OBJECTIVES OF GENEVA

THE Parley at the Summit will have no fixed agenda, but both sides will arrive in Geneva with a well-defined set of objectives. On the eve of the conference the basic outline of these objectives is clear.

WESTERN AIMS

The net of the U.S. position is that Communist subversion and the Soviet Union's iron domination of Eastern Europe constitute the major dangers to peace; the President of the U.S. will therefore seek peace by attempting to eliminate, or to minimize these dangers. With support from Britain and France, the U.S. will work toward:

P: An end to the worldwide Communist conspiracy to subvert free governments.

P: Free elections and the reunification of Germany as an ally of the West.

P: A new Europe-wide security arrangement based upon a careful balancing of conventional arms on either side of the Iron Curtain, plus a continuing search for a safe and foolproof way to limit, then prohibit atomic weapons.

P: Independence for the satellites of the Communist empire.

SOVIET AIMS

The net of the Soviet objective is to win a respite in the armaments race, neutralize Germany, wreck NATO, get the U.S. out of Europe, and get credit as defender of the peace. Toward this end, the Soviet will seek:

P: A world conference on disarmament that will emphasize the emotional Communist campaign to ban atomic weapons and "foreign military bases," and de-emphasize the cooler Western insistence on the need for proper safeguards and controls.

P: A new interregional alliance for "mutual security" among the 30-odd countries of East and West Europe to replace the present NATO, with U.S. forces barred from Europe and the U.S.S.R. in control.

P: A Big Four resolution pledging withdrawal of troops from Germany.

P: A world economic conference designed to remove Western sanctions on strategic East-West trade.

P: A conference to win Formosa and U.N. membership for Red China.

P: A Big Four declaration vaguely proclaiming the "equal status" of the Communist satellite states.

THE BARGAINING PROCESS

Each Chief of State will present his country's accounting for the tensions that perplex the world. Then, the parley is set up to resolve itself into a continuing conference of committees --on Germany, on European security, on atomic control, probably on trade, possibly on the Far East (though to this the U.S. is opposed).

In the committees on Germany--probably comprising the Big Four Foreign Ministers and the Germans--the U.S. will not yield to the Soviet call for a neutralized state. Nor does the U.S. intend to let itself be drawn into Sir Winston Churchill's original notion of "a new Locarno pact," for that would involve a formal new U.S. guarantee for the Communist frontiers.

The U.S. holds that its pledge to uphold the U.N. Charter is sufficient guarantee that the West will not commit aggression to liberate the satellites.

With its allies, the U.S. recognizes the Soviet Union's traditional fear of a powerful Germany; the U.S. is therefore ready to concede that East Germany shall become a demilitarized buffer zone inside the reunified German state. The U.S. further accepts Sir Anthony Eden's plan to offer the Russians security by keeping the conventional arms of West Europe in balance with the East so that each region may coexist without fear--each strong enough to defend itself against the other, but not to attack.

THE KEY TOPIC

The key topic of the Parley at the Summit will be disarmament--symbol of the worldwide yearning for peace.

"The more one studies intensively this problem of disarmament," said the President of the U.S. last week, "the more he finds himself in a sort of squirrel's cage . . . running around pretty rapidly . . . and at times feeling he is merely chasing himself." But the President promised the people he would persevere "because, from my mind, to my mind, it is perfectly stupid for the world to continue to put so much in these agencies and instrumentalities that cost us so much . . ." In preliminary talks before the parley, the U.S. delegation significantly stopped talking about "disarmament" in favor of a new phrase--"limitation of arms."; The U.S. attitude is that total disarmament and controls are not now enforceable; the U.S. does believe--though it does not specify how--that atomic arms might be controlled to the point that the delivery of a decisive surprise attack would become impossible.

The U.S. believes that the Soviet attitude on disarmament might best define the validity of the Soviet Union's new peacefulness; the U.S. wants the Soviet good intentions tested step by step. Neither believing nor disbelieving, the U.S. waits to be shown.

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