Diplomatic Front

The Dove's Progress

The word went to U.S. ambassadors at the United Nations and in Moscow: sound out the Russians. At the U.N., the sounding produced only hollow noises. Russia's Jacob Malik, who had floated the first hint of peace, holed up in his Glen Cove mansion, claiming illness. One night he appeared as host at a U.N. dinner, tuxedoed and healthy-looking--but he dodged all questions about a ceasefire.

In Moscow, Ambassador Alan Kirk made the five-minute drive from Spasso House to the Foreign Ministry just outside the Kremlin's walls, and was ushered in for a 20-minute talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Soon after, Alan Kirk's report reached Washington: the Russian peace feeler looked like the real thing.

In fact, it was less a Russian feeler than a reaction to various cease-fire proposals made by Douglas MacArthur and others. Malik and Gromyko made news by hinting that the Reds were finally willing to talk battlefield truce; the Americans had long ago expressed their willingness.

Jangle & Clatter. The news traversed Washington like an electric current. Telephones jangled and teletypes clattered. Limousines drew up before the State Department building and disgorged briefcase-toting diplomats of the 15 nations fighting, with the U.S., in Korea. In map-hung conference room 5105, where they had been meeting twice a week for months to be briefed on the progress of the war, the diplomats were briefed on the progress of the peace negotiations. On the same afternoon--Wednesday--President Truman summoned his National Security Council, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George Marshall and seven other top advisers. Next morning the President made his decision on the next step. He said he was "moderately hopeful" that it would bring peace in Korea. The plan was to have General Matthew Ridgway, as U.N. commander, invite the enemy to a field parley.

By 3 p.m. Friday the details were drawn up. Within three hours, Ridgway was carrying out his instructions. Nearly 100 radio stations beamed his words, in English, Korean and Chinese, to "the Commander in Chief, Communist Forces in Korea."

"... I am informed," said the message, "that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such an armistice. Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative . . ." The meeting, Ridgway suggested, could be held aboard the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia in the harbor off Wonsan, a port 70 miles deep in Communist-held territory.

Then came the waiting. Along the battle lines, fighting slackened. South Korean leaders worried over the prospect of a settlement whjch would leave North Korea in Communist hands. Their legislature had already passed a resolution opposing a cease-fire at the 38th parallel. In Pusan, the powerful National Society staged a street rally and, before waving, hand-clapping Koreans, voted for a fight to the finish, immediate disarmament of North Korean Communists, and "international sanctions" against the aggressors' allies. But elsewhere in the non-Communist world, there was only cautious hope.

Conditions. While they waited, U.S. officials settled on the terms they would present if the Communists agreed to negotiate, and got them approved by all the U.N. allies. Their gist:

P:A cease-fire with provisions for enforcement.

P:Establishment of a 20-mile-deep buffer zone from five miles south of the 38th parallel on the west to a point 15 miles north on the east--roughly paralleling the line now held by the U.N., and requiring the Communists to do the moving back.

P:Agreement that both sides would stick to their demilitarized zones, and that their ships would stay at least three miles off each other's coasts.

P:No more shipments to Korea of war materiel or troops, including "volunteers."

P:An international commission, not necessarily under U.N. (which the Reds maintain has no legal right in Korea), with unrestricted access to all of Korea to supervise the truce.

P:Possibly an exchange of war prisoners. (The U.N. holds about 163,000 Communists; they hold some 10,000 prisoners, mostly Americans.)

Every Asiatic listening post in Allied hands was tuned to Communist wavelengths. But as the weekend ticked away the silence was broken only by discouraging sounds. The Peking radio slapped at Ridgway for acting like "a victor calling upon the other side to surrender." A few more hours passed; a still more disturbing noise: the words of General Chu Teh, commander in chief of all Red Chinese forces. "Unless American aggressors are withdrawn from Korea," he said, "there is no way out." Was that to be the enemy's answer?

The world did not have to wait long before Radio Peking crackled to life again. It was 11 o'clock Sunday night in Tokyo, 9 Sunday morning in Washington--just 39 hours after Ridgway's invitation. "Important news from the Korean front!" said the voice.

"General Ridgway, commander in chief of United Nations forces: Your statement . . . concerning peace talks has been received. We agree to meet your representative for conducting talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace. We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the 38th parallel. If you agree, our representatives are prepared to meet your representative between July 10 and 15, 1951."

The acceptance was signed, as the U.N. had hoped it would be, by commanders of both the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists--fat, sleepy-eyed Kim II Sung, Communist boss of North Korea and commander in chief of its army, and close-cropped General Peng Teh-huai, deputy commander in chief of Chinese Communist forces and commander of the Chinese "Volunteer" Forces in Korea.

By Helicopter or Jeep. With what could be described only as calm exuberance, the West put the enemy's words under its microscopes, examined every phrase, studied every comma. The enemy had, as anticipated, come back with his own meeting place--probably to demonstrate that he was also in a position to call part of the tune. But that did not alarm the West. Kaesong was venerable to the Koreans and had, centuries ago, been their capital. Now a ruin in a shell of aged city walls, it stood in a no man's land between U.N. and Communist positions.

Ridgway accepted Kaesong as the meeting place, shrewdly tried to hurry the Reds as to the date of the meeting. His answer to their reply: GENERAL KIM IL SUNG: GENERAL PENG TEH-HUAI:

I have received your reply to my message of 30 June.

I am prepared for my representatives to meet yours at Kaesong on July 10, or at an earlier date if your representatives complete their preparations before that date.

Since agreement on armistice terms has to precede cessation of hostilities, delay in initiating a meeting and in reaching agreement will prolong the fighting and increase the losses.

To insure efficient arrangement of the many details connected with the first meeting, I propose that not to exceed three of my liaison officers have a preliminary meeting with an equal number of yours in Kaesong July 5 or as soon thereafter as practicable.

If you concur, my liaison officers, the senior officer of whom will not be above the rank of colonel will depart Kimpo Airfield southwest of Seoul by helicopter at 2300 G.M.T. on July 4 (6 p.m. E.S.T. July 4) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting, proceeding direct to Kaesong.

In the event of bad weather, these officers will proceed in a convoy of three unarmed quarter ton trucks. The trucks, commonly known as jeeps, will proceed along the main road from Seoul to Kaesong.

The convoy will cross the Imjin River on the Seoul-Kaesong road at about 2300 hours G.M.T. 4 July (6 p.m. E.S.T. July 4) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon to this meeting.

The convoy bearing your liaison officers will be granted immunity from attacks by my forces, providing you advise me of its route and its schedule and the manner by which my forces may identify it.

Your reply is requested.

(Signed) M. B. RIDGWAY, General U.S. Armies, Commander in Chief U.N. Command.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.