Diplomats at Work

While Congress dallied over the Eisenhower doctrine, the State Department last week fixed its sights on the next goal in the Middle East: a set of solutions designed to reduce the areas of Israeli-Egyptian friction. At the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. made a triple-decked proposal that in effect staked out a new U.S. position:

Proposal No. 1: Israel must withdraw behind the 1949 demarcation line in accordance with U.N. resolutions.

Proposal No. 2: Israel, in return for withdrawal, must be secured against a renewal of Egyptian action which led to the original attack, e.g., by assurances that Egypt will not reoccupy the Gulf of Aqaba area, from which it was able to blockade Elath, Israel's one port to the South.

Proposal No. 3: Since the "areas in question have been major sources of tension and hostile actions in the past," the Secretary General, using powers already granted him by the General Assembly, should order the U.N. Emergency Force to "move in immediately behind the withdrawing Israeli forces to assure the maintenance of the cease-fire"--specifically, "along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line and in the area of the Strait of Tiran [Aqaba]."

In Washington, U.S. officials kept up their steady pressure on Egypt to curb its intransigence, e.g., Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein failed to win release of the more than $40 million in Egyptian assets frozen by the U.S. after Egypt nationalized the Suez. Similarly, the U.S. continued to stall on Egypt's month-old request to buy American surplus wheat with local currency and thus help shore up its sagging economy. Behind the American moves was a common denominator: the conviction that U.S.-Egyptian relations--political and economic--hinge on Colonel Nasser's willingness to help settle Mideast problems within the frame of international law.

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