"Prepare for the Worst"

General George Washington, who survived his share of defeats, laid down a military policy for the U. S. "If we are wise," said he, "let us prepare for the worst." Since then, in 150 years of peace and war, the U. S. people have never faced the worst until it was upon them. Last week, with a peacetime conscription bill due for early passage Congress and public were still excusably confused about what worst they were preparing against.

Paper Soldiers. According to U. S. tradition, the Regular Army would be the nucleus for the citizen Army in war, but in peacetime was itself simply an unemployed police force. This system tended to discourage and demoralize the officers who were its pensioners and victims. If only to keep busy, they constantly fiddled with their paper armies.

In 1930, Chief of Staff Charles Pelot Summerall fixed on 2,000,000 as the proper number for a wartime U. S. Army. His successor, General Douglas MacArthur, in 1931, quoting Washington's advice, upped the figure to 4,000,000, but talked unofficially of up to 10,000,000. When Chief of Staff Malin Craig (1935-39) took over, he decided the MacArthur conception was unpractically high.

First stage of the Craig plan was an

Initial Protective Force of 400,000 Regulars and National Guardsmen, to be the first troops to do actual fighting. Still counting that there would be an interval of several months between a declaration of war and actual fighting, Craig planned to flesh out this force with 330,000 volunteers and conscripts, thus building up a Protective Mobilization Force of 730,000. It would carry on while enough replacements were being trained to raise the active total to 1,000,000 (possibly to 1,550,000).

All these paper plans had three common characteristics: 1) they assumed a step-by-step increase to the wartime maximum; 2) they assumed that this increase would be acquired by conscription, to be voted after war was declared; 3) they had no logical basis, since the U. S. never told its soldiers where and under what conditions they should be prepared to fight.

1940 Plans. The present Chief of Staff, George Catlett Marshall, has had his job a year. In that year a new war, new ways of making war, new and successive enlargements of the Roosevelt theory of Hemisphere Defense have kept General Marshall shifting paws like a cat on a hot stove. Last February he put the procurement of more material ahead of recruiting more men for the Regular Army. Last June, the unofficial but well-informed Army & Navy Journal reported: "The War Department does not look with favor upon proposals to increase the enlisted strength beyond 375,000 men at this time." In July, General Marshall came out publicly for conscription.

Cried Colorado's Senator Alva Adams, chairman of a Senate appropriations subcommittee: "We are dealing here one day with 375,000 [men in the Army], and the next day with 750,000, and then 1,200,000 and then 2,000,000 and then 4,000,000." There may be still more changes--for the laudable reason that the Army is trying to profit by the lessons of this war.

Last week a delegation of top U. S. officers was completing a study of the Battle of Britain and British defenses on the scene of action. They included Air Corps Major General Delos Emmons and two officers who are experts on U. S. war plans: Brigadier General George V. Strong, Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley. Meanwhile General Marshall and his personnel assistant, Brigadier General Shedd, explained to Congress their present plans:

>The initial wartime "Army of the United States" would be an enlarged Mobilization Protective Force of 1,200,000 Regulars, National Guardsmen and conscripts.

>The Army expects to continue recruiting three-year volunteers, even after conscription. Reason: if the Army had to depend solely on either one-year volunteers or conscripts, it would soon cease to have a trained nucleus.

>George Marshall now intends to use the first 400,000 conscripts to flesh out the Regular Army and the National Guard toward 1,200,000, a second 400,000 for replacements and further expansion next spring. "When you pass beyond the second 400,000 you are beginning to get into the system of compulsory training to provide trained reserves." That will begin in the fall of 1941.

Under the recent act authorizing the call of 217,000 National Guardsmen (about 20,000 of the 237,000 now on the rolls would be exempt) and up to 120,000 reserve officers, the President last week called up 60,000 Guardsmen for training beginning Sept. 16. General Marshall announced that he expected he might get enough reserve officers by voluntary methods, in any event would not compel officers below the rank of captain to serve if they have dependents. At 15-to-30-day intervals, the Army plans to make subsequent calls for National Guardsmen and conscripts. The last conscripts on this schedule would be in camp by Jan. 1.

Big If. Said insistent Senator Adams: "In case any enemy attempted a direct assault on us, what number of men would be necessary to repel that direct invasion?" Answered General Marshall:

"The very minimum for the immediate protection of the continental U. S. would be the 1,200,000 ... for the defense of our territory only. . . . [It] is the largest force that can be built on the existing framework of the Regular Army and National Guard and with the utilization of all the material we have on hand and all that we could procure in the immediate future. . . . We are ... confronted with the unfortunate situation of being limited to ... around 1,200,000 because of lack of equipment. . . .

"We cannot tell what final strength will be required. If danger threatens this hemisphere we may require 3,000,000 men, 4,000,000 or more. . . . The force required depends entirely on the extent and determination of the hostile effort. ... If a two-ocean Navy existed at the present time, that would make quite a difference in our situation. But that is a very big 'If.' "

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