No to Cuba in Quito

In diplomacy, as in horse racing, sure things sometimes end up as also-rans. Before the start of last week's meeting in Quito of foreign ministers representing the Organization of American States, several Latin American diplomats were confidently passing the word that the OAS would vote to end the diplomatic and economic quarantine it slapped on Cuba in 1964. They were wrong. On the balloting, three nations (Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile) voted no, six (including the U.S.) abstained, and twelve were in favor--two less than the two-thirds majority necessary for passage.

In the past, efforts to lift the quarantine had failed because the U.S. had lobbied against allowing the Cubans back into the hemisphere community. This time, the proposal to bring Cuba into the fold collapsed because the U.S. did nothing. Before the meeting began, Under Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, who headed the U.S. delegation, declared that the U.S. would play a "tactically cool" game and would not try to influence the vote.

Crucial Abstentions. In the wake of the visit to Havana by Senators Claiborne Pell and Jacob Javits, the resignation of Castro-hating Nixon, and the Linowitz Commission report recommending a normalization of U.S. relations with Cuba (TIME, Nov. 18), many delegates were convinced that the U.S. was ready to accept the lifting of sanctions. In fact, the American delegation did arrive in Quito intending to vote yes if an unbeatable majority developed. But as the vote neared, the aloof U.S. posture clearly worked against Cuba. An abstention frustrated a two-thirds majority almost as effectively as a negative ballot. At the same time, some nervous, borderline nations interpreted the abstention as an indication that the Ford Administration really did not want the embargo lifted.

The crucial abstentions were those of Haiti and Guatemala, both of which had been counted on by the sponsors of the conference to support the lifting of sanctions. Haiti was widely accused of having abstained because neither side was willing to promise financial aid in return for its vote. If the U.S. had hinted that it would have liked to see the sanctions lifted, Guatemala's right-wing government might well have gone along, but with no such clue it abstained.

The vote may have hurt the U.S. and the OAS more than Cuba. Earlier, there had been favorable reaction to the new hands-off U.S. policy, which Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William D. Rogers described at Quito as "healthy." But Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio of Costa Rica, which had co-sponsored the Cuban measure with Venezuela and Colombia, was openly bitter. "We have helped the United States when they needed us," he complained, "but now that we need their help, they do nothing." After the Cuban proposal failed, some Latin American newspapers, and even diplomats, claimed that the OAS was dead. That clearly was not the case. However, as more and more Latin nations ignore the OAS embargo by recognizing and trading with Cuba, the organization's authority will inevitably be undermined. Venezuela, for example, is widely expected to become Castro's first non-Soviet source of oil.

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