiated at Geneva, the U. S. would almost certainly have to build up to Great Britain and Japan; and that would cost the U. S. taxpayers at least $140,000,000 for this one item alone. The alternative would be for Britain and Japan to scrap enough ships to bring their super-cruiser strength below that of France or Italy-- something beyond the scope of practical realities. 3) Since reduction of the present number of submarines and fast cruisers would thus be so difficult of attainment, why not at least reduce future cruiser tonnage? This seemed last week a practicable, a likely step. It would appeal to U. S. public opinion as something definite, something accomplished. Great Britain would approve; for there are British naval bases in every quarter of the globe from which these little ships could operate. Japan would approve because her immediate naval objectives are of the short range type. The U. S., with but few bases, yet with the distant Philippines to defend, would be placed at a great disadvantage, yet would have won a "moral victory."

*When the U. S., Britain, Japan, France and Italy adopted the 5-5-8-1.67-1.67 ratio made binding until 1932. *The Mauretania, "fastest liner in the world," makes only 32 miles per hour (28 the knots).