Facts Without Flowers

Outside, all Holland was ablaze with tulips, but in one bare-walled room of The Hague's Princess Juliana Kazarne, the dominant colors were the army green of the ashtrays and the top-secret red of the wastebaskets. There were no flowers in the room for the simple reason that they afford a natural receptacle for hidden microphones. This week, as NATO's 15 Foreign Ministers gathered for their 15th spring meeting around the long, oval table in that closely guarded room, the most intimate secrets of the Western alliance were up for discussion.

Partial Control. The agenda also left plenty of time for interallied acrimony, which of late has seemed to be NATO's main activity. Greece and Turkey threaten war over Cyprus; London and Washington are at odds over British trade with Cuba; France in effect has withdrawn her navy from NATO command. The most sensitive issue of all promised to be the question of NATO's basic command structure, which has drawn a rising barrage of criticism in recent months. At the heart of the controversy lies the conviction of most NATO members that they should share control of the West's nuclear deterrent with the U.S. Last week Washington made clear its own views on this perennially irksome subject.

In an outspoken address at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic Studies, U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball emphasized Washington's conviction that the multilateral force represents the only practical means of giving NATO nations partial control of nuclear weapons. As advocated by the U.S. since 1960, MLF would consist of 20 Polaris-armed surface ships manned by mixed allied crews. Though the U.S. would initially retain its veto power over the use of the missiles, the fleet would ultimately be controlled by some form of executive body representing the participating nations. So far, eight NATO members have joined in a working group to examine the MLF proposal, but only West Germany and Italy are demonstrably enthusiastic about it. Though France's own force de frappe probably will not be operative until 1967, Charles de Gaulle is the only allied leader who is flatly opposed to MLF. But De Gaulle's nuclear nationalism faces mounting criticism in France: last week in the Paris suburb of Sceaux, a sea of demonstrators shouting "A bas la bombe!" rose in flat opposition to the French nuclear force.

Greater Cohesion. Not until Europe has achieved a modicum of political unity, Ball warned, can it expect anything closer to "a true nuclear partnership." The lack of political integration also hamstrings NATO as "an instrument for effective political consultation," and Ball decried the "rigid philosophical differences" that prevent NATO from enforcing sanctions against Cuba. Without naming Britain or France, both of whom trade with Castro, he put his finger on NATO's real problem: its members' "limited sense of world responsibility--as distinct from national interest."

The U.S. is willing to hear Europe's arguments for minor revisions in the NATO command structure. However, said Ball, "effective solutions will not be achieved by tinkering with the structure, but rather by progress in achieving a greater cohesion in relations among the member nations." In short, the allies may well find ways to make NATO work more smoothly and gradually assume greater responsibility for their own nuclear defenses. Meanwhile, in Ball's words, "the burden of decision" will have to rest with the U.S.--not by "deliberate American choice" but because "policy and responsibility cannot be divorced."

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