Good Intentions

Three weeks ago President Roosevelt sent a budget message to Congress strongly urging economy and at the same time presenting estimates of revenues and expenditures showing a 1938 deficit of $418,000,000. Contrary to all recent precedent, most Congressmen passed over taxes and expenditures to seize on Economy as the thing which appealed to them most (TIME. May 3). There was still doubt, however, whether the President would drive a reluctant Congress, or the Congress would drive a reluctant President, to the first specific beginnings of Economy. Last week Congressmen gave indications that their good intentions were going to be more obstinate than the President's.

When his Congressional lieutenants left the White House three weeks ago after boldly talking back to the President on the subject of economy, they thought they were leaving him favorably disposed toward Senator Byrnes's proposal of a flat 10% cut in all appropriations except fixed charges (interest on public debt, veterans' pensions, Government contracts). But on the eve of the President's departure for Texas and tarpon, Missouri's Clarence Cannon, the senior member of the House Appropriations Committee, paid a White House visit. Returning to the Capitol, he promptly sponsored a 132-word resolution simply "impounding" 15% of all appropriations for fiscal 1938 and providing that "no amount so impounded and set aside shall be available for obligation unless and until released and restored in whole or in part by the President." Speaker Bankhead promptly spoke up for the proposal, said that the President favored the idea.

The difference between the 10% and 15% proposals was chiefly that the 15% cut looked bigger but was not mandatory and might end up as no saving at all, depending on the President. This was a tempting proposition. Congressmen could take credit for promoting Economy, the President all blame for sinking it. Such was the temper of Congress, however, that Senators Robinson, Byrnes, McKellar and other, less regular, supporters of the Administration came out strongly against it, declaring that they preferred a certain 10% cut (about $350,000,000 net after fixed charges) in the hand, to a possible 15% cut ($1,100,000,000) in the bush. After this Senate backfire, Speaker Bank head announced that he had only assumed that the Cannon proposal had President Roosevelt's approval. His embarrassment was heightened by discovery that under a statute of 1906 the President already has precisely the authority set forth in the Cannon resolution.

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