The Meat of the Matter

Appearances are deceiving. Last week well-publicized proposals for negotiations leading to a U.S. withdrawal from South Viet Nam inspired an international supposition that the U.S. would actually succumb to such pressure. But President Lyndon Johnson, without saying a public word on the subject, was more determined than ever to remain in Viet Nam--and, thread by thread, to tighten the screw against the Communist aggressors.

The talk -it -over -and -then -get -out proposals to the U.S. (no one ever seems to suggest that the North Vietnamese get out of South Viet Nam) came from two major sources:

> Moscow, which sent its ambassador to France a memorandum for delivery to Charles de Gaulle. Its gist: Russia, France, and all other peace-loving nations who were signatories to the 1954 Geneva pact that split up French Indo-China, should sit down at a table, neutralize South Viet Nam, and require the U.S. to depart the premises. The idea was right in line with De Gaulle's own thinking, and his government promptly agreed to support such a conference.

> Burma's U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who announced that he had been "conducting private discussions" with various nations involved in the Viet Nam conflict and had made "concrete" proposals that he could not publicly divulge. Still, he felt certain that the American people, "if only they knew the true facts"--presumably, there are "untrue" facts in Burma--would agree with him "that further bloodshed is unnecessary."

Once & for All. When President Johnson heard of U Thant's statements, he went through the roof. Among other things, he authorized White House Press Secretary George Reedy to declare emphatically: "There are no authorized negotiations under way with Mr. Thant or any other government." In fact, said Reedy, the U.S. has yet to receive from any source any "meaningful" proposal for negotiations. The President also authorized Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to issue a "white paper" aimed at proving once and for all the extent of North Vietnamese aggression in South Viet Nam (see THE WORLD).

More than anything else, the President worked behind the scenes in rounding up support for his position. He dealt first with the Washington press corps, which has been hostile to him lately (see THE PRESS). Individually or in small groups, he summoned journalists who had been clamoring against his policy, and the results of his persuasive efforts were swiftly evidenced in print. He also re-recruited former U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. Speaking in Denver, Lodge said: "None of the countries now urging us to negotiate would consider negotiations for themselves if they were in our situation." Next day Johnson announced that he was assigning Lodge to consult with him on the entire Vietnamese situation.

Getting into Line. To members of Congress, the President let it be known in no uncertain terms that he was getting pretty tired of criticism. The legislators fell all over themselves getting into line. Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, who several times in the past had suggested that the U.S. ought to get out of Southeast Asia, now rose to say that the President had acted "as Commander in Chief with great courage, firmness and restraint. President Johnson can be counted upon to continue to work with complete dedication on this problem." Idaho's fuzzy-cheeked Democratic Senator Frank Church, who had been making a lot of headlines with his calls for withdrawal, got the word from Lyndon, now retorted ferociously to a relatively mild propaganda speech by Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin. Cried Church: "Kosygin calls not for talks but for surrender. He will never get that from the United States!"

Legislators who had already supported Johnson's Viet Nam policy now did so more forcefully than ever. Notable among them was Connecticut's Democratic Senator Thomas Dodd, who in a 2 1/2-hour Senate speech said: "Whether we decide to abandon Southeast Asia or to try to draw another line outside Viet Nam, the loss of Viet Nam will result in a dozen more Viet Nams in different parts of the world. If we cannot cope with this type of warfare in Viet Nam, the Chinese Communists will be encouraged in the belief that we cannot cope with it anywhere else."

Salt, Pepper & Garlic. To demands that he make a public statement "clarifying" U.S. policy toward Viet Nam, the President had Secretary of State Dean Rusk hold a news briefing to reiterate what Johnson himself had explained many times before. The U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, said Rusk, "is an obligation under the 1954 agreements, under the 1962 accords on Laos, and under general international law." It was underwritten last year by a joint resolution of Congress, passed by a 502-2 vote (the holdouts: Oregon's Democratic Senator Wayne Morse and Alaska's Democratic Senator Ernest Gruening) authorizing the President to take "whatever measures necessary" to protect the sovereignty of South Viet Nam.

The U.S., said Rusk, is not blindly opposed to negotiating about Viet Nam. But it will enter into negotiations only on the prospect that North Viet Nam will agree, in an enforceable pact, to withdraw its own aid to the Viet Cong Communists in return for U.S. withdrawal. "Concentrate," said Rusk, "on the meat of the matter. The meat of the matter is that Hanoi is sending these people and these arms into South Viet Nam contrary to every agreement and contrary to international law. Now if that problem is grappled with, then we can get into details. We can consider whether the meat involves a little salt and pepper and a dash of garlic."

Ready to Go. The President himself eschewed words, confined himself to action orders. For the first time, U.S. pilots and crewmen in U.S. B-57s and F-100s swept out in repeated sorties against Viet Cong emplacements in South Viet Nam. This time there was no talk of Americans being in South Viet Nam on a mere "advisory" basis.

By every unofficial accounting, new air strikes against North Vietnamese bases are in prospect. And, poised on Okinawa ready to head instantly for South Viet Nam, is the U.S. Marine Corps' 9th Expeditionary Brigade. The 7,500-man force presumably would be used for perimeter defense of American military installations--but by no stretch of the imagination could the marines be considered "advisers."

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