The "Breakthrough" on SALT

"We have averted an arms race of unbelievable cost," declared President Ford. "A breakthrough," summed up Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. "It was something Nixon couldn't do in three years, but Ford did it in three months," said Presidential Press Secretary Ron Nessen in early exuberance, before apologizing for "a hasty and oversimplified remark."

Those comments on the preliminary SALT II agreement reached in Vladivostok between Ford and Soviet Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev apparently were the opening statements in another national debate over nuclear weapons. While there seemed to be a growing consensus that the impending deal is better than no agreement at all, it was nevertheless promptly criticized from two contrasting viewpoints: some critics felt that the U.S. was yielding too much, while various arms-control specialists complained that the pact would legitimize both nuclear deployment to date and the further development plans of the two superpowers over the next ten years.

While some details were yet to be revealed and others depend upon further negotiations, the general outlines were clear. If completed and ratified, the ten-year pact would impose two kinds of ceilings on strategic nuclear arms:

1) A limit of about 2,400 on the total number of missile launchers that each nation may deploy. That includes land-based and submarine-fired missiles; in addition, each long-range bomber would count as a single launcher, even though each plane can release more than one bomb. In a major concession, the Soviets dropped their demand that tactical nuclear weapons (both airborne and land-based) deployed with NATO forces in Europe be counted as launchers too.

The top limit would mean that the Soviets would have to phase out about 100 launchers, since they are now estimated to have some 2,500. This includes 1,618 ICBMS, 740 seaborne missiles and 150 bombers. For the U.S., a slight increase in launchers would be permitted. The U.S. now has about 2,200, including 1,054 land-based ICBMs, 656 submarine-fired missiles and 500 strategic bombers. Within the overall limit, each side would be able to alter the mix of its types of weapons.

2) As part of the 2,400 launchers allowed, each nation would be permitted to deploy a maximum of 1,300 missiles carrying multiple independently targeted warheads (MIRVS). Although the Soviets have been testing such weapons, they currently have deployed none. By next year they are expected to deploy their SS-17 and SS-19 missiles, which can carry about four warheads each.

They are also working on an SS-18 missile that can deliver up to eight individual warheads. The U.S. now has a huge advantage in MIRV missiles. By next year it will have deployed 1,046 MIRVS, including 550 Minuteman III missiles and 496 Poseidon missiles in 31 submarines. It should approach the 1,300 limit when ten new Trident submarines, each carrying 24 MIRV missiles, are completed in the mid-1980s.

The agreement thus is aimed at what Kissinger calls "equal aggregates"--a rough balance in missile launchers without limits on either the number of warheads each side may deploy or the explosive power of those warheads. The U.S. has placed a higher priority on the accuracy of its missiles, while the Soviet Union has emphasized higher firepower or "throw weight." Each side would be free to change that emphasis if it desired.

The precise number of allowable weapons may yet be altered in negotiations, although it is questionable whether minor changes would make much difference. A top U.S. defender of the agreement insists that "to win an advantage of 200 missiles more or less is no longer decisive strategically."

Superiority becomes important when it is great enough to prevent effective retaliation after a nuclear first strike. While the growing number of large Soviet MiRVed missiles permitted by the pact would pose a more serious threat to U.S. land-based ICBMS, less than half of the total U.S. nuclear megatonnage is committed to land missiles.

There is as yet no way for an enemy to track and eliminate a significant portion of the large U.S. missile-carrying submarine force in a single strike. The U.S. also has been experimenting with mobile ICBMS launched from cargo aircraft and missiles that can maneuver on re-entry to evade enemy defenses.

After congressional leaders were briefed by Ford, Democrat George Mahon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, said that "nobody was overwhelmed" by the agreement.

He called it "of considerable, but not monumental significance" and "the best that could be done at this tune." Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield said that "an equal reduction" in arms would have been better--although there seemed no chance of achieving it.

Briefed separately at the White House, Democratic Senator Henry Jackson said that the pact could cost billions and he was "astonished at the high levels" of launchers allowed. He too preferred arms reduction. Paul Nitze, former chief of the Pentagon's SALT advisers, said that he was "disappointed" because the Russians apparently will not be prevented from deploying "a new family of Soviet missiles."

No Danger. Some critics worried about whether cheating on the number of MIRV missiles could be detected. Pentagon experts seemed confident that U.S. analysis of Soviet missile testing will indicate which missiles have MIRV capability. Other experts claim that modifications in missile silos and in adjacent equipment for MIRVS can be detected by satellites.

Generally, the agreement seems to pose no new strategic danger for either side. Its merit is that it seeks to place some kind of cap on nuclear development--even though that cap does not fit very tightly. Observes Edward Luttwak, a Pentagon strategist: "The Air Force and the Navy can keep building whatever they want." So, of course, can the Soviet forces. Indeed, as each side maneuvers for the strongest possible position within the new arms limits, pressures toward a multibillion-dollar race to improve weapons may prove irresistible. By 1985, when the projected pact would run out, the two superpowers will presumably have made the most of the arms leeway permitted in the interval, and a new agreement will be necessary.

Meanwhile, there will have been no significant arms reduction and a limitation that is largely academic. That is not an overly impressive "breakthrough" in weaponry, however important it may be in maintaining the momentum of broader detente between the two superpowers.

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