"We Are Losing"

Is the U.S. gaining or losing in its struggle against world Communism?

Before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee last week, Bernard Baruch, mobilization authority in two world wars, gave his considered answers: "We are losing. No decisive victory in the cold war is possible as long as the Soviets hold as terrifying an edge in military readiness over the West as they do today . . ."

Baruch thus put his finger on the vague, wishful and widely held notion that the U.S. is steadily overtaking Russia's military head start. In effect, said Elder Statesman Baruch, the U.S. is complacently counting birds in the bush where it should be after birds in the hand. "Since the outbreak in Korea, more than roo billions have been appropriated for defense--an enormous sum. Why has it produced proportionately so little in the way of actual weapons? . . .

The Stretch-Out. The Truman Administration's stretch-out of defense-production goals, warned Baruch, may prove an invitation to disaster. "Far from slowing down, our security requires that we step up our defenses both in speed and scale . . . The whole defense program should be reviewed to determine whether too heavy an emphasis has not been placed on building new facilities and too little on turning out weapons . . . No aggressor was ever stopped by blueprints . . ."

Witness Baruch was ready to agree that the rearmament program must guard against "obsolescence" and strive constantly to improve weapons. But concern with this factor--the bird in the bush--seemed to him to be blotting out the need for the U.S. to build up an overwhelming stockpile of guns and ammunition. Such an arsenal, if occasion arose, could supply peoples everywhere on the long Russian border, help pin down the Soviet armies, contribute decisively to the chances for peace.

Calculated or Unwarranted? Among Baruch's recommendations for a safer, swifter mobilization:

P: "A driving production authority" within the armed services to decide on weapon designs and get output going at top speed.

P: A congressional inquiry to find out what "our actual production of munitions is," and whether the stretch-out is a "calculated risk" or an exposure of the nation to "unwarranted danger."

P: A return to the goal of 143 air wings by mid-1954 instead of late 1955 or 1956.

P: A stepping-up of other munitions schedules to provide "a sizable reserve of weapons, considerably in excess of our own troop requirements."

"Our highest military authorities," said Baruch, "have stated . . . that from now through 1954 will be the period of maximum peril . . . Yet we deliberately are doing less than we can to achieve readiness by that date. Nowhere have I seen any justifiable reason offered for such recklessness . . ."

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