Electing God's Government

For months the sign of the banyan tree has been sprouting all over Indonesia. Planes dropped leaflets and kites that displayed the spreading tree. Be-tjak (three-wheeled ricksha) drivers wore polo shirts imprinted with it. Practically every civil servant in the sprawling archipelago nation sported a button emblazoned with the symbol. Radio and television stations frequently played a song extolling the tree, traditional symbol of security, as the place "to hail while expecting the blessings of God."

The message was clear: the blessings of God would come only if President Suharto and his regime remained in power. The tree is the symbol of the government's political organization, Sekber Golkar. Last week, when 57 million Indonesians went to the polls in the country's first national elections in 16 years, a majority of them probably punched the sign of the banyan tree on the ballot. Exactly how many will not be known until mid-August, when President Suharto will announce the results. But since the government had already reserved the right to appoint 100 members of the 460-member House of Representatives, there is little doubt that the military regime will obtain a clear majority in Parliament and thus be able to re-elect the quiet Javanese general as President in 1973.

Measure of Legitimacy. The election was a costly ($55 million) move designed to give the regime, which took power from the late President Sukarno in 1965, a measure of legitimacy. The government took no chances. Before the election it forbade criticism of President Suharto or the government's program. The nine opposition parties were allowed to hold village rallies, but there were widespread charges of intimidation. In some provinces, army commanders prevented political rallies by scheduling military drills at the same time. The government also weeded out 2,500 unacceptable candidates and arrested many others.

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union also had a hand in trying to influence the elections. In the late '50s and early '60s, Moscow gave Indonesia an estimated $1 billion worth of military equipment only to see the army turn the weapons against the Communists in a massacre that claimed perhaps 300,000 lives in 1965. Since then, Soviet influence has been extremely muted. Russian efforts were confined to good-will visits to Nationalist Party candidates and broadcasts denouncing the Suharto regime over Radio Moscow's Indonesian-language station. Washington's influence was more direct: $18 million worth of military aid, including M-16 rifles, machine guns, aircraft and $500,000 worth of sophisticated communications gear to link Indonesian military commands around the country.

Far from Perfect. For a nation that has been torn in recent decades by bloody internal strife, the pre-election mood was surprisingly calm. Life under Suharto's "new order" is far from perfect, but markedly better than in Sukarno's days. Inflation has been curbed from an annual rate of 635% to less than 10%. Suharto's economists have balanced the budget and won the confidence of private investors. After several setbacks, the country last year achieved a record rice harvest. The biggest sore point in a land where the per capita income is only about $80 is the relative affluence enjoyed by the military since coming to power. "If you use American standards, Indonesia is not democratic," conceded a leading politician last week. "The army is now the only decisive factor in Indonesian politics. Later, perhaps in 25 years when we have a sound economic life, we can afford to return to real democracy."

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