Time of Decision

Out of the strategy conferences in Washington and into the headlines across the U.S. boiled an urgent question: Will the U.S. soon be at war again?

The question arose from a new military estimate of the situation in the Far East. U.S. leaders are convinced that the Chinese Communists are about to attack the offshore islands now held by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. The Reds are expected to hit the Matsu group between April 15 and April 30, the Quemoys a month or so later. To inform and prepare the Congress and the people, the White House this week scheduled a series of bipartisan conferences on the danger and the problems the new estimate presents.

Unpleasant Alternatives. The estimate of Communist intent is based on an observable military buildup and on corroborating intelligence from top-secret sources. On the China mainland facing Quemoy, the Reds are moving into revetted positions heavy artillery of 155 mm. and up. There are some 250 observable positions along a semicircle at point-blank ranges of from 2 1/2 to five miles. At Foochow, the jump-off point for a Matsu invasion, the buildup is also apparent.

From Chiang Kai-shek the U.S. Government has had clear notice that the Nationalists will defend Matsu and Quemoy at all cost. On-the-spot military observers give Chiang little or no hope of holding the offshore islands against Red invasion without U.S. intervention. Matsu, although farther from the mainland "than Quemoy, is considered more vulnerable because of its small size (roughly 7 sq. mi.). On Matsu Chiang has one regular division, all the troops (10,000) the island will accommodate efficiently. Dug in on Quemoy's 70 sq. mi. are about 50,000 Nationalist regulars, one-fifth of Chiang's entire effective ground force.

Dwight Eisenhower must make the final agonizing decision on what to do. Among many choices he has three major alternatives, none of them pleasant:

P:Quemoy and Matsu can be left to Chiang's forces, with the U.S. maintaining a static defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. U.S. land-based and carrier air power would fend off Red bombing attacks on Formosa, might possibly pursue the attackers to their bases. This alternative accepts the loss of Matsu and Quemoy.

P:The U.S. could limit itself to local tactical action aimed at stopping the invasion of Quemoy and Matsu. Both Quemoy and Matsu lie so close offshore that U.S. naval and air operations would be severely restricted in effectiveness. Fleets of Red junks assembled and launched by night might unload their troops before U.S. sea and air forces could stop them. Even in the face of this sort of U.S. intervention, the Communists might win.

P: The U.S. could launch, general tactical action that would not only smash the invasion but blunt Red China's air power, communications system and expanding industrial plant for the foreseeable future. Under this alternative atomic weapons would be used against the Chinese mainland, although great care would be exercised to avoid indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations.

Some diplomats in Washington think that the Chinese Communists, for diplomatic reasons, will not attack before the Afro-Asian conference, which begins in Bandung, Indonesia on April 18. But that would only delay the day. Some military men hope that a firm, public U.S. determination to defend the islands will call the Communists to a halt. But that is only a hope.

Watching Millions. It is an old and constantly more crucial problem that stands before the President of the U.S. If he decides to defend the islands, some U.S. allies (and some U.S. citizens) will immediately cry that a little war will inevitably lead to a big war, a non sequitur that is being pounded home in speeches, editorials and sermons in spite of the world's experience with restricted wars (including Korea) since the end of World War II. If he decides to use atomic weapons, which the military now regards as standard pieces in the modern-weapons arsenal, the same objectors will predict that a hydrogen holocaust will inevitably follow. Despite Red China's fanatical aggressiveness, the best U.S. intelligence is that the Communists are not ready for World War III.

The other side of the President's problem is the danger that lies in another retreat. If the U.S. bows before Communist aggression again, the watching Asian millions may finally decide that the U.S. is, as Red China has charged, merely a paper tiger, of no value as a friend and ally. In Asia, where strength and determination are so important, that could mean the loss not only of the offshore islands but eventually of Formosa and of all Asia.

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