We Arm to Parley

At 12:21 one afternoon last week, Dwight Eisenhower snapped erect in his seat at the NATO conference table, put on his glasses, and. in firm, clear tones, began to read: "We are in a fast-running current of the great stream of history. Heroic efforts will be needed to steer the world toward true peace. This is a high endeavor. But it is one which the free nations of the world can accomplish." When he had finished, NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak and Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan turned to him with quick, wide smiles of congratulation.

Truth was that it was too early for congratulations. The U.S. delegation had gone to Paris with some misconceptions about the temper of the rest of the NATO allies. In Washington shortly before leaving, Secretary of State Dulles had made it plain that he was counting on hard and fast acceptance of the U.S. plan to establish missile bases in Europe. Said he: "I don't favor these so-called agreements in principle." He had apparently given little weight to the talk of new East-West negotiations that had swept Europe in the wake of Russian Premier Bulganin's preconference notes to NATO nations (TIME. Dec. 23). "If Communism is stubborn for the wrong, let us be even more steadfast for the right," he wrote in an article published in LIFE last week, and dismissed the question of a new round of East-West talks with the observation: "The areas where you can usefully reach agreement are quite limited."

Question of Strength. In this mood, the U.S. had taken to Paris proposals that were designed above all else to increase the military strength of the NATO alliance. Ike earnestly insisted that "we should leave no stone unturned in our search for an agreement to end this appalling armaments race," declared that the U.S. "proposes to increase the economic resources which we can make available to the less developed countries of the free world." But what primarily concerned the U.S. was the need for intermediate range ballistic missile bases in Europe.

Taking over from the President, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spelled out the U.S. plan. The U.S: was prepared to make available to U.S. General Lauris Norstad. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a stock of intermediate range ballistic missiles. Norstad would assign the missiles to any NATO member that wanted them and, in his judgment, had need of them. To give the missiles nuclear punch in case of war with the U.S.S.R., the U.S. also proposed to establish stockpiles of nuclear warheads in Europe. But the warheads, unlike the missiles themselves, would remain in U.S. custody.

Unexpected Rejection. The U.S. had expected some NATO allies to reject the offer--notably Norway and Denmark, who have steadfastly refused to have U.S. bombers based on their soil. Norway's Einar Gerhardsen, a 60-year-old ex-road mender who was one of the five Socialist or quasi-Socialist Premiers among the 14 present in Paris, promptly met that expectation. Said Gerhardsen: "We have no plans in Norway to let atomic stockpiles be established on Norwegian territory, or to construct launching sites for intermediate range ballistic missiles." What was not expected was his next statement. Seizing on the fact that the U.S. does not yet have any operational IRBMs to give NATO. Gerhardsen declared: "It is our view that the right course could be to postpone the decision. The time which will in any case elapse before any existing [missile] plans can be implemented could be used to examine the possibilities for renewed negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament."

Denmark's Hans Christian Hansen, another Socialist, echoed the Norwegian line. Then West Germany's tough-minded Chancellor Konrad Adenauer spoke up. Despite the fact that the Bulganin notes talked vaguely of a neutralized Germany --a prospect that is anathema to Adenauer--the West German Chancellor was no longer prepared to accept the U.S. lead in the matter of East-West negotiations. Said he: "I would see no objection to attempting to inquire through diplomatic channels from the Soviet government what precise conceptions form the basis of these proposals."

Demonstrated Need. Clearly, canny old Konrad Adenauer was thinking of the widespread reluctance of Europe's voters to have missiles on their soil unless they were proved absolutely necessary. His implied intent: NATO should demonstrate that they were necessary, by making one more attempt to negotiate with the Russians. Hastily the U.S. delegation set to work reconciling its differences with its allies.

Dulles, who saw no reason to alter the Western disarmament proposals that 56 nations had endorsed in the U.N. and the Soviets had flatly rejected, argued that any new approach to the Russians should be made through the U.N. France's Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, adopting as his own what was originally a British suggestion, urged that, instead, the Soviets be invited to discuss the matter with the Foreign Ministers of the four Western nations on the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee--Britain, France, the U.S. and Canada. In the end, it was the U.S. that gave ground. The compromise solution: any new negotiations should be "preferably within the framework of the U.N.," but if the Soviets balked at that, "we would welcome a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level to resolve the deadlock."

"Overwhelming Desire." The U.S. had acceded to Western Europe's wish to feel out the Russians diplomatically. Now the time had come for Europe to endorse the missile base plan. There were still hangers-back. West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss made it clear once again that his government was not yet prepared to commit itself to missile bases in Germany itself. "It would be foolish," said Strauss, "to put heavy artillery in the front lines." (Privately, NATO strategists agree that no missile bases should be placed east of the Rhine.) But Britain's Macmillan neatly cut through all anti-IRBM arguments with the pointed statement that while he could understand a nation wishing to be neutral and unarmed, he could see no sense in a nation that was not neutral contenting itself with obsolete arms.

On the third morning of the conference, Norway, followed once again by Etenmark, did a dramatic turnabout. Though Norway still did not want any missiles, explained Norway's Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, he had been impressed by the "overwhelming desire" on the part of other European NATO members to make the decision to accept IRBMs now. He was so impressed, in fact, that Norway now "ardently" favored immediate adoption of the "principle" of missile bases in Europe. Harold Macmillan summarized the new posture in a phrase borrowed from Sir Winston Churchill: "We arm to parley."

No Wavering. Point by point, agreement was reached on phraseology. In the section on NATO defense, the meeting (presumably in deference to John Foster Dulles) avoided the words "in principle," produced a firm statement that assured SHAPE of missile bases in Europe but spared individual nations the political embarrassment of an immediate commitment. In the articles dealing with negotiations with the Russians, there was careful omission of the fact that Konrad Adenauer apparently intended to explore through diplomatic channels just what kind of deal the Russians were prepared to offer in Central Europe.

When the leaders at the great conference table came to France's demand that the conference endorse at least indirectly France's position in Algeria, Dulles hesitated. Then Dwight Eisenhower took a hand. Turning to Dulles, he said, "Give me a pencil, Foster," and set down what eventually became the final sentence of Article Four of the Paris communique: "Historic, economic and other friendly ties between certain European countries and Africa would make . . . cooperation [between them] particularly desirable and effective." Glowed one French delegate: "When Ike took that pencil in hand, it was an act of great leadership." He added: "We were also pleased to notice that there was no wavering in the hand that held the pencil."

At long last the job was done. Graciously Ike turned down a Turkish proposal that the communique include a special word of gratitude to the U.S. "No, gentlemen," he said, "this is a team effort, a corporate effort. Let's not praise any individual nation."

As Paul-Henri Spaak prepared to declare the conference closed, Dwight Eisenhower asked permission to speak. Said he: "In order to ensure that the actions we are taking meet with the approval of our peoples and of a still higher authority, I suggest that all of you join me in bowing our heads in 30 seconds of silent prayer."

And so, in prayer, the leaders of the Atlantic world ended their meeting.

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