As Others See Us

Relations between the Western allies are at one of their low postwar points. What unity there is was born of irresolution rather than resolution, of recognition of common danger rather than agreement on common action.

In Britain, the very failure of U.S. plans for "united action" brought a sense of relief. The Times of London was notably pleased, and seemed to have made a discovery for itself, to wit, that the Americans are not wicked warmongers, after all.

"One immensely important factor which has been all too often ignored in recent years seems at last to have come into its own on Capitol Hill," pontificated the Times. "American opinion, in spite of the cold war, in spite of its profound antiCommunism, is still firmly pacific, and, far from straining at the leash, will fight only when all reasonable chances of negotiation have failed. Peace is still, as in Jefferson's day, the American people's passion . . . By rejecting premature commitments in Indo-China, public opinion has overtaken the party cries."

In better-informed publications there was recognition that Britain had also contributed its bit to confusion among the allies. The weekly Spectator blamed equally"Mr. Dulles' tendency to underestimate the diplomatic difficulties of a strong policy, President Eisenhower's unwillingness to give a courageous lead," and "Sir Winston Churchill's determination to stake everything on high-level international meetings, the unwillingness of the British government to back the undoubtedly clumsy but fundamentally sound basic American policy of firmness in the face of all Communist maneuvers."

In Western Germany, dismay at the U.S. performance touched off a spate of statements urging direct negotiations with the Russians. In the German view, Dulles went to Geneva with both hands tied behind his back by Congress, and left looking like the small boy who takes the bat and ball home because he is not allowed to pitch. Wrote TIME'S Bonn correspondent: "The U.S. is Bonn's godfather; Bonn expects it to lead the infant Federal Republic out into the world. But daily the U.S. seems more lost itself."

In India, officials were rosily pleased to see the U.S. forced into a secondary role at Geneva. Nehru told his Parliament that a real model for Asian agreements was his new pact with China, in which India meekly accepted the Red Chinese conquest of its northern neighbor, Tibet. Nehru made clear to those who had missed the point over the years that India was not ready to join any alliance to resist Communist expansion.

But in strongly anti-Communist Hong Kong, Formosa and Korea, there was concern that the U.S. was hobbled by its own allies in talking of a European-based Asian alliance or one including India, Indonesia or Burma. In their view, the U.S. should base Pacific defense on smaller but more enthusiastic allies: South Korea, Formosa, Thailand, the Philippines.

Cabled TIME'S Senior Editor John Osborne from Hong Kong: "America's problem in Asia is to make Asians feel that it is safe to be non-Communist or antiCommunist. Our intervention in Korea made millions of Asians feel that it was safe to be antiCommunist, and thereby started a great turn against Communism. Our present demonstration of unwillingness and unreadiness to make non-Communism safe in Indo-China has impaired Asian confidence in America and in the practicality of being on America's side. But the overwhelming, though negative, preference of Asia still is not to be Communist. What is required to turn this negative into a mighty positive is an early demonstration that it is safe to be for us, and against our enemies."

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