Challenge & Response

One of the laws of cold war, as of Newton's physics, is that action and reaction are equal and opposite. When Soviet pressure relaxes, so does Western vigilance; when Soviet threats increase, so does Western resistance. Last week Soviet pressure increased portentously in the most sensitive spot of cold war: Berlin. The West's reaction was instantaneous: 15 NATO nations, meeting in Paris, moved off the dead center made by the spirit of Geneva and 1) warned the Russians to keep their hands off West Berlin, 2) resolved unanimously to stop the summer's rot in the Atlantic alliance.

What the Communists are up to in Berlin was made plain at midweek by Soviet Ambassador to East Germany Georgy M. Pushkin. In identical notes to the U.S., Britain and France, Pushkin rejected their joint protest over the four-hour detention by East Berlin police of two U.S. Congressmen (TIME, Dec. 12) and added ominously: "East Germany now . . . regulates . . . the lines of communication between [West Germany] and West Berlin." In effect, Pushkin was telling the West: if you want barge permits and free road traffic, apply to the East German Communists; it's no longer any business of ours. His implication was obvious: unless the West agrees to deal with the East Germans (thereby recognizing their so-called sovereignty), Berlin would be made to suffer.

Closing Ranks. Faced with the threat of a new Berlin blockade, the 15 Atlantic allies, meeting in Paris for their sixth annual review of NATO policies, reacted by closing ranks. West Germany, NATO's newest member, wanted NATO support for its refusal to deal with East Germany and won a unanimous affirmation: "The council . . . considers the Federal Republic as the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany."

Weakest Link. Examining their defense posture in the light of the new Russian challenge, the ministers reached a dismaying conclusion: a summer of relaxation has robbed NATO of much strength.

Theoretically, NATO maintains 48 divisions (v. Russia's 175). Actually, it can presently rely on only ten of them, of which five are U.S., four British. France has depleted its four divisions on the Rhine to crush the spreading revolt in North Africa. Britain is reducing its army by 100,000 men; Belgium is disbanding one of its three active divisions; four of the five Dutch divisions are mere skeletons. Denmark's contribution in soldiers is practically negligible, since its 14-month conscription period is too short to train a soldier properly.

The U.S. too came under the ministers' scrutiny and was found wanting. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson admitted that only 50% of the U.S.'s promised military aid had reached Europe so far this year, but pointed out that many regiments in the U.S. do not have as up-to-date equipment as NATO units. Altogether, the 15 nations are spending $53 billion a year on defense. Western Europe's contribution: about $8 billion.

Last summer, with the spirit of Geneva soaring, many an allied minister might have rationalized NATO's shortcomings on the optimistic ground that peace was just around the corner. But last week no one tried. Instead, in their brief two-day meeting, they addressed themselves to NATO's weakest link, air defense.

To replace the patchwork quilt of uncoordinated radar stations that is NATO's only air-warning system today, the ministers agreed to build a 14-nation radar screen and radio signal network stretching 3,500 miles from Norway to the easternmost tip of Turkey. NATO-land will be divided into four air-warning areas: Central Europe (with headquarters near Paris), Northern Europe (Oslo), Southern Europe (Naples), Great Britain (London). All four will be linked to SHAPE by the latest type of U.S. communications equipment, similar to that used in DEW, the joint U.S.-Canadian Distant Early Warning radar screen stretching from Alaska to Greenland.

Installation of this screen, warned NATO Supreme Commander Alfred M. Gruenther, will be "very expensive." The decision was a triumph for Gruenther and SHAPE because individual nations have previously refused to surrender control of their air warnings. "Today a radar operator in Norway could spot a flight of high level Soviet bombers," says one SHAPE official, "but by the time the news filtered through two or three different national telephone systems, you wouldn't be able to see the Place de la Concorde for radioactive dust."

Arms v. Ideas. Next day NATO turned to the political and economic impact of Russia's new cold war offensive. The Soviet challenge in the Middle East, observed John Foster Dulles, is founded on Russia's capacity to export three surplus commodities: "Obsolescent arms, Soviet technicians and words." The West's best counter, he said, is not to compete in the same commodities, but to match Communist words with deeds; and in this kind of competition Dulles felt confident of winning, since Russia itself is economically a "deficit area."

Canada's Lester Pearson pressed hard for doing something about the all but ignored Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty, calling for political, economic and military cooperation. Why not, he suggested, do more to fight the Russian threat with economic weapons? "NATO cannot endure permanently on fear alone," said Pearson.

In side meetings with Britain's Harold Macmillan and France's Antoine Pinay, Dulles reached final agreement to provide Egypt's Premier Nasser with an initial grant loan of $70 million (the U.S. share: $56 million) to start building the Aswan dam. Within hours of the Western offer, the Soviet ambassador to Cairo renewed Russia's offer to help build the dam but significantly omitted to name the amount the Kremlin would put up. Henceforth, the West will put more emphasis on dramatic commitments (such as the Aswan dam), hoping to match in propaganda value what the Russians have lately got from much smaller dole-outs.

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