The Lull That Lapsed

"From now on," said a U.S. official in Saigon, "they're going to have a tough time guessing how, when and where they may be hit. Some days they may not be hit at all. Other days they may get hit a little, and other days they may get plastered almost from border to border." In that spirit the U.S. last week ended a five-day lull in bombing raids against North Viet Nam.

Running Out of Bridges. In the days after the lull lapsed, U.S. planes, almost without letup, prowled north of the 17th parallel. Carrier-based Skyraiders and Skyhawks plastered petroleum-storage facilities at Phuqui, 125 miles south of Hanoi, sending braided columns of orange flame and black smoke billowing hundreds of feet into the air. Navy jets took potluck, strafing targets along highways, rail lines and riverbeds from the 17th parallel to a point only 80 miles from Hanoi. Air Force Thunderchiefs made the deepest penetration yet by U.S. warplanes, streaking up to the Red River Delta town of Ninhbinh, 60 miles south of Hanoi, to drop 500,000 propaganda leaflets urging North Viet Nam's people not to let "the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists use your bones and blood to wage a fratricidal war." Later in the week 90 Air Force jets returned with bombs instead of leaflets, blasted a big barracks near Ninhbinh.

Several factors had gone into President Johnson's earlier decision to order the pause. The U.S. had already blasted just about every worthwhile military target south of the populous Hanoi-Haiphong complex, and was running out of bridges and barracks to bomb. The lull gave U.S. reconnaissance planes a chance to assess the damage and size up new targets--and according to Communist broadcasts, the recon planes were busy indeed, some of them probing points only twelve miles from Hanoi. Perhaps most important, the lull gave Johnson a chance to show such critics as Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright that they were all wet in arguing that a halt in the bombing might open the way to negotiations.

Proving the Point. The President took special pains to inform Hanoi of the purpose of the lull. U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler told Red China's Moscow embassy about it. U.S. officials let Russian diplomats in Washington know. The French, British and Canadians--all of whom have pipelines to Hanoi--were informed. Each was asked to pass on the message that any hostile action by the Viet Cong during the lull would prompt the U.S. to double its bomb loads if and when the raids resumed. North Viet Nam brusquely condemned the lull as a "U.S. swindle" and "a deceitful maneuver designed to pave the way for new U.S. acts of war."

In responding as it did, Hanoi proved Lyndon's point. And so, after five days, the Administration announced that it was "disappointed" because "we have seen no reaction" from the Reds, ordered the bombers into the air again.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.