Friday, Feb. 28, 1964
Four Choices in Viet Nam
President Johnson may soon have to face up to the most critical decision of his Administration so far. U.S.-backed forces are not winning the war in South Viet Nam, and something should be done about it. There seem to be four choices, all, in varying degrees, painful: > Withdraw under some sort of agreement to "neutralize" the country. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has described this as "a formula for surrender." But since Charles de Gaulle proposed "a possible neutrality agreement relating to the Southeast Asian States," others have begun to espouse the idea. Said Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield last week: "We have teetered for too long on the brink of turning the war in Viet Nam, which is still a Vietnamese war, into an American war to be paid for primarily with American lives. There is no national interest at this time which would appear to justify this conversion.
The possibilities of neutralization may be extremely difficult to realize, but they ought not to be dismissed out of hand."
> Do just what is being done now.
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara says that the U.S. is still committed to the cause of its South Vietnamese allies.
But he also insists that the U.S. hopes to be able to pull most of its military personnel out of South Viet Nam by the end of 1965. Explained he in testimony released last week by the House Armed Services Committee: "I simply believe that the war in South Viet Nam will be won primarily through Vietnamese effort. It is a war of counter-guerrillas against the guerrillas. We are only assisting them through training and logistical support."
> Exert a much greater effort, both in manpower and money, to win the war. For this, the U.S. would have to send in combat troops, take over the war and give up on the notion that American military men are there only to advise and train the South Vietnamese. The cost of such a policy would come high--but if, as official American policy now holds, the security of South Viet Nam affects the security of the U.S. and the free world, it could be worth the price.
> Carry the war to the Viet Cong's North Vietnamese sanctuary. This would require the U.S. to encourage and finance South Vietnamese guerrilla activity north of the border, perhaps even provide for pinpoint bombing of supply depots. As a possible compromise between withdrawal and all-out participation by the U.S., the idea is attractive. But some Washington planners fear that by thus expanding the war the U.S. would bring on a repetition of its unhappy experience against Red China in Korea.
President Johnson will have to choose between these possibilities, or variations of them. While he may not like what he inherited from his predecessors, enough has changed since his accession so that the responsibility now is his.
For whatever he decides, Johnson and only Johnson must accept the credit-- or the blame.
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