Bluff or Backdown?

The two great allies of the West spent the week in mutual recriminations. In the U.S., the charge was made that Britain had let the West down. The British retorted that only British steadiness and wisdom had saved the allies from hasty, dangerous and useless action. Even London's Economist observed: "If American opinion has the impression that Mr. Dulles' boldness is always being curbed by Britain's timidity, it is largely his fault for starting off with big talk and then coming down to less big doing . . ."

The truth was not as clear-cut as either side would have it. What happened:

P: The U.S. was caught napping with faulty intelligence and overconfident estimates from the French. Not until General Paul Ely, chief of staff of the French armed forces, flew to Washington in late March did the U.S. Chiefs of Staff realize how serious France's plight in Indo-China was. Ely told them for the first time that the French might lose Dienbienphu, and with it, the whole of Viet Nam. JCS Chairman Admiral Radford left Ely with the impression that he personally was ready and willing to send in carrier planes if the French asked for them.

P: A few days later, Dulles issued his call for "united action." What he actually envisioned was a show of united determination to give the West bargaining strength at Geneva to offset Dienbienphu. By the time the news got out from London and Paris (through Foreign Office and Quai D Orsay leaks), Dulles' plan and his later warning that Chinese intervention was coming "awfully close" to direct intervention had become something else. In the British and French press, the plan, coupled with the memory of threats of "massive retaliation," grew to an "ultimatum." The British began to see visions of H-bombs dropping on London.

P: On Sunday, April 4, the French held an emergency Cabinet meeting, asked U.S. Ambassador Douglas Dillon whether the U.S. could help Dienbienphu with carrier-plane strikes. The U.S. refused, explained that such intervention could only be taken within some framework of "united action." The French were surprised, particularly as they knew that six U.S. carriers had been moved into the Gulf of Tonkin.

P: April 11-14: Dulles flew to London, talked to the British about a broad defense pact in Southeast Asia, looking toward direct intervention in Indo-China if needed. The British were reluctant to act before Geneva, and Dulles could not guarantee the British that the U.S. itself would go ahead; he could only say that, if the British agreed on "united action," he would be able to ask Congress. The British agreed only to "examine the possibility." The French took somewhat the same attitude, though they still talked of an air strike. As Laniel explained last week: "All solutions which might help a local situation, that of Dienbienphu, were studied, [but] we refused before the Geneva Conference to accept solutions which might risk a generalized conflict."

P: April 21: Dulles returned to Paris for pre-Geneva talks with Bidault and Eden. Two days later, a cable arrived from Indo-China which the British privately refer to as "Navarre's panic cable." Navarre said Dienbienphu was on the verge of falling, could be saved only by heavy air support either from the U.S. or Britain. Dulles again rejected the appeal both because it would be "war," which Congress would have to approve, and because U.S. military experts doubted that air strikes could now save the fortress. Bidault seemed to have got the idea from Dulles that congressional approval might still be obtained if only Britain would agree to some form of "united action." Eden told Bidault that the British considered that air strikes would be impractical and might prejudice hope of a Geneva settlement, but that he would consult the Cabinet. He made a hurried trip back to London to be sure and was unanimously supported by the Cabinet and British military men. Bidault was anxiously waiting at Orly airfield when Eden got back from London. "Bidault looked as if he had been hit by something," said an eyewitness.

At that late hour, planes could not have saved Dienbienphu. But by publicly demanding something their allies could not deliver and had never promised, the French made it appear that the U.S. had been bluffing, and the bluff had been called.

P: The day after the Geneva Conference started on April 26, Churchill made his flat announcement that Britain was "not prepared to give any undertakings" until after Geneva. This, in the view of U.S. diplomats, was a backdown on the agreement to "examine the possibility," and cut the ground from under the West at a critical moment. The British retorted that Churchill had tacitly pledged military action after Geneva--if the fighting continued or if the settlement was breached.

P: The British argued, to the exasperation of the U.S., that a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization could not succeed without the backing of the Asian countries of the Commonwealth, particularly India. (Snapped one observer: "If the U.S. cannot take strong action without the approval of the British Parliament, and the British cannot act without the approval of Nehru, Western policy will be immobilized.") Last week Nehru told the British his decision: he was willing to associate in an Asian defense pact if everybody else joined too. By everybody Nehru apparently meant Communist China, and perhaps Russia as well:--a plan about as useful as penning up wolves with sheep. Belatedly, British foreign officials conceded that SEATO would have to get along without Nehru.

Last week there were signs that recriminations between the allies were dying down and new ways of getting together were being sought. De Castries' last stand had stirred Britain's admiration. Wrote London's influential Daily Telegraph: "The local lesson of Dienbienphu is that the Red Delta must be defended, not abandoned." Added the Spectator: "The fact that Britain and the U.S. ... decided not to attempt the virtually impossible--the relief of Dienbienphu--does not mean that they should refuse to attempt the possible--the effective defense of large remaining areas of Indo-China."

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