A Start Is Made

The West's defensive cordon against Soviet aggression starts at the Arctic Ocean, sweeps down across Western Europe to the Mediterranean and into Turkey. There, in the vicinity of Mount Ararat, the West's defenses end--and Soviet opportunity begins. An offensive rolling through Iran and on to Iraq 120 miles away might easily overrun the West's advanced air bases at Habbaniya (Iraq) and Dhahran (Saudi Arabia). It might also outflank Turkey and open the back door to Europe.

The old deterrents to Russian ambitions in the Middle East--the Ottoman Empire (before World War I) and the Indian army operating as the "Imperial Reserve" behind British and French strength (before World War II)--are not what they were. What remains--one division of the British-officered Arab Legion and two British divisions in the Suez Canal Zone--would be toothpicks in the torrent. (Britain, moreover, is negotiating to quit the Zone.) The Arab states are divided against each other and divided within, more scared of Israel, and more resentful of Britain, than of Russia.

The Thin Chain. Last week, for the first time, the West seemed to be on the way to closing the gap. The method: a thin chain of defense positions across the Middle East's northern perimeter, to be built piece by piece in separate pacts between the U.S. and the states of Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Later, if Iran gets hold of itself internally, it would become another link. So would Afghanistan.

This project does not even have an official name; it was not even announced, only leaked. Its existence means that the West's original, highly touted but overadvertised MEDO (Middle East Defense Organization) is dead. MEDO, in fact, was stillborn. In November 1951 the U.S., Britain, France and Turkey proposed a Middle East Command as a kind of eastern extension of NATO, complete with blueprints for bases, armies and fleets, and a headquarters at Cyprus. It had everything, in fact, but the support of the people most concerned.

To begin with, the West did not even bother to consult Egypt, the biggest Arab state, in advance. Egypt at that time was rioting against the British in the Suez, and it immediately decided that the MEDO scheme was just a clever British trick to perpetuate imperialism. Moreover, disregarding the fact that the Arabs and Israelis were still technically at war, it was proposed that they sit down together at headquarters and swap secrets. The plan was hastily revised to answer objections, but again was spurned by the Arabs.

Countries Willing. Last May, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, touring the area in search of allies, arrived in Saudi Arabia, a dusty, disillusioned man. He had found the Arab world fragmented by fears and quarrels. In Riyadh, Dulles got the advice he needed from the dying old desert King, Ibn Saud. Arabs, explained Ibn Saud, would never agree to MEDO. They detest legalistic documents so crammed with fine print and annexes "as to resemble a telephone book."

Dulles began seeking informal agreements. In Iraq he found the Foreign Ministry anxious for U.S. military assistance. In Pakistan he was asked for arms. In Ankara he discovered the Turks worrying about their eastern flank. Dulles concluded that help must not be thrust on those who do not want it, but concentrated on "those countries which want strength." No longer would the U.S. have to wait on the least interested nations.

By last week, without trumpet call or handout, the plan was under way. Leaders of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are preparing to visit Pakistan. Shortly, the U.S. is expected to approve the first arms shipments to Pakistan.

India's Nehru, determined to be neutralist, and also unwilling to see his hated neighbor Pakistan strengthened, had deliberately set out to organize Indian opinion against both the U.S. and Pakistan (TIME, Jan. 4). Last week that campaign was moderating. But in Cairo, India's suave, fellow-traveling Ambassador Sardar K. M. Panikkar was trying to stir up the Egyptian battle against the idea, and working to prevent the British and Egyptians from settling their Suez differences. He was skillfully opposed by Pakistan's representative Tayeb Hussein, who, when Britain and Egypt seem on the verge of a break, has a way of getting the negotiators back together again over his friendly dinner table.

Privately, Egypt's ruling military leaders admit that the defense perimeter is a good idea, and might protect Egypt in the future. They are not so unrealistic about Russia as is Nehru. Regardless of Egyptian hesitations and Indian hostility, the U.S. has decided to get on with its policy of strengthening those anti-Communist nations who want to be made strong.

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