Monday, Mar. 22, 1954
Success at Caracas
John Foster Dulles flew home from Caracas last week with another diplomatic triumph: the first Western Hemisphere agreement that gives real promise of stopping Communist infiltration in the Americas. For three tense hours, delegates to the Tenth Inter-American Conference had voted clause by clause on the U.S. anti-Communist resolution, a state paper that went well beyond the vague and timid declarations of earlier conferences. After the 51st ballot, Secretary of State Dulles allowed himself a pleased smile. Final vote: 17 to 1 for the U.S. proposal.
Dulles had gone to Caracas fresh from Berlin, filled in on hemisphere affairs with force-fed haste. He was aware that most Latin delegates considered anti-Communist measures uninteresting at best, interventionist at worst. Because economic aid to Latin America (e.g., loans and tariff advantages) is largely out of State Department hands, he had little to trade. But Dulles pushed ahead with what he had: a strong will, well-reasoned answers to all objections and long experience ("I have been attending international conferences since early in the century," he said).
Warning to Despots. The U.S. proposal was that "the domination . . . of the political institutions of any American state by the international Communist movement . . . would call for a consultative meeting [of the hemisphere's nations] to consider the adoption of measures in accordance with existing treaties." Guatemala, where Reds already run such governmental institutions as social security and the land-reform program, took to itself the role of martyr and chief opposer of the measure. Fewer than 15 favorable votes, delegates agreed, would mean psychological defeat for the U.S.; at midweek, only ten were on record favoring the measure.
The U.S. offered to call a special meeting of the American nations in Washington (date unspecified) to talk economic aid--without changing the tally. Mexico and Argentina were openly fighting the resolution, seemingly fearful that it ultimately meant intervention. Dulles made a last heartfelt argument.
"Our United States proposal is a foreign policy declaration directed to the Soviet despots who operate the subversive apparatus of international Communism," he said. "We would warn them that we are aware of their design, that we oppose it and that they cannot hope to gain a real success within this hemisphere. All past threats have been tea parties compared to this one." The Secretary then amended his resolution, spelling out that it was directed at "dangers originating outside this hemisphere." Most of the holdouts, notably Uruguay, swung to the U.S. side--although Mexico and Argentina in the end chose not to vote at all.
Target: Guatemala. "We went along with the U.S. because it has sacrificed blood and treasure in the fight against Red aggression and it wanted the resolution badly," said one delegate. "If we did not agree, the U.S. might resort to unilateral action. That would be far worse." The meaning of the Caracas resolution is precisely that it calls for joint action.
In practice, any one of the hemisphere's foreign offices can now legally call a dangerous Communist penetration in another nation to the attention of the Organization of American States. The O.A.S. will investigate, and may summon all nations to consultation. By a two-thirds vote, the nations may take whatever action (e.g., admonitions, economic sanctions or sterner measures) seems advisable.
Against whom? Last week's vote suggested a possible first peril point. Only Guatemala voted against the doctrine. Said Dulles, just before taking off for Washington an hour after the final ballot : "The fact that one American nation voted against the resolution shows how necessary it was that the conference should have acted as it did. Now, of course, we shall have the task of assuring that the enemies of freedom do not move into the breach which has been disclosed in our ranks."
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