The NATO Deterrent

Almost as old as NATO itself is the "disarray" that seems to haunt its councils. Yet allied differences are not so much symptoms of any deep-rooted disunity as the result of NATO's military effectiveness. Because they know that they are secure behind the U.S. nuclear shield, few European nations are eager to build up conventional forces for which they see little use. At the same time, as they have grown more powerful and prosperous, Europeans have come to question total U.S. control of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. Thus dependence breeds mistrust.

Charles de Gaulle is not the only European to fear that the U.S. cannot be counted upon to risk destruction of its cities if Russia were to attack Western Europe--despite repeated U.S. assurances of its long-term strategic commitment to Europe, and heedless of the fact that 400,000 G.I.s on the Continent are a permanent U.S. hostage to Europe's security. Yet neither France's embryonic force de frappe nor Britain's near-obsolete V-bomber strike force carries sufficient punch to deter, let alone defeat, an aggressor.

Fine Watches. Last week, in an attempt to soothe Europe's restiveness by giving its Allies greater responsibility for their own security, the U.S. made its most serious pitch yet to share the planning and control of atomic weapons in Europe with Europeans themselves. Before NATO's 15-member Permanent Council in Paris, President Kennedy's special envoy, Livingston Merchant, proposed creation of a multinational nuclear deterrent consisting of a fleet of surface ships equipped with the U.S. Polaris missile. Key provision of the plan is that the ships would be "multi-manned," i.e., their crews would be drawn from every NATO nation that would be willing to help foot the bill. Cost of the international task force would be about $2 billion for 200 missiles and their floating launch pads; it would take at least three years to build, about half as much in time and money as it would take to create a multinational nuclear Polaris sub marine fleet.

Originally, in fact, the U.S. had hastily suggested that multi-manned, multinational Polaris submarines might be a logical progression from the independent Polaris subs that Britain has agreed to build (but has committed to NATO). Apart from the cost, however, Congress has already indicated that it is dead set against giving U.S. Allies the components or know-how to build the submarines. Moreover, old naval hands are aghast at the prospect of manning submarines with crews of mixed nationalities. Warned a West German naval expert last week: "Sub crews are the fine watches of naval warfare. There can be no room for misunderstanding."

Force or Farce? As for whose finger will be on the trigger of the new surface fleet, the U.S. agrees that each participating ally will have an equal veto. For all the argument it provokes, however, the question of control is largely academic; the fingers would be unanimous. "Do you really believe that Europe will want to shoot this thing off without being sure that the major U.S. force would be used?" asked a U.S. strategist. "Considering it as a second strike force, the semantics of voting becomes irrelevant."

Seven NATO partners--Britain, Belgium, Italy, Greece, The Netherlands, Turkey, West Germany--were immediately receptive to Merchant's proposal. West Germany expressed the warmest interest; the British looked on the scheme with "mild benevolence." But all seven wanted to hear more about it, and allowed that the price was high and the payoff distant. Meanwhile, all but a fraction of the existing Western atomic stockpile would remain under U.S. lock and key. The proposal was coldly received in France, where the Gaullist daily La Nation even dubbed the prospect of a multilateral force "la farce multilaterale." If the Polaris plan had been touted as a significant boost to the West's deterrent, the gibe might have been justified. As it was, the joke fell flat because a jointly manned, jointly financed armada may actually offer solid benefits for both the U.S. and Europe.

Arts Course. For the first time, a multinational deterrent would allow Europeans to collaborate with the U.S. from scratch in targeting, contingency planning and control of atomic weapons; it would satisfy their acute desire for atomic know-how by giving them a thorough education in complex technological and financial nuclear realities. For both sides, it would provide an added, substantial token of U.S. determination to remain in Europe and defend its allies with the ultimate weapon, if necessary. Says a U.S. defense planner: "This is one thing that can put glue in the alliance."

As Merchant prepared to leave Paris this week for a series of briefings on the plan in Rome, Brussels, Bonn and London, another U.S. diplomat pointed out an even greater incentive to participate: "Those nations that contribute to this force will know more about the missile arts in a year than the French do."

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