An Alliance in Need of D

Acrimony and pique have been building up behind the fac,ade of the Atlantic Alliance for months. Last week they erupted, exposing American-European relations at their worst in years. What triggered the blowup was an informal talk that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave to about 225 wives of Congressmen at the State Department. Apparently unaware that journalists were present and thinking that his remarks would be off the record, Kissinger abandoned the carefully measured phrases of diplomacy of which he is a grand master.

"I would say that the biggest problem American foreign policy confronts," he grumbled, "is not how to regulate competition with its enemies--we have a generation of experience with this, and with ups and downs we are going to handle it--but how to bring our friends to a realization that there are greater common interests than simply self-assertiveness." He further observed that "the deepest problem in Europe today is that there have been rarely, fully legitimate governments in any European country since World War I."

Within a few hours, the news of Kissinger's blunt criticism of America's allies was all over Washington--and, worse, all over Europe. Foreign news agencies and embassies scurried to obtain accurate texts. By the time that the State Department issued a somewhat laundered transcript of the talk, the damage had been done. Europe was stunned. Said French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who later in the week accompanied President Georges Pompidou on a state visit to the Soviet Union: "Kissinger does not understand Europe." In Bonn, a ranking German official complained: "Now we have a cold war between America and Europe." A Belgian official advised Europe to "try to behave, publicly at least, as if we did not hear Kissinger's remarks."

Verbal Bombshell. It soon became clear that unusual action would be needed to patch up the allies' relations. On Thursday, Kissinger unexpectedly appeared at the State Department's regular noon press briefing where he apologized for his biting comments: "I regret them, and I feel they make no great contribution to the Atlantic dialogue."

Europe's leaders scarcely had time to consider Kissinger's apology when Richard Nixon dropped another verbal bombshell on the alliance. At his Friday press conference in Chicago, the President warned Europe that "the day of the one-way street is gone." Nixon told the EEC that it must decide to work with the U.S. "on the economic and political front," or else America "will go separately." Just in case Europeans missed the point, the President observed that Congress might vote to cut U.S. troop strength in Europe unless some understanding is reached. On Saturday, Le Monde, the Paris daily, denounced this as "blackmail."

A number of recent events have fueled Washington's wrath. Kissinger feels that the Common Market has been making important unilateral decisions without properly consulting the U.S. On March 4, the EEC announced that later this year it would like to meet with 20 Arab nations to discuss economic, cultural and technical cooperation. Kissinger fears that such a meeting could undermine his own efforts to find a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and could work at cross-purposes to the coordinating group created by the recent Washington energy conference. Kissinger has known since last November that France was urging the EEC to call such a conference. But when he visited Bonn on March 3, he was led to believe by West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel that the EEC was not yet ready to accept the French proposal. Thus Kissinger believed that he still had time to dissuade the Market's leaders from going ahead with the conference. When he was informed on March 4 that the EEC had formally agreed to the French proposal, he was furious.

Kissinger did little to conceal his anger, complaining to both reporters and Congress about the EEC'S perfidy. Then Nixon wrote to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who is currently spokesman for the EEC countries. Employing blunter language than is normally used by allies, Nixon complained that the U.S. had a right to expect closer consultation with the EEC on relations with the Arabs. Kissinger surely had a hand in drafting the letter.

In his reply, Brandt insisted that the EEC had kept Washington fully informed of progress on the French proposal. The West German leader ended his letter on a conciliatory note, by inviting Nixon, on behalf of the EEC, to visit Europe at the end of April. At his Friday press conference, Nixon rejected the EEC invitation, declaring that "until Europe is...willing to cooperate on the economic and political front, no meeting of heads of state will occur "

French Nemesis. In tact, Washington's unhappiness with Europe is caused by much more than the EEC conference proposal. Kissinger feels that Western Europe does not know what it wants and is plagued by weak leaders and minority governments. He is annoyed that Europe has dragged its feet on drafting the new Atlantic Charter that he proposed eleven months ago. France, which has openly warned other European countries that they can maintain their identity only if they keep some distance from the U.S., is a particular nemesis. Most rankling, perhaps, is the EEC'S method of "consultation." Kissinger believes that the U.S. is seldom allowed to participate in EEC discussions early enough to affect their outcome.

The Europeans return Kissinger's criticisms in kind, accusing the U.S. of failing to consult with them. An example: Washington's decision to place American troops on alert during the Yom Kippur War. Kissinger's style of personal diplomacy, which many Europeans regard as imperious, grates on them. A leading British politician angrily asks: "Does Kissinger think he can treat us like South Vietnamese?" After the American difficulties in Southeast Asia and Watergate, few European leaders regard the U.S. as a model to be blindly followed--if they ever did. In many capitals the proposal for a new Atlantic Charter was viewed as an effort to strengthen U.S. influence in Europe. The French argue that America's primary goal is to reimpose its hegemony over Western Europe. Paris urges Europe to act and not, in the words of a French diplomat, "worry whether Washington will approve or not."

Genuine Partnership. Most European leaders, however, are not quite as wary as the French. Willy Brandt remains committed to the idea that Europe needs a genuine partnership with America, as does Britain's new Labor government. Moreover, Kissinger is still eager to bring new life to the Atlantic Alliance. As a high U.S. official has remarked, "America cannot afford to let Europe go neutralist." What remains uncertain is whether Washington's new shock tactics of confrontation are the best means of bringing the alliance back together, or whether a dose of detente may not work better.

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