LOW PROFILE IN LATIN AMERICA

The Good Neighbor policy was all right for the '30s, and the Alliance for Progress has been a step forward in the '60s. But in the '70s we need something more.

--Galo Plaza

RICHARD NIXON'S first official foreign visitor in the White House last January was Galo Plaza, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and there was a sense of urgency in his call. U.S. relations with the nations to the south were at their lowest ebb in years. The U.S.-conceived Alliance for Progress had been a disappointment, if not an outright failure, and many disillusioned Latin Americans were seriously asking whether the U.S., preoccupied with Viet Nam and domestic crises, really cared. Not until last week, after more than nine months of reassessment, did Nixon give his answer. "We do care," he told Latin America. "I care." The President could hardly have said less. But how much did he care? And in what ways? Nixon expressed his concern rather quietly, in the form of a sedate and pragmatic U.S. approach to relations with its neighbors. Businesslike and low-keyed, his proposals were a far cry--and, some felt, a refreshingly realistic departure--from the soaring vision of John Kennedy's Alliance or the "Decade of Urgency" that Lyndon Johnson proclaimed at the conference of hemisphere Presidents in Punta del Este, Uruguay, more than two years ago.

Listening More. The President's policy, outlined before the Inter-American Press Association in Washington, called for a more balanced partnership rather than an American-dominated alliance. From now on, the President promised, the U.S. would listen more and lecture less; it would be "guided by a healthy awareness that give-and-take is better than take-it-or-leave-it."

Nixon drew some of his recommendations from the findings of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who earlier this year visited 20 hemisphere nations (TIME, July 11). Rocky's report, to be released soon, was described in Washington as considerably more far-reaching than Nixon's guidelines. During his tour, the Governor was told that Latin Americans are unhappy not only with the slow pace of development but also with the often domineering, paternalistic attitudes and policies of the

U.S. Such sentiments are fueling a relatively new, vibrant nationalism of both right and left that frequently finds expression in strident anti-Americanism.

"We have heard many voices from Latin America in these first months of our new Administration--voices of hope, voices of concern, voices of frustration," Nixon declared. "They have told us that if our partnership is to thrive, or even to survive, we must recognize that the nations of Latin America must go forward in their own way, under their own leadership. I recognize the concerns, and I share many of them."

Nixon's initial prescriptions for a better partnership proved to be considerably less sweeping than many Latin Americans had hoped for. In part, his options were limited by congressional economizers. Only two days before his speech, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had axed $100 million from the President's $437.5 million request for the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, Nixon was certain to come under fire from liberals--at home and abroad--because of his pragmatic assessment of U.S. relations with the military regimes that now rule more than half of Latin America's 260 million people. In view of the "enormous, sometimes explosive forces for change," he said, "we must deal realistically with governments in the inter-American system as they are.

We have, of course, a preference for democratic procedure." That was a significant departure from the attitude of active disdain for Latin American dictators adopted by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

"I offer no grandiose promises and no panaceas," said Nixon. What he did offer was:

> To raise the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to the rank of Under Secretary, with authority to coordinate the welter of U.S. Government activities concerning Latin America, thereby curtailing bureaucratic delays.

> To loosen restrictions on U.S. loans to Latin American nations. In the past, such aid has been "tied," meaning that

it had to be used to buy items made in the U.S. As of now, recipients will be able to spend the money not only in the U.S. but throughout Latin America as well. Trouble is, most of the Latin American nations would also like to be able to go to Europe and Japan for some of their purchases.

-- To channel more development funds through a multilateral inter-American agency and to invite Latin American reviews of U.S. economic policies. In the past, bilateral aid agreements have invited charges of political string-pulling and economic intervention.

> To reduce nontariff barriers to trade maintained by nearly all industrialized countries, including the U.S. As it is, while the U.S. has encouraged economic diversification in Latin America, it has also imposed barriers against imports from the area. Under Nixon's proposed liberalization, the U.S. might conceivably increase its quotas on sugar or on such processed primary products as textiles--provided, of course, that stiff congressional resistance to such proposals can be surmounted.

Emotional Facet. The President approached no issue more gingerly than that of U.S. private investment, one of the most emotional facets of U.S.-Latin American relations. Many countries view U.S. investment as a form of economic colonialism that extracts more than it puts in. "We will not encourage U.S. private investment where it is not wanted or where local political conditions face it with unwarranted risks," Nixon said. "But my own strong belief is that properly motivated private enterprise has a vital role to play." Nixon plainly had in mind Bolivia's recent nationalization of the U.S.-owned Bolivian Gulf Oil Co. and Peru's seizure last year of the International Petroleum Co. --both so far without compensation. The President said nothing about the use of such punitive weapons as the Hickenlooper Amendment, which provides for suspension of aid in case of nationalization of U.S. property without speedy and adequate repayment.

While Rockefeller hailed the President's statement as "an impressive start on a 'policy of good partners,' " the initial reaction from Latin America was distinctly mixed. Said former Argentine President Arturo Illia, who was deposed by the military in 1966: "It is a concrete diagnosis, but not a cure. The situation is more serious than is expressed by Nixon." Brazilian Economist Roberto Campos was pleased with Nixon's approach, which was less condescending than past U.S. attitudes. "The U.S. today is much less certain that it understands the realities of life in Latin America," said Campos. "That is a healthy recognition." More characteristic, however, was the complaint aired by the Chilean paper Clarin, which claimed that "frustration was the sentiment after the speech."

Plainly, the speech signaled a lower profile for the U.S. south of the border and a determination to require Latin American nations to assume from this point on a more active role in guiding their own development. Did it also signal a U.S. desire to disengage? Said a high Administration spokesman: "the answer is no--not disengagement, but re-engagement." Nor would the new policy imply economic isolation, he added. "What it does mean is that we would like to dispel the myth that the U.S. is the instant messiah for miracles." The question remains whether Nixon's proposed partnership asks enough of the partners --either the Latin American lands or, for that matter, the U.S. itself.

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