The Syrian Aftermath

With a quip and a toast from Nikita Khrushchev, the great Middle East war scare collapsed. For the embarrassed Syrians, there was no concealing the loud whistle of escaping air.

Only the day before, the Syrians had been working hard on their contrived crisis. The Damascus press reported six Turkish violations of Syrian territory in 48 hours. The Foreign Ministry sent notes to the NATO powers warning that NATO maneuvers scheduled for late in the week might be used as an excuse for Turkey to attack. The government announced that the next week would be "Fortification Week," devoted to building trenches and earthworks for last-ditch defenses. Radio Moscow chimed in: "The situation is very serious. Turkey is preparing to attack."

Then Khrushchev called at the embassy of the criminal Turks and blandly declared: "When Turkey is warm, a cool wind can go from the Soviet Union to Turkey and cool it off. And a warm breeze can come north from Turkey, and so there will always be a moderate climate." The Syrian attempts to recover their dignity were both funny and pathetic. The NATO maneuvers were forgotten. To save what face they could, the Syrians moved Fortification Week ceremonies ahead, and President Shukri el Kuwatly dutifully dug his spade into Syrian soil, crying defiance to the "invader" even as in the U.N. his Foreign Minister Salah el Bitar conceded that the much-advertised threat of Turkish attack was not worth debating, and dropped Syria's demand for investigation.

At week's end, amidst the litter of abandoned slogans and the fizzle of rocket threats, the world could take stock:

Russia had wedged itself farther into the Middle East. It had clamped political and economic chains on Syria that would be hard to break. The economic assistance agreement signed last week sealed the bargain. Russia will lend Syria an estimated $100 million at 2.5% interest during the next seven years. If implemented as outlined, the agreement put Syria's entire future economic development into the hands of Russia.

Egypt was dismayed by Russia's display of arrogant power. Nasser's dispatch of Egyptian troops to Syria suggested he did not like another bullyboy muscling in on his territory. Probability: Nasser would be increasingly cool to offers of further Russian aid.

The Arabs had once again shown that Arab solidarity was only lip deep. King Saud was privately furious at the Syrians. His mediation efforts increased his stature with other Arabs; Syria's refusal of them cost Syria sympathy.

Turkey had proved impressive. It had clearly shown that it meant business, but no harm.

Israel profited. "Recently, Israel's name has been dropped from the plot, and none of us are sorry," observed Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.

The U.S., though its initial alarmist handling of the crisis had set off a hysterical rush for Arab "solidarity" with Syria, might yet emerge ahead. It had failed to halt Syria's sag toward Russia. But the Arabs had been plainly scared by the behavior of the nation they had invited into the Middle East. "Positive neutrality" did not look so attractive. Syria had provided a humiliating demonstration of the penalties of flirting with Russia. Distaste for Russia's performance made Arabs more sympathetic to the U.S.

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