Down, But Not Out, in Moscow

"If I were Brezhnev I'd say 'to hell with it' and go home." A Soviet diplomat in Beirut

As President Nixon made his happy progress through the Middle East, that remark probably summed up much of the anger and frustration felt by many Russian diplomats. In Washington last week Soviet officials indicated privately that Nixon's reception in Moscow two weeks from now will be more restrained than it might have been because of the Russians' displeasure over their eclipse in the Middle East. Ironically, the U.S. has gone out of its way to give the appearance that the Soviets have been involved in the Syrian-Israeli disengagement negotiations, even as Moscow has played down the U.S. role and permitted little reporting on Nixon's trip.

Moscow's pique is understandable. The predominant role in the Arab world that the Soviets created at a cost of billions of dollars in military and economic assistance during the past two decades has been dramatically undercut by Henry Kissinger's dazzling diplomatic tour de force and by the change in perspective on the part of several Arab leaders, notably Egypt's Anwar Sadat.

The problem for the Russians, say Soviet analysts, is that they are caught in a dilemma of exquisite subtlety: the more they succeed in supporting a settlement on Arab terms, the more their influence among the Arabs will decline. If there is a settlement in the region, the Arabs will no longer have to depend upon the Soviets for arms, and Soviet influence would lessen. Freed from confrontation with Israel, the Arab states would probably devote more of their energy to internal development.

The Soviet Union would find itself at a further disadvantage. As enormous new oil revenues begin to flow into the Arab countries, there is little inclination to spend them in the Soviet Union. Credits for inferior Soviet technology no longer amount to such an attractive deal. Iraq, the current epicenter of Soviet in fluence in the Middle East, is turning once again to the West for technology and investment. The country's biggest project, a $120 million deep-water terminal on the Persian Gulf, is being built by a Texas outfit and a West German company. A major expansion in oil production is being handled by a largely Western-owned concern.

There are, however, other long-term factors at work that seem to guarantee a significant Soviet role in the Middle East for years to come. The Soviets have been redoubling their diplomatic efforts in the Arab states that bracket Egypt: Libya, Syria and Iraq. Egypt and Syria still depend upon the Soviet Union for military supplies, and spare parts for current equipment will dictate a relatively close relationship for some time.

Aside from the Aswan High Dam, Moscow is believed to have nearly $2 billion in economic investment tied up in Egypt and almost $2 billion in military and economic assistance in Syria. If the Soviet presence declined dramatically, would or could the U.S. pick up where the Soviets left off? "I hope to God we don't," says one senior U.S. diplomat.

When the Geneva Conference gets under way, the Soviets no doubt will play a highly visible role as the Arabs' champion, even as they grudgingly acquiesced in Kissinger's peacemaking efforts. There is even some speculation that Moscow might renew its formal relations with Israel -- to whose existence as a state the Soviet Union is still committed -- in order to escape its present one-sided posture. But a more visible role at Geneva would result in merely a short-term success. In the long run, the formula still holds that the more the Soviets "succeed," the more it appears that they stand to lose. As Arab dependence upon Soviet military and diplomatic support declines, the Arabs will be looking elsewhere. They already are.

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