TAFT-HARTLEY CHANGES

It's a Fight Between Professionals

EVERY day," said bombastic John L. Lewis, "I have a matutinal indisposition that emanates from the nauseous effluvia of that oppressive slave statute." Lewis was, of course, referring to the Taft-Hartley Act, which other labor leaders have more simply branded a union-wrecker. Just as the Wagner Act was passed at a time when business was in disrepute, so Taft-Hartley was passed as a result of the excesses of organized labor. But Co-Author Bob Taft thought the act far from perfect, later suggested more than a dozen amendments. Last year congressional committees took 7,000 pages of testimony on proposed changes in the 30-page act; none was made, and Secretary of Labor Martin Durkin resigned in a huff as a result. Now President Eisenhower has suggested 15 amendments and the political storm is blowing again.

One reason that other attempts to change Taft-Hartley have made little progress is that the battle, as Labor Secretary James Mitchell says, is between "professionals on both sides." For management, the leading professionals are members of the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. For labor, the leader is John Lewis, who pulled his mine workers out of the A.F.L. (for the second time) after it declined to boycott the act. It was also Lewis who was most hurt by the act when the U.M.W. was fined $1.4 million for refusing to obey a no-strike injunction issued under Taft-Hartley.

Other big unions apparently have not been hurt by Taft-Hartley. But it probably has hit some weak unions. Under Taft-Hartley, workers striking for economic reasons -may not vote in plant elections. Hence, an employer can hire non-union workers, hold an election and exclude the striking workers. Dwight Eisenhower views this as a "union busting" license, and wants to prohibit such votes until the strike is at least four months old. Even so, there is little solid evidence of Taft-Hartley's overall effects, good or bad.

Many unionists privately concede that Taft-Hartley is far from oppressive or anti-union despite its concessions to employers. It bans the closed shop and jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts (i.e., strikes against one employer to win concessions from another), and gives employers the right to argue against unionism with their employees. But it also bans company unions, specifically allows the union shop, permits labor (as well as management) to sue for damages if a contract is broken.

Some Taft-Hartley provisions, designed to modify the Wagner Act, have little effect because they are unenforceable or simply ignored. Hence, some of the proposed changes would simply bring the law in line with reality. The closed-shop ban, for example, has been ignored, notably in the construction, maritime and amusement trades where the unions have the labor market sewed up. The Administration wants to permit a virtual closed shop in these industries. When a firm handles work for a struck company, the union obviously has a grievance--and in such cases Eisenhower would legalize secondary boycotts.

The President's most controversial proposal is that the Government should hold secret polls of employees on whether they want to strike. Since most unions already conduct such polls on their own, C.I.O. President Walter Reuther was affronted. He labeled the plan "the most vicious strikebreaking weapon ever devised." Actually most labor specialists agree that the plan would be costly, unwieldy and no help to collective bargaining. And it would get the Government deeper into disputes, instead of getting it out, which is Ike's avowed policy.

The strike vote proposal reflects the belief that workers would often vote against their union leaders if they had the chance. But while such a regulation was in effect for essential industries during the war. the Government conducted 2,285 strike polls in such companies as Goodyear, General Motors and Wright Aeronautical, found that in most (85%) employees voted to strike. Instead of making for quicker settlement, the polls served (in workers' eyes) as a sort of Government approval, tended to solidify the opposing battle lines.

One big reason that Taft-Hartley has not stirred up more rank & file protest is that prosperity has been high and unemployment low since the act was passed in 1947. It has remained unamended because it was originally passed by overwhelming bipartisan majorities, and, until recently, liberally interpreted by a Democrat-controlled NLRB. Furthermore, labor leaders wanted outright repeal. Though the labor leaders have since changed their tune, the Taft-Hartley fight remains a battle of the professionals. And like old pros who have been through all this before, they may well let the battle die--and Congress will feel no need to change the act.

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