Egypt's Sadat: New Look

Ikingi Maryut is a small green retreat in the Western Desert outside Alexandria, where Egyptian President Anwar Sadat last April reached his fateful decision to go to war with Israel. There last week Sadat received Hedley Donovan and gave his first interview with a representative of a Western publication since the war. Wearing a gray turtleneck sweater, slacks and sports jacket, Sadat puffed his pipe and broke into confident laughter from time to time as he ranged widely over a number of topics. Among the questions and answers:

Q. Did you foresee, before the war, [any] American diplomatic moves toward reaching a peace settlement?

A. Starting from the summit meeting in Moscow--the first between Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972--and the communique that was issued after it, there was a very critical phrase that caused us great annoyance. It said that both parties agreed on military relaxation in the area. Military relaxation meant that the state of no war-no peace that had prevailed here, and that had caused us all our trouble and our dilemma, would continue. The next year, [at] the Washington summit, it was obvious that the two superpowers had gone a step further. It was quite clear from the communique that our problem had been put in the freezer again. So, believe me, when I took this decision [to go to war] whatever the reaction, we were not ready to continue because both superpowers wanted to freeze the whole thing.

Whatever the reaction, we were not ready to continue this state of no war-no peace. We were no longer ready to bear this humiliation that we had suffered for six years.

Q. What new elements since the war make you optimistic that peace is a possibility now?

A. The most important factor is the American position. The American position had always been one of complete alignment with Israel. Before the Nixon Administration, [and] to be fair, during the Johnson Administration--it was horrible for us.

But since the October war, and from the changed attitude of the U.S.--specifically the attitude of the Nixon Administration and the tireless efforts of Dr. Kissinger--I am optimistic. This is the main reason.

Another thing, I think, is that the sixth of October must have changed some of the outlook in Israel. Up to this moment, I am not sure of this.

Q. Why does disengagement on the Syrian front seem so much more difficult to achieve than Egyptian-Israeli disengagement?

A. I don't think it is difficult. From my viewpoint, maybe because there has been a personal relationship and understanding between me and Dr. Kissinger, I think that Kissinger is doing his best and President [Hafez] Assad is doing his best.

Q. When you agreed to exchange prisoners with Israel, you seemed to have made concessions beyond previously stated positions. Why?

A. I had a three-hour talk in November with Kissinger. In politics, I think, flexibility without losing the target is very essential.

Q. How long do you think the process of settlement might take?

A. My idea is this: disengagement on the Syrian front must first take place. After that, all of us will go to Geneva, and there will start the real process for peace. Disengagement is only a military conception. It is a ceasefire. [But] peace--in my mind is a matter of months only. It does not need more than that. For instance, we shall not be going to Geneva to discuss withdrawal. Withdrawal is a fact. Maybe, to be practical, we can discuss security.

Q. You mean that withdrawal to the 1967 borders is a fact?

A. It is a fact.

Q. Does Israel know this?

A. I should like them to know it. No acquisition of others' land by force; this was stated in [United Nations] Resolution 242, and I think it has been proved as of the sixth of October that this [Israeli] theory [of security] has failed completely. Let us discuss security problems in Geneva, but let us discuss them openly. They must be prepared to do their share because it is not just security for them only. It is security for us too.

Q. Was reopening the Suez Canal part of the disengagement agreement?

A. Not at all. The Suez Canal is Egyptian, on Egyptian land. Opening it is an Egyptian affair. It was never a matter of discussion or a matter of condition; I would never permit that. [But] the canal will be reopened. I have given the appropriate orders. Since the Israelis left the western bank, everything has been going forward.

Q. Can you visualize any useful international guarantee of borders?

A . Yes, sure. Either by the two superpowers or all the big powers. In any form, it is welcome. But the talk in Israel about the demilitarization of Sinai should stop. If they want a demilitarized Sinai, I shall be asking for a demilitarized Israel. How can I demilitarize Sinai when, within six hours, I could be threatened by then? No, if there is a demilitarized zone, it must be on both sides.

Q. What about a strip of perhaps ten miles on each side?

A. I quite agree. Twenty miles on each side? I quite agree. Why not?

Q. Would you want a kind of U.N. emergency force interposed between the two sides in such a demilitarized zone?

A. I would not object to it. In fact, it is necessary.

Q. Do you visualize normal diplomatic relations with Israel at some point?

A. How could you visualize that, after 26 years of bitterness, belligerency, hatred and violence? It cannot be. For 26 years a state of belligerency has prevailed between us. Let our aim be to end this state of belligerency officially and openly. That will be a big achievement. As a practical man, I say: Let us end the state of belligerence and then there will be a new atmosphere. We cannot say what will happen after that.

Q. What are your hopes for Egypt in such a new atmosphere?

A. I think there are great possibilities. As you know, investment was very limited during the last seven years because of the war. Our population is increasing by about a million a year. We have to find food, everything, for them. Without industrializing the country and improving our agriculture, rebuilding the cities in the canal zone and the factories that were destroyed, we cannot move. This is a huge program.

Before the war, I always said that we must make the battle the starting point for [economic] takeoff, for building a new country on the technology of the generation of which we are a part, through the cooperation of the big powers, of Western Europe. I think we will achieve that.

Q. You see ahead, then, a mix of public and private sectors?

A. That is inevitable for us, because of our growing population. We did not choose this social system because we wanted to be in a certain camp. No, it is like this: there is no other alternative for us. We have a small cultivable area of land and a big population that is increasing by maybe the biggest rate in the world.

Q. How do you see Egypt's relations with the U.S.?

A. President Nixon--whom you do not value as we value him here--has done much for them. We have suffered a lot from all your previous Administrations, starting with [Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles and ending with [William] Rogers. The real approach to the problem and the real new look that should have come from America in this area long ago came only from Nixon and Kissinger.

There has never been any problem between us except this alignment with Israel. If we can reach understanding on that, there will be nothing between us. Our relationship can thus improve step by step. It is galloping.

Q. Did you have in mind reestablishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. before you met Kissinger?

A. It was the result of meeting him. After my talk with Kissinger in November, I felt confident. So when he asked me about diplomatic relations, I told him in principle I agreed, but as you know this needed some time. We agreed on this, and then the time came.

Q. How would you compare your regime with that of your predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser?

A. I have always said that I am responsible in part for every decision made during Nasser's regime because I was his partner and he left me as Vice President. Believe me, if Nasser had lived to this moment, he would be doing what I am doing, maybe.

It is a continuation, but in this continuation there are two main points. First, we had an experiment and in the experiment there were negatives and positives. What I am now doing is trying to correct the negatives. Second, there must be a new look, because all around us in the world all relations, all balances are changing hour by hour, not day by day. So there must be a new look, and I am trying to adapt us to this new look, to the new balances, to the new strategies. Some are shouting that I am abolishing Nasserism. I don't pay heed to them at all.

Q. Do you intend to designate an heir, as Nasser designated you?

A. No. According to our constitution, if the President leaves or dies, the Speaker of Parliament takes over for 60 days.* The process will be quite normal. I will leave it for the people to choose.

* Under Egypt's present constitution, enacted after Sadat took office, Vice Presidents no longer succeed automatically upon the death of a President.

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