THE ARGUMENT

General MacArthur's voice had sounded loud & clear. The Administration spoke with three voices, all in general agreement but with different inflections:

How well is the U.S. doing in Korea?

MacArthur: "We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver . . . but could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition . . ."

Truman: "So far, it has been successful. So far... we have prevented aggression from succeeding and bringing on a general war."

Bradley: "Even though it would possibly result.for a time in a military stalemate, we have already achieved an international victory."

Under U.N. restrictions, how can the war end?

MacArthur: "The position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory."

Bradley: "There is no early end in sight. . . Our armed forces will continue [to fight] until conditions permit a political decision to be reached . . . There is every reason to believe that the war in Korea can ultimately be concluded on honorable terms . . ."

Truman: "If the Communist authorities realize they cannot defeat us, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression."

Should the war be carried to China?

MacArthur: Yes. "Once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision."

Truman: No. "We would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war ... We would become entangled in a vast conflict on the Continent of Asia."

Bradley: "Any such direct, unilateral solution to the problem would be militarily unfeasible. . ."

Would extending the war provoke Russia?

MacArthur: "The Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a worldwide basis."

Bradley: "I don't think anybody can guess what 14 guys in the Kremlin would do ... We cannot take the chance of trying to anticipate immediate Communist intentions. We can only determine their capabilities and prepare to meet them. Otherwise ... we would be playing Russian roulette with a gun at our heads."

Acheson: "We usually talk about the rulers of the Soviet Union as though they were always well-informed, cool-headed and calculating. [But Soviet leaders] may be blinded to actual conditions in the outside world by the rigidity of their theory. And, what is even more dangerous . . . they are subject to becoming rattled."

What is our goal in the Far East?

MacArthur: "In war, there is no substitute for victory."

Truman: "We are trying to prevent a third world war."

Is China Russia's stooge?

MacArthur: "[Communist China is] a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia, but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion . . . There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up . . . Their interests are at present parallel with those of the Soviet . . ."

Truman: "The whole Communist imperialism is back of the attack on peace in the Far East . . . They want to control all Asia from the Kremlin."

What about Europe?

MacArthur: "Here [in Asia] we fight Europe's wars with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words ... if we lose the war to Communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it, and Europe most probably would avoid war yet preserve freedom . . . You cannot appease or otherwise surrender to Communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe."

Truman: "[Korea] has given the free world warning and what is vastly more important, time to begin building up its own defenses. We fight for time."

What about our U.N. allies?

MacArthur: No mention of them in his address. In the past, however, he has praised their contributions, but pointed out that they are not large enough.

Acheson: "The major purpose of the Soviet strategy . . . appears to be to isolate us, to weaken the moral strength of our position, to break apart our ties and our allies, and to prevent us from moving ahead together to build the strength on which our safety depends."

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