The Quiet Escalation

It was late in the morning, and the Communist antiaircraft crews guarding the bridge on Route 7, ten miles from the Laotian village of Ban Ban, were probably not hankering for extra work. Suddenly they had their hands--and gun sights--full. Screaming in low from surrounding hills was a long, swift file of supersonic U.S. Air Force jet fighters, which loosed a blizzard of bombs on the bridge, blowing it to bits.

Most of the planes got through unscathed, but by the time the last jets had reached the target, the excited Reds got off some telling ack-ack rounds. Down went two of the attackers, an F-100 and an F-105, and out went the pilots in their parachutes. While the remaining U.S. jets held Communist ground troops at bay with strafing runs, U.S. helicopters fluttered in from nearby bases, picked up Captain Albert C. Vollmer, 32, of Denton, Kans. His downed flight mate, Captain Charles L. Ferguson, 35, of Clovis, N. Mex., hid all night in the jungle before his rescue next day.

Spectacular as it was, the clash over central Laos last week was more important for what it revealed. U.S. officials have long said that the possibility of hitting Communist supply lines in Laos was only under study. In fact, after last month's "demi-coup" in South Viet Nam, the U.S. loudly announced that discussions about expanding the war had been suspended. Now it is known that Washington has "-" been carrying out air strikes in Laos since last year--a significant escalation of the anti-Communist struggle in Indo-China.

"Suppressive Fire." Last May, with the Red Pathet Lao on the offensive, the U.S. began flying reconnaissance flights over Laos. Time after time, the)missions carried them to Ban Ban (which in Laotian means Village of Villages), a tiny cluster of about 100 shacks on stilts noted more for the rice whisky its inhabitants produce than for anything else. But the Ban Ban area is dotted with camouflaged antiaircraft batteries designed to protect the key bridge near by, a 50-yd.-long span across the Nam Mat River used by the Reds in their supply line from North Viet Nam. When the Communists shot down a camera-carrying jet, the U.S. started sending armed escorts. When one of the latter was downed, U.S. fighter-bombers clobbered the offending Palhet Lao guns. Recon sweeps continued, and when fired upon at times, fighter escorts dished out more "suppressive fire."

Before long, "suppressive fire" became something else. Not waiting to be shot at, U.S. jets began blasting Red targets--mainly along Route 7, the principal convoy link from Communist North Viet Nam to the Pathet Lao, and along the Ho Chi Minh trail, over which North Viet Nam feeds men and material into South Viet Nam (see map). Though aided by Laotian-flown propeller-driven T-28s, bases in South Viet Nam and elsewhere supplied U.S.-manned F-105 Thunderchiefs--one of the hottest, meanest items in the U.S. Air Force inventory, capable of lifting twenty-six 565-lb. bombs, almost twice the payload of a World War II B17. Of late, F-105s have been seen taking off from the sprawling airbase at Danang, South Viet Nam, at least half of them carrying bombs. There has been no complex strategy to the missions. When a Communist target offers itself, a strike is called.

Presidential Ire. The flights have been controlled on almost a mission-by-mission basis by the White House in Washington, which began by restricting missions to four planes. With half of the craft flying cover, such small flights often failed to destroy their objectives. Explains a Pentagon official: "These are young, green kids, and there was a lot of flak around." Because of mountainous terrain, the U.S. jets usually must attack low, slowly, and in single file, which makes them all the more vulnerable; it was only last November when a jet fighter was shot down and its pilot killed.

Nevertheless, Lyndon Johnson was irritated at the misses and near misses of targets. The Air Force replied somewhat testily that it should be given an overall mission and allowed to accomplish it in its own way. Last week, for the first time, it got its wish. The tactical objective of the strike near Ban Ban was confined solely to Laos. The bridge over the Nam Mat was instrumental in maintaining the flow of Red supplies to the Pathet Lao--the stretch of Route 7 that was hit is too distant to form part of the Ho Chi Minh trail to the south. But the demonstration of U.S. power would undoubtedly have its positive psychological effect in South Viet Nam, where there is concern that the U.S. might pull out.

Making Them Walk. How effective can such aerial strikes be against Hanoi's infiltration? There is evidence that the Red supply lines are indeed being somewhat disrupted. No longer do columns of cadres move openly through Laos toward South Viet Nam; they have been forced to disperse. The Reds now find it more difficult to use trucks, even at night when headlights can be spotted and movement on the roads is inevitably slowed. Says a U.S. official: "They're going to have to walk all the way." Under the marauding jets, even campfires have become dangerous.

But men slipping through jungle are still hard to stop. Two months ago, a French planter in South Viet Nam was captured by the Viet Cong. Before he was freed, he reports, his captors were bombed for 17 days but kept moving. Total guerrilla casualties: one dead. Further, as was shown in Korea, masses of manpower can repair roads and makeshift bridges overnight. Says a U.S. military officer in Laos: "A 500-lb. bomb makes a hole five feet deep and ten feet across. With 50 coolies filling the hole and packing it with a battering ram the road can be ready again the next day." Moreover, the North Vietnamese funnel much aid to the Viet Cong along routes far removed from Laos. Cambodia is now a big supply depot for Communist men and equipment moved by sea from North Viet Nam. It remains to be seen whether Washington's quiet escalation can really curb Hanoi's undeclared invasion of its neighbors.

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