Treaty Talk

Two Senate committees last week began a study of the provisions and implications of the London Naval Treaty. The document was officially before the Foreign Relations Committee where a friendly attitude toward it was manifested by members, including Pennsylvania's Senator Reed and Arkansas' Senator Robinson, both delegates to the London parley. The Naval Affairs Committee, under the nervous leadership of Maine's Senator Hale, conducted hearings in an atmosphere hostile to the agreement which was, under the Senate rules, none of its official business. Senator Hale, a big Navy man, did everything possible to develop the worst features of the treaty as a means of drumming up public opposition to its restrictive provisions.

Witnesses grew weary traipsing back and forth between the two committees all week long. Their testimony grew jumbled in the confusion of double hearings. But above the welter of words and figures, the loud police court methods of interrogation used by unfriendly Senators, the first poundings and cane thumpings of vehement witnesses, emerged the definite out lines of a real and important division of opinion on naval policy.

The prime issue that arose at these hearings had to do with the size and gun power of U. S. cruisers under the London Treaty. Congress has authorized the construction of 23 cruisers of 10,000-tons armed with Sin. guns. Of these only two, the Salt Lake City and Pensacola, are constructed and in commission. In addition the Navy has ten 7,500-ton cruisers (Omaha class) armed with 6-in. guns. Under the London Treaty the U. S. would reduce its 8-in. gun cruiser program to 18 vessels, of which only 15 would be actually finished at the expiration of the Treaty in 1936. The U. S. would be allowed 143,500 tons of smaller cruisers of the 6-in. gun class, including the 75,000 tons already in service. That would leave 60,500 tons of cruiser strength to be constructed and armed with 6-in. guns, probably eight vessels of about 8,500 tons each. Though the total cruiser tonnage of Britain and the U. S. in both categories would be almost the same (339,000 to 323,500). Britain would have more small cruisers, the U. S. more large ones. The committee controversy last week involved relative merits of the big 8-in. gun cruiser and the small 6-in. gun cruiser. Since 1926 U. S. naval policy has favored the big cruiser, on the theory that the U. S., lacking naval bases, needed fighters with the maximum offensive cruising radius. The 6-in. gun fires about three times as rapidly as the 8-in., throws a smaller projectile. The question was whether the U. S., by accepting the London Treaty, would not put itself at a disadvantage through a reduction of big cruisers from 23 to 18. This question was answered differently by different witnesses. Secretary of State Stimson, chief of the U. S. delegation to London, insisted that the Treaty gave U. S. '"substantial" naval parity with Britain. Banging the committee table with his fist he defended the 6-in. gun cruisers, declared that the 8-in. gun cruiser, a "vulnerable ship," was overrated as a sea weapon by certain naval experts, made much of the point that Japan would "stand still" on cruiser strength to allow the U. S. to catch up and pass her. He found nothing objectionable in the fact that the U. S. had agreed to a 10-7 instead of a 5-3 ratio with Japan on auxiliary craft. When questioned about the negotiations leading up to the London compromise. Statesman Stimson said he was like "a man with his hand tied behind his back," that he could not answer publicly. Secretary of the Navy Charles Francis Adams, a conference delegate, defended the Treaty as the best obtainable. He went to London, he said, to get 21 big cruisers for the U. S. and relaxed his demand only when it threatened to break up the Conference. ("You always like to get as much as you can.") He upheld the 6-in. gun cruisers as making a "well rounded fleet, declared that under certain close range battle conditions they were as useful as larger craft. Squirming uncomfortably before the hostile Naval Affairs Committee, Secretary Adams declared against building the U. S. fleet up to the full Treaty strength, said Treaty parity would cost the U. S. a billion dollars in new ships, was noncommittal about the large savings President Hoover had hailed as a benefit of the Treaty. Said he of the Treaty Navy: "Our country and its interests will be safe --far safer than those of any other nation." Admiral William Veazie Pratt, commander-in-chief of the U. S. fleet. No. i naval adviser to the U. S. delegation at London, suave, genial, crisp, voiced approval of the Treaty Navy. He admitted that he had once favored only 8-in. gun cruisers but that he had changed his mind. He went into technical explanations to show how the 6-in. gun cruiser could drive off a night destroyer attack where a larger vessel would be helpless. He preferred the smaller gun for all "close-in fighting." though larger weapons were more accurate. Said he: "This Treaty suits me and when I say that I remember the fact that if we had to fight now, I would have to do the fighting. It suits me better to get some of these 6-in. ships than it did to take all eights. . . . The 8-in. gun is a corker where you have clear weather and high visibility . . . but much of the time you have fog and trouble ahead, and under these circumstances I would prefer the 6-in gun."

Rear Admiral Hilary Pollard Jones, retired, went to the London conference as a naval adviser but illness caused his return to the U. S. before 'the Treaty was concluded. Broken in health but still the grim old sea dog battling for the largest possible Navy, he stumped before the Senate committees last week on a heavy cane to protest vehemently against the size of the Treaty Navy. Under no moral obligations as a negotiator to support the London agreement, he contended that it did not give the U. S. parity with Britain. He warned that its terms would "freeze" the U. S. fleet into an inferior position by the time of the next conference in 1935 and allow no room "to veer and haul." At London the Navy's policy on 8-in. gun cruisers was abandoned without a compensating benefit. He could see no use for the small cruisers to cover the long U. S. trade routes through the Pacific. He argued that in event of war with Japan the U. S. would have to carry the fighting into Japanese waters where the enemy strength would be 5 plus to our 5, instead of 7 to 10. He "simply couldn't understand" how Admiral Pratt could find the Treaty good for the Navy. Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, chairman of the Navy's potent policy-making General Board, followed Admiral Jones in condemning the Treaty as unfair and unjust to the fleet. He pointed out that the Board had reluctantly reduced its 8-in. gun cruiser demand from 23 to 21 (as the irreducible minimum) when the U. S. delegation went to London. He denied the Treaty gave U. S. parity, opposed the 10-7 Japanese ratio as a dangerous and unwarranted concession, repeated Admiral Jones' statement about carrying a war into Japanese waters where the U. S. would be at disadvantage. He did admit that as a compromise the General Board would have approved five 6-in. gun cruisers but not eight and recommended that, if the Treaty were approved, not more than five of these smaller vessels be built. He insisted that he was more interested in the principle than he was in the armament of three big cruisers which divided the position of the General Board and the U. S. delegation at London.

As the committee hearing neared its end, Senators hostile to the Treaty began to talk of changes and reservations based on the technical objections of Admirals Jones and Bristol. But even such threats of tangling the pact in new diplomatic coils did not down the widespread opinion that the Senate would ratify the agreement before it went home for the summer.

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