The "FRENCH PRESENCE" in NORTH AFRICA

Newsman Raymond Aron at 50 is France's No. 1 commentator. A university professor until World War II, he joined General Charles de Gaulle in London, edited the Free French newspaper La France Libre. Since 1947 he has been chief columnist for the conservative Le Figaro, has proved himself a sturdy friend of the U.S., a lucid opponent of Marxism, a devastating critic of neutralism. In this article, written for TIME, he states the French case in North Africa.

There is no subject on which French and American opinion splits so sharply as on that of colonies in general and North Africa in particular.

From the American point of view, the French presence in North Africa is an example of colonialism, therefore deplorable and fit to be damned. And the Frenchman, meeting this summary damnation, has a tendency to answer that colonialism would have existed in America had the Indian population been encouraged instead of blighted by contact with the white invaders.

Let us drop these sterile arguments and try to understand the two major arguments of French opinion.

The Accomplishments

The first is that, almost unanimously--left and right, conservative and fellow traveler--French opinion does not admit that it has anything to be ashamed of in North Africa. Items:

P: Tunisia had 1,500,000 inhabitants in 1881; it has 3,500,000 today.

P: In Algeria, the population increased from about 2,500,000 a century ago to about 9,500,000 today.

P: Except for Lebanon (which twelve years ago was a French mandate), "colonized" Tunisia has a higher density of paved roads and highways than any Arab country in the Middle East, more telephones per inhabitant, probably more hospital beds.

The second French argument is that any oversimplified solution, any sudden and total "liberation," would not resolve the .immense problems of North Africa. The departure of the French would inevitably precipitate chaos. The French minority of North Africa--1,000,000 in Algeria, 270,000 in Tunisia, 360,000 in Morocco--have contributed a share in the economic and cultural development of the country which is disproportionate to their numbers. In general, farming methods are more modern and profits are higher on lands cultivated by French colons. Emigration of Frenchmen might precipitate the collapse of the country's resources at a moment when the pressure of growing population is particularly strong; the handing over of all power to an improvised government might touch off an emigration which everyone wishes to avoid.

Beyond these arguments, which are self-evident to French eyes, there are the criticisms of what the French have failed to accomplish, and disagreements on measures which must be taken.

Population Pressures

In North Africa, as in most underdeveloped countries, the increase in population has outstripped that of natural resources, because medical progress has moved faster than economic progress. The birth rate has not increased, but the death rate has diminished. France has never stopped investing heavily in North Africa, especially since the war. In Algeria, the first four-year equipment plan represented a total of $728 million; the second foresees an expenditure of $820 million. But during the first plan, it is estimated that the population increased by 9% and production by 10%. The standard of living, therefore, remained approximately the same.

To assure a higher standard of living, we must spend at least $285 million more. Continental France finances about three-fourths of this special budget. For the whole of Africa, investment expenditures now approach the neighborhood of $570 million. They should be increased by about 50% to 100% in order to ensure a rise in the standard of living.

Tne Stir or Nationalism

The population pressure is not the only cause of political conflicts, but it inevitably aggravates the conflicts which colonialism creates all by itself, even in a successful union. The French minority--colons, civil servants, shopkeepers, industrialists--are privileged in comparison to the mass of the native population. The revolt of the masses against the privileged classes, inevitable in all underdeveloped countries, is often directed against colonizers and takes a nationalist accent.

So do the aspirations of the cultivated minorities, hesitating between their traditional Moslem culture and religion on one hand, and the Western culture brought by France on the other. Their nationalistic feelings are increased, exacerbated, when their young university graduates have trouble finding work suited to their talents, and, as a consequence, feel that they have been exiled from their native land. There are too many places filled by Frenchmen in the Tunisian and Moroccan bureaucracies which could be filled by natives.

But opening wide the doors of administration to North African youth would not be enough to satisfy nationalist aspirations. The crux of the question is to find out if these aspirations can be satisfied progressively in friendly collaboration with the French, or satisfied only in conflict with them. The conviction of the majority of French opinion is that this progressive transformation is possible. And the example of Tunisia bears witness to this.

The French were divided into two schools on this subject. Some thought that cooperation could be organized within the framework with a Franco-Tunisian government. Others thought that we must grant the moderate nationalists internal autonomy, and fix, by a negotiated agreement, the rights and duties of the Tunisian state and the French minority, thus allowing a new form of Franco-Tunisian community to develop naturally. This second school has carried the day. Negotiations, in which Mendes-France took the lead, have resulted in the signature of conventions which we hope will soon be ratified. Returning in triumph to his own country, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia spoke of the independence of Tunisia but also of the interdependence of Tunisia and of France. So we find that a nationalist, steeped in French culture, has formulated the ruling thesis of French opinion.

Evolution in Morocco

The example of Tunisia will have repercussions in the rest of North Africa, especially Morocco. At the present moment, Franco-Moroccan discussions have been interrupted by the dynastic question. The replacement of the old Sultan, who was both a civil and religious leader, has offended an important section of Moroccan opinion which has never recognized the new Sultan. The terrorism which has been launched against Frenchmen and against Moroccans who are reputedly pro-French, and the counter-terrorism which has struck down Moroccans as well as Frenchmen who are reputedly favorable to certain reforms, have created a tragic situation. Reasonable opinion in France does not misunderstand the dangers of this breakdown, but it remains convinced, and rightly, it seems to me, that a chance still remains for a Moroccan evolution akin to the Tunisian evolution.

When the French arrived in Tunisia at the end of the 19th century, and in Morocco at the beginning of the 20th, neither the Bey of Tunis nor the Sultan of Morocco exercised effective authority over the whole of his kingdom. Their authority ceased some distance from the cities. The colonial power has revived, rebuilt, reinforced the authority of the Tunisian and Moroccan state. These states are today made of bits and pieces, of traditional elements and of Western institutions brought by the French. Tomorrow, Tunisians and Moroccans can be the heirs of a state which the French have brought to life.

Changes in Algeria

Another more difficult situation exists in Algeria, where there is no Algerian state (as there was barely a trace of one, more than a century ago, when the French arrived). Algeria is composed of French departments, in many ways assimilated into those of continental France. For a long time there was a school of French opinion which favored assimilation pure and simple. One scarcely thinks this to be possible today. The Islamic religion is too big a barrier between Algerians and Frenchmen, the standard of living is too unequal on either side of the Mediterranean, the cost of investments which would be needed to raise Algeria to the level of the home country is too much beyond the means of France. To obtain results comparable to what has been achieved in Tunisia, some beginning will have to be made toward the creation of a Franco-Algerian state, linked to France.

Tne American "Intervention"

These are the facts, these are the ideas, which I think the majority of French opinion holds. I have omitted an important factor: the propaganda coming from Arab countries, and the organization, encouraged and subsidized by them, which aims at creating and extending a zone of guerrilla warfare. In Algeria the guerrilla warfare in the Aures Mountains and the terrorism in Constantine have local causes, but they would not spread without outside help. These deplorable events encourage the worst partisans on both sides, those who accept no change and those who rely on violence. Hit-and-run warfare paves the way, not for "liberation" but for chaos.

American opinion, American government, by their words and by their silence, by their deeds and by their abstentions, are making a fateful intervention. It is for them to decide if they want to encourage the extension of disorder in regions vital for the defense of the West, or to help Frenchmen, Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans to prove, by their peaceful cooperation, that Western civilization protects its own treasures, and that the friendship of Christians and Moslems is possible.

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