Out of the Grave

Isolationism had been pronounced dead by many competent doctors. But it was not dead, just shamming. Last week it was ripping off its winding sheet and making loud speeches--and attracting crowds of listeners. The question it posed: Should the U.S. continue its attempts to shore up allies in Europe and Asia, or should it make itself as strong as possible at home and prepare to stand alone?

Across the Rainbow. The answers at hand formed a rainbow of passionate opinion. On one edge of the spectrum were the old isolationists--the Colonel McCormicks who would defend the U.S. (and possibly Canada) but let the rest of the world go hang. In the next sector were men like ex-Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, who would add South America to the area they would defend. Then came others who would include some Atlantic and Pacific bases as well. Over on the other side of the particolored band were the backers of the policy that (with some disastrous lapses in Asia) had dominated America's conduct in the world since 1940: that the U.S. should seek friends in the world, and pledge them that an attack on them would be considered an attack on the U.S. Beyond that was an even bolder position espoused by such men as Republican Harold Stassen and Democratic Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois--the position that at the next aggressive move by Communists, Russian or satellite, wherever it came, the U.S. should go to war with Russia. In this view the U.S. should stay in Europe, wage an air and sea blockade on Communist China, and take allies where they could be found--Nationalist China's Chiang Kai-shek and his army on Formosa, Generalissimo Francisco Franco and his strategic Spain, Tito and Yugoslavia.

A powerful voice joined in the argument last week; it was the voice of the only living ex-President.

Watchful Waiting. The U.S., said 76-year-old Herbert Hoover in a radio speech to the nation, should, in effect, be prepared to abandon Asia and Europe to Communism, and to build the Western Hemisphere into "the Gibraltar of civilization." It should cut its world commitments down to a cordon of ocean bases--Formosa, the Philippines and Japan in the Pacific, and Britain, "if she wishes to cooperate," in the Atlantic.

"We Americans alone, with sea and air power, can so control the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that there can be no possible invasion of the Western Hemisphere by Communist armies," said he. In Europe, "our policy . . . should be confined to a period of watchful waiting."

The West, he concluded, can never beat Russia on the ground in Europe or Asia. "Any attempt to make war on the Communist mass by land invasion, through the quicksands of China, India or Western Europe, is sheer folly. That would be the graveyard of millions of American boys."

No Appeasement. Mr. Hoover was convinced that the U.S. should get out of Korea, should stiffen its hold on Formosa and the Philippines and give the Japanese independence and arms for defense. It should cut off Western European allies without another dollar or U.S. soldier until they organize and equip combat divisions "of such large numbers as would erect a sure dam against the Red flood."

He would have none of appeasement. "Appeasement," said the ex-President, "contains more dangers than Dunkirk. We want no more Teherans and Yaltas. We can retrieve a battle but we cannot retrieve an appeasement. We are grateful that President Truman has denounced such a course."

Isolationism had become a bad word; most isolationists did not like to be called that. "These policies I have suggested," said Herbert Hoover, "would be no isolationism. Indeed, they are the opposite. They would avoid rash involvement of our military forces in hopeless campaigns. They do not relieve us of working to our utmost . . . We shall not fail in this even if we have to stand alone . . ."

Shading. There was a notable difference between the isolationists of 1950 and the isolationism of a decade before. Then, many isolationists refused even to agree that the Nazis were a menace to the U.S.; this time there were few Americans, outside of the Communists and fellow travelers, who had any doubts about who the enemy was or that he had to be faced somewhere, some time. In the rainbow shadings of opinion, Herbert Hoover's was closer to the center than some, but those who would cut or shorten U.S. ties overseas recognized a man who was generally on their side, and they exulted at his words.

"He exactly expressed my sentiments," said Nebraska's Kenneth Wherry, G.O.P. floor leader in the Senate. "I agree with many of the general principles he states," said Ohio's Bob Taft, now a prime molder of G.O.P. foreign policy in the Senate. Indiana's 100% Isolationist Homer Capehart rejoiced: "I agree with Mr. Hoover 100%." "The people are with him," proclaimed Colonel McCormick's Chicago Tribune. (Its enthusiasm barely exceeded that of the Communist Party's Daily Worker, which appreciatively turned over its big headline type to Hoover's speech.)

The Last, Last Word. Isolationism had come to life again, but it had not come to command. Internationalists in both parties, and such powerful editorial voices as the New York Times, Christian Science Monitor and the Denver Post, entered the debate against Gibraltarism. All of them warned of the danger of abandoning Western Europe and Asia to Russia. Along with Western Europe would go control of the Mediterranean, of the vast oil resources of the Middle East and of the strategic uranium deposits of the Belgian Congo, which are the main source of supply for U.S. A-bombs. With Africa would go excellent bases for South America-bound Soviet bomber fleets. With Asia would go a treasure house of materials and millions of potential soldiers. In a matter of time, it would mean the loss, too, of Japan, factory for the Orient.

Ex-Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, a Republican, called Herbert Hoover's proposal a "counsel of discouragement, despair and defeat." Democratic Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut called it "the most monstrous act of appeasement ever suggested in this country."

Secretary of State Acheson replied: "We are rejecting any policy of sitting quivering in a storm cellar waiting for whatever fate others may wish to prepare for us."

Said General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, soon to leave for Supreme Command of the combined defense army of the U.S. and its eleven North Atlantic allies: "I am convinced that to retire to our own country and wait for the end would bring sure defeat. I see no reason for the U.S. to act in an atmosphere of hysterical fear . . . 150 million Americans cannot be defeated."

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