"A Clear, Unimpeded Voice"

Into a presidential adviser's office last week moved General Maxwell Davenport Taylor. His official title was that of Military Representative of the President, and he was to serve as a military and intelligence planner in the cold war. The specifics of the job were vague, but there is nothing vague about the views that Max Taylor brings to the White House: they have been bluntly and controversially stated in his 1959 book, The Uncertain Trumpet, and in his public statements.

As a World War II commander of the 101st Airborne Division, as Eighth Army commander in Korea, and as Army Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959, Taylor was a champion of the foot soldier and an acid critic of the theory of massive retaliation. While his own theory of flexible response calls for balanced forces, he contends that the prevailing definition of massive retaliation rules out anything less than full nuclear war if U.S. and Soviet troops clash in Europe. "This definition," he wrote, "can stultify sensible planning for a situation such as might arise if the U.S.S.R. or its allies blocked our access to Berlin. In planning for such a contingency, the definition can be used as an argument against using U.S. ground forces as a probe to determine Soviet intentions and thus to avoid the possibility of our being kept out of Berlin by a bluff."

"Losing Game." Taylor has painted a bleak picture of the U.S. military stance: "We have lost our former atomic monopoly. We are probably inferior to the U.S.S.R. in numbers of ballistic missiles.

We have no antiballistic missiles as a defense to offset this superiority in offense.

We have made no realistic effort to cope with Communist strength on the ground. Anemia is afflicting many of our military alliances. We are playing a losing game and should change it."

In his book, Taylor told how he would change the game. He urged that NATO ground forces be built up and made strong enough to deter a Soviet army attack. He argued that shallow "tripwire" forces might actually become a liability, since they could get entangled with an enemy to the point that the U.S. would be unable to use nuclear weapons for fear of killing its own troops. He advocated a "limited-war headquarters" that would cut across service lines. Wrote he: "There is no single headquarters anywhere which supervises the planning for overseas movements or verifies readiness for movement. The cost would be negligible, but the advantage gained very considerable." Taylor would also give ground forces a nuclear backup punch as a further deterrent.

"At the Top." Max Taylor is more than willing to fight for his views. When President Eisenhower refused to accept them, Taylor retired from the Army and turned public critic of the Eisenhower defense policy. In his new job he will have plenty of chance to air his ideas. The Administration denies that Taylor will undermine the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Taylor himself has little use for the J.C.S. Wrote he: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff system has proved ineffective and needs a fundamental overhaul . . . If war comes, the committee system for the conduct of modern operations would break down within the first few hours or days." And Taylor has argued for civilian military control to "be exercised at the top only after hearing a clear, unimpeded voice of responsible military counsel." Max Taylor clearly intends to provide that voice.

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