A Quest for Concepts

The national dialogue over foreign aid that breaks out in the U.S. each spring often takes on some of the qualities of a bad dream. Defenders emit a high-sounding but vague rhetoric. Critics recite nightmarish examples of waste. The two sides seldom even get into communication. Both tend to talk in black and white terms of something that is a complex mixture of pale to dark greys.

Contributing to the confusion of debate is the fact that foreign aid has undergone numerous transformations of structure and purpose through the 17 years during which the U.S. has pumped $100 billion in aid to more than 100 countries. And through it all, says the University of Chicago's political scientist Hans Morgenthau, the U.S. never managed to "develop an intelligible theory of foreign aid that could provide standards of judgment for both the supporters and opponents of a particular measure.''

"Bum & Beggar Nations." In the past year, however, a broad re-examination of foreign aid has been going on in the U.S., and in the course of it, coherent concepts have emerged. A thoughtful article by Morgenthau in the American Political Science Review last June helped get the re-examination going. He called for tougher-minded selectivity in the handing out of economic development aid. Some nations. he wrote, "are bum and beggar nations'" that cannot really make use of development aid unless they undergo a "miraculous transformation of their collective intelligence and character." Above all, he argued that aid can be effective only if it is "considered an integral part of the political policies of the giving country."

The U.S. has discovered how effective the Morgenthau concept of using aid as a political instrument can be. After South Korea's military head man, General Park Chung Hee. threatened to go back on his promise to permit elections in the fall, the U.S. warned that it might reduce military and economic aid to Korea. Last week General Park said that he would hold elections after all. Similarly, the U.S. recently used Brazil's need for continued aid installments to prod the government into moving to curb inflation.

Various New Frontiersmen, including Chester Bowles and David Bell, have also argued for sterner selectivity in the distribution of aid funds. Says Bell, the Administration's new foreign aid boss: "It would be a mistake for the U.S. to try to engage in anything like a worldwide welfare program. What we are trying to do is assist the people of these countries to get in the position where they can solve their own problems." Last month President Kennedy's special Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, headed by retired General Lucius D. Clay, produced a report that, while thoroughly endorsing the principle of foreign aid, declared: "We cannot believe that our national interest is served by indefinitely continuing commitments at the present rate to 95 countries and territories" (TIME, March 29). The report concluded that the U.S. could well reduce its present aid program by $500 million.

Sense-Making Objectives. The yearlong re-examination was reflected last week in President Kennedy's foreign aid message to Congress. Heeding the Clay committee, he trimmed his request for new aid funds from $4.9 billion to $4.5 billion. And he set forth sense-making objectives:

> "To apply stricter standards of selectivity and self-help in aiding developing countries." As an example of progress, he said that only 20 nations now get 80% of all development aid and that 60% of it is laid out in the form of repayable loans rather than outright grants. Aid, he said, must be used "as a catalyst for progress and not as a handout."

> "To achieve a reduction and ultimate elimination of U.S. assistance by enabling nations to stand on their own as rapidly as possible."

> "To secure the increased participation of other industrialized nations in sharing the cost of international development assistance."

> "To lighten any adverse impact of the aid program on our own balance of payments and economy." -- "To continue to assist in the defense of countries under the threat of external and internal Communist attack." He cited the Clay report's finding that "dollar for dollar" military aid programs "contribute more to the security of the free world than corresponding expenditures in our defense appropriations."

> "To increase the role of private investment and other nonfederal resources in assisting developing nations." He offered legislative proposals to implement this objective: a tax credit on U.S. private investments in underdeveloped countries; expansion of U.S. guarantees to investors against heavy losses abroad through expropriation and other hazards.

The President said that all of the recent studies of foreign aid agree that "these assistance programs are of great value to our deepest national interest--that their basic concepts and organization are properly conceived--that progress has been made and is being made in translating these concepts into action." And he added, rightly of course, that "much still remains to be done to improve our performance and make the best possible use of these programs."

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