Of Hope & Skepticism

Prudent minds have as a natural gift one safeguard which is the common possession of all, and this applies especially to the dealings of democracies with dictatorships. What is this safeguard? Skepticism. This you must preserve, this you must retain.

--Demosthenes

Eight years ago, there was "the spirit of Geneva." Four years ago, it was "the spirit of Camp David." Last week, as if some quadrennial cold war cycle were reasserting itself, the air hummed once again with talk of a hopeful new turn in East-West relations. As U.S., British and Soviet negotiators met in Moscow to discuss a limited nuclear test ban, one diplomat observed: "Even the pessimists are optimistic."

Beyond Moscow. The optimism was nourished by a dazzling display of Soviet amiability (see THE WORLD). Even so seasoned a veteran of diplomatic dealings with the Russians as the U.S.'s Special Envoy W. Averell Harriman was impressed with the signs of thaw. And Harriman, having served as ambassador to Stalin's Russia from 1943 to 1946 and on missions to Moscow on other occasions, surely knows well the wisdom of Demosthenes' counsel.

Because the conclusion of even a partial nuclear test ban is regarded as the necessary first step toward an East-West detente, the air of confidence prompted statesmen on both sides of the Iron Curtain to begin looking beyond the Moscow talks toward other negotiable issues. In Washington, President Kennedy told his news conference it was "clear that these negotiations, if successful, should lead on to wider discussions among other nations." But the President seemed in no hurry to rush into a top-level meeting with Khrushchev. "There is no evidence," he said, "that a summit is indicated or needed."

Past cold war "thaws" have proved to be only interludes between freeze-ups. But this time some Western diplomats thought they detected the promise of a thaw deeper and more durable than its predecessors--largely because Khrushchev now has compelling reasons to work toward a long-term easing of tensions. Foremost among them is his bitter doctrinal struggle with Red China. The gravity of that dispute was dramatically underscored by the contrasting cordiality of the East-West talks and the glum hostility that shrouded the Sino-Soviet parleys in Moscow. Also prodding Khrushchev to produce a test ban treaty is the deep Russian fear of a nuclear-armed West Germany.

Before the Senate. If a test ban agreement emerges from the Moscow meetings, it will raise complicated problems for the U.S. A final test ban pact would take the form of a treaty, which would require a two-thirds approval by the Senate--and a test ban would certainly encounter some resistance there. Among the NATO allies, Germany undoubtedly would have deep doubts and reservations, and Charles de Gaulle would almost certainly act as if a U.S.British-Russian ban were a scrap of paper.

At week's end it seemed increasingly likely that a test ban agreement would be reached in Moscow. Even so, in the larger picture of East-West relations--considering the deep, deadly philosophical differences between democracy and Communism--a test ban would be a far from conclusive step. It was still wise to remember Demosthenes' advice about the importance of skepticism.

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