Still Fighting

Robert ("Fighting Bob") McNamara was back in the ring, eagerly taking on anyone and everyone who has the slightest doubt about the way he handled the controversial TFX fighter-aircraft contract award. Since he feels that the whole fuss reflects on his personal integrity, he was in a belligerent mood.

Testifying before the Joint Defense Procurement Subcommittee, the Defense Secretary said that it is "extremely difficult to change the traditional way of doing things in the defense establishment," but that he is trying to save money. All those uniformed officers who disagree with his economy moves, he said bluntly, do so out of "ignorance." He cited his TFX decision as "perhaps the most important single action we have taken thus far to reduce the number of different weapons systems in our inventory," since its goal is to produce one airplane suitable for both Navy and Air Force use.

Loose Goose. Punching away at some of his Pentagon predecessors, McNamara listed a number of weapons projects which, he implied, were started, without proper advance study, because military chiefs had an empire-building yen for them. They included a nuclear-powered aircraft, killed in 1961 after 15 years' work and the expenditure of a billion dollars; a jet-powered flying boat on which $450 million was spent; the Goose decoy missile, a pilotless aircraft to fool enemy radar, canceled after $80 million in costs because the contrivance "could not be recovered once it was launched." As closely related to the TFX situation, he cited the Navy's attempt to develop two fighters, the F4H-1 and F8U-3, that were so similar in purpose that a congressional committee in 1958 forced the Navy to select just one.

Earlier, McNamara had told Arkansas Senator John McClellan's Senate Investigations Subcommittee, which is holding the TFX hearings, that "I think there is going to be tremendous harm done to many individuals as a result of this hearing." He left no doubt about who he thought would be hurt the most. The hearings, as reported in the press, he said, imply "that I am either subject to political influence, self-interest, or stupid."

To back up his award of the contract to General Dynamics, although the Boeing Co. had bid lower, McNamara then released to the committee a previously secret Navy report which concluded that there was "no clear-cut choice between contractors" in the competing designs. This seemed to conflict with previous testimony that military evaluation experts had preferred the Boeing plans.

Reluctant. Some of those military officers whom McNamara had branded as ignorant began turning up before McClellan's subcommittee--and got in some licks of their own. Rear Admiral Frederick Ashworth, the top Navy TFX evaluator, declared: "My personal opinion is that the Boeing airplane is a superior airplane to meet the Navy requirements in a superior fashion." Air Force Colonel John Gregory, co-chairman of a military evaluation team that found the Boeing design superior in some respects, testified that he was called by a Defense Department civilian, was told that "they had prepared some documents that were of extreme interest to the Secretary." After 4 1/2 hours of discussion, Gregory signed two long memos which supported technical arguments for the General Dynamics proposal. "I had no basis to non-concur," said Gregory, "and I reluctantly signed the papers."

With the military testimony running against him, McNamara lured a new second into his corner: Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Bobby, who had served as chief counsel for the McClellan committee for three years (1957-60), accompanied McNamara to a private meeting with McClellan. Kennedy explained that he was there "just as a friend." Their mission: to supply McClellan with some tough questions to ask the military brass. McClellan said he would use the questions. Complained Subcommittee Member Karl Mundt: "There's a little question about propriety. It's a funny deal."

Another funny thing happened when McNamara's testimony, given last February to a House subcommittee, was released late last week--and immediately became a major issue in Canada's election campaign (see THE HEMISPHERE). Defending his decision to continue Bomarc missile bases (eight in the U.S., two in Canada), McNamara insisted that the ground-to-air missile is not expensive and that, through its dispersal, it might draw enemy fire from more important targets. This was hardly a comforting thought to Canadians.

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