Demon on the Ground

In a Washington hearing room last week a House Government Operations subcommittee started to investigate the fiasco of the Navy's F3H1 Demon jet fighters, built by McDonnell Aircraft and powered by Westinghouse engines. Five of the carrier planes crashed and four more are flying with other engines; 21, never to fly, may be used only for Navy ground training. Estimated loss: $200 million.

What the probers brought out was a story of men under pressure straining to do the best job they could, and making mistakes. J. S. McDonnell, president of St. Louis' McDonnell Aircraft Corp., testified that the Demon was originally a 22,000-lb., short-range interceptor. By early 1951 the Navy, engaged in Korea, sent a hurry-up call for something to meet the MIG on a fairly even basis. It wanted to redesign the plane, change it from the short-range to a mediumrange, all-weather fighter. This meant adding 7,000 Ibs. to the plane's weight.

Would the Westinghouse 340-22 jet engine, originally intended for the 22,000-Ib. plane, serve a 29.000-lb. plane in combat flying? It would not, and in April 1952 McDonnell fired off a letter to Washington warning that the result would be a "disappointingly underpowered combination." He asked for a substitute engine. But none was yet ready, and the Navy could not wait. It took a gamble, put the J40-22 power plant into the heavier plane to serve as an "interim engine" while it urged Westinghouse to speed a more powerful version, the J40-10.

But the new engine did not work out and the "interim" became the permanent engine. On the stand. W. W. Smith, Westinghouse's aviation gas turbine chief, frankly admitted: "We underestimated the magnitude of the task . . . This engine program moved slowly." Finally, the Navy canceled the Westinghouse contract, and none of the underpowered Demons ever saw combat.

Navy spokesmen testified that from the start Westinghouse's J40-22 engines were "unsatisfactory due to lack of reliability." Planemaker McDonnell added: "As regards reliability of the engine . . . at no time throughout the last two or three years has our company had confidence in the reliability of the engine. However, it is my humble judgment that Westinghouse was working as hard as they could within their human and corporate limitations." Said Westinghouse's Smith: "I want to make very clear that all the engines we delivered did meet the Navy's thrust specifications."

After four days of testimony. Subcommittee Chairman Chet Holafield summed up: "Undoubtedly there was waste in this program, as there is in any development of a new plane or weapon. I've seen no evidence of fraud or improper action . . . Mistakes made were made honestly under the pressure of the Korean emergency. Navy officers simply were caught in a gamble . . . to push ahead in search of a plane equal to the MIG, or wait until assured their new plane would be a success."

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