Fuel for Franco

Last week Carlton J. H. Hayes, U.S. Ambassador to Fascist Spain (TIME, Feb. 22), told the American Chamber of Commerce in Barcelona that the U.S. has recently sent Spain:

> So much oil and gasoline that stocks in Spain are now "considerably higher than the present per capita distribution to the people of the Atlantic seaboard of the U.S."

> 25,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia--despite shortages at home.

> 10,000 tons of cotton; and Spain could expect "a very noticeable increase."

> War-important coal, cellulose, carbon black, industrial chemicals and foodstuffs.

Spain does not get Lend-Lease aid; its purchases have been financed through a complex series of loans and trade exchanges. Said Hayes: "The U.S. stands ready to continue and extend any help it can to Spain, which itself is doing so much to develop a peace economy that can, and will, carry this country safely into a future period of world peace."

Ambassador Hayes was deliberately making out a case for closer ties between Spain and the U.S., and some of his figures sounded bigger than they actually were (for example, on close examination his statement on gasoline was almost meaningless). But his statements shocked many citizens who remembered that Franco only three months ago specifically declared his admiration for the Axis, his loathing of the democracies, his desire for Axis victory in Europe.

Trade with the Devil. There were explanations. Many of them made immediate sense in much the same way that the military deal in North Africa made sense:

> All the oil and gasoline was shipped to Spain from the Caribbean, was carried solely in Spanish tankers. Because the U.S. lacks tankers, the oil would not have come to the U.S. in any event.

> Responsible U.S. officials are certain, and will continue to make certain, that no oil reaches the Axis war machine from a country swarming with Nazis.

> In return for exports to Spain, the U.S. receives substantial amounts of strategic materials, most important of which are wolfram (for tungsten) and cork.

> No more than two months ago, Franco's troops in Spanish Morocco were enough of a menace to alter Allied military plans in North Africa, definitely hamper preparations for the Tunisian campaign. Now military relations with Spain are much improved and Allied forces have been freed for battle with the Germans. This consideration, more than the less immediate threat of Nazi invasion of Spain, weighed heavily in determining and "justifying" U.S. policy toward Franco.

Military Advocate. A direct result of military dealings with Franco was the presence in Washington of his first ex-Foreign Minister, Colonel Juan Beigbeder (TIME, March 1), former High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco, who is considered to be one of the Allies' few friends in official Madrid. So urgent did the U.S. Government consider its Spanish policy that Beigbeder came to the U.S. as the guest of the War Department. The fact that his reports will presumably go to Franco and the Madrid Government may somewhat limit the information given him.

Colonel Beigbeder talked long with Sumner Welles at the State Department, went with him for a chat with President Roosevelt. Guesses were that Colonel Beigbeder was as interested in U.S. foreign policy as in U.S. military might; that U.S. officials were as interested in what Beigbeder had to say about Spain and Spanish Morocco as they were in showing him the U.S. military plant.

Oil for the Fires? Dictator Franco's first interest up to now has been to stay out of the fighting war, at the same time help Hitler as much as he liked or had to. To what extent, if any, the U.S. concessions had actually altered that policy was a moot question last week. As in other phases of U.S. foreign relations, many factors were as yet unknown to the public. Said the New York Herald Tribune, voicing a prevalent doubt:

"A similar course in the case of Italy and Japan certainly did not prevent those two countries from taking action inimical to American interests when they felt the time was ripe. . . . As in the case of Vichy, the Spanish policy inevitably strengthens a regime which is openly hostile to democracy and which is maintaining a force that is actually fighting one of America's associates (Russia) in the war against Hitler. . . . It remains to be seen whether the oil poured into Spain smooths troubled waters--or adds fuel to the flames of war."

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