Area of Maneuver

For nearly two weeks--until the National Assembly dispersed for vacation--France's canny Foreign Minister Georges Bidault kept a document locked up in his desk. Then, one day last week, he took out the paper, got Premier Laniel to summon the Cabinet to consider it. It contained Britain's terms for "associating" with the proposed European Defense Community, an association which Paris demanded as one of three major preconditions to France's final decisions on EDC.

The ministers assembled with grumbles, angry about the short notice and the little time to study the terms. Bidault briskly got down to business: "We have received satisfaction on one of the three preconditions. The government must now engage itself on this point."

"Replace Me." Immediately, the leader of the Gaullists in Laniel's Cabinet objected. "The government is not entitled to sign an agreement which implies effective creation of EDC" protested Edouard Corniglion-Molinier. The Minister of Overseas Territories supported him: "I consider the British terms hollow."

"It is absurd to ask the Russians to help us in settling the Indo-China conflict if we slap their faces before Geneva," said Radical-Socialist Edgar Faure, the Finance Minister. "I am hostile toward any initiative before the Geneva Conference."

A rasp slipped into Georges Bidault's calm voice. "Indo-China is not one of the preconditions [to EDC approval]. If you want to construe it to be one, then you must replace me as a Foreign Minister."

The discourse grew louder, more ill-tempered. Half the ministers were on their feet at once; the several Gaullists and so-called "dissident Gaullists" huddled in a corner to consider whether to withdraw from the Laniel government, which would almost certainly bring it down. Corniglion-Molinier came back to the table and asked for a recess until 5 p.m. so that the matter might be discussed with party leaders. "Not even five minutes!" snapped Bidault. "This text must be signed today, because it must be presented to the House of Commons before it goes on holiday."

Had the Cabinet voted its mind, Bidault might well have been beaten, but in France it is not customary to take a vote in Cabinet meetings. Instead, Premier Laniel nodded to Bidault. Bidault left the room, telephoned France's representative to sign the formal agreements by which Great Britain will blend some of its military forces with the European Army while retaining full control over their use and disposition (see box}. That took care of Precondition No. 1.

"Partners Without Responsibilities." This sudden, uncompromising maneuver was part of little Georges Bidault's attempt to keep a promise he made to John Foster Dulles: before going off to Geneva, he would get a date set for France's too-long-postponed parliamentary decision on EDC. Three days later, Laniel announced that on May 18 he would formally ask the National Assembly's steering committee to set an "early" debate on EDC, perhaps May 25--if all three of Paris' preconditions are met by then.

A few hours later (by similar pre-arrangement). Precondition No. 2 was also met. From U.S. Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon came the text of the U.S. pledge to keep troops on the Continent so long as the threat to Western Europe continues (see box).

The American and British pledges did not materially add to what the two governments had long made plain they intended to do. But the British pledge of actual participation in the European Army's working was designed to reassure the many Frenchmen who fear that otherwise, the efficient Germans will use it to dominate the French. And the U.S. promise was explicit enough to combat the fear of U.S. withdrawal, which has been strong in France ever since Defense Secretary Charles Wilson's too-casual talk about pulling U.S. ground forces away from the Continent (TIME, Nov. 2).

The promises were hardly enough to convert the enemies of EDC, but they were enough to blunt some of their arguments. There remained Precondition No. 3: a settlement with West Germany of the future of the Saar. West German Chancellor .. Konrad Adenauer, bucking strong feelings at home, is going more than halfway to meet French demands for economic control of the German-speaking Saar. But it will be difficult to achieve agreement by May 18, giving Laniel an excuse for more delay if he wants it.

The grumblings and rumblings in French political circles made plain, however, that the week's maneuverings had pushed France's day of decision closer. "It would have been impossible for me to go to Geneva . . . without at least a decision as to the date," said Bidault. "If the outcome had been different, I should have preferred to resign."

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.