Monday, Dec. 23, 1974

Fighting for the Leopard Spots

With good reason, some gloomy citizens in Saigon are by now convinced that the war in South Viet Nam will never end. Last week fighting between Communist and government troops reached its greatest intensity since the ineffective ceasefire, signed nearly two years ago. By week's end the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) had suffered 706 killed and 2,758 wounded; Saigon officials claim to have killed more than 3,600 of their enemies.

Most of the fighting was centered in the heavily populated and agriculturally rich Mekong River Delta area, known as Military Region IV. The Communists launched their attacks--primarily by rocket and mortar--against bridges, roads, district and provincial capitals, and government outposts manned by the increasingly feeble regional militia. Kien Tuong and Dinh Tuong provinces were particularly hard hit (see map). Communists in Kien Tuong, using a shoulder-fired missile, shot down a huge Chinook helicopter, killing all 54 government troops aboard. A major target was Highway 4, linking the Delta with Saigon.

Communist Gains. Heavy fighting also broke out in Military Region III, which consists of the eleven provinces surrounding Saigon. The town of Cu Chi, the rear headquarters of the 25th ARVN Division, was shelled. Communist mortar and artillery attacks in Tay Ninh province, especially around Nui Ba Den (Black Virgin Mountain), drove thousands of terrified refugees into already crowded Tay Ninh City. In Phuoc Tuy province, the Communists are attempting to gain control of several rubber plantations near the town of Long Thanh. Not far from there, they have organized the 301st Regiment of the so-called People's Liberation Armed Forces. Government military analysts believe this new command will direct intensified attacks around Saigon.

The South Vietnamese have retaliated with air and artillery strikes and have dispatched ground forces to recapture outposts. The Communists, however, have held on to most of their gains. The major reason: ARVN now has to fight more Communist soldiers than it has ever faced in the long history of the Viet Nam War. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces now number about 285,000, up 65,000 in the past two years. All-weather roads have replaced the slow Ho Chi Minh Trail as a supply route, down which ammunition and replacements flow from the North. Since U.S. bombing in Indochina ended last year, the crack North Vietnamese army (NVA) 5th Division has been able to return to its traditional base area in the Parrot's Beak inside Cambodia. There it poses a constant threat to Tay Ninh.

Saigon's forces also face serious internal problems. The regional militia has frequently proved to be unreliable. So far this year, militiamen have abandoned 40% of their 2,500 outposts in the Delta. The morale of regular ARVN troops, which has seldom been high, has recently fallen even farther, due in part to the continuing corruption within the Thieu regime and among ranking military officers (TIME, Nov. 11). Moreover, Saigon's economic squeeze--the result of the increased price of imported oil and a decrease in U.S. aid--has forced ARVN to economize on the battlefield. Many outposts are now limited to two artillery shells per day as a conservation measure. Fighter-bomber missions have been slashed by two-thirds and helicopter missions by nearly three-quarters to save fuel.

Foreign observers in Saigon believe that ARVN is still strong enough to defend most cities and the capital, but it will probably lose increasing chunks of the countryside. The resulting leopard-spot pattern will resemble the situation in South Viet Nam during the early 1960s, before the massive U.S. involvement in the war. According to a captured Communist document, one of the main goals of the Communists' current campaign is to establish secure military bases in the provinces from which they can attack the cities. Another is the disruption of the Delta rice harvest and the movement of goods between town and country. This would worsen the nation's already desperate economic situation and could strengthen the anti-Thieu opposition in the cities (TIME, Sept. 30).

Opposition leaders argue that Thieu must resign in favor of a government containing genuine "neutrals" which could strike a political bargain with the Communists. The Communists have made his removal a precondition for talks. Yet there is no sign that Thieu's government is crumbling. His recent reshuffling of the Cabinet and the top military command has diffused much of the opposition for the moment. With Thieu still in control, therefore, and the Communists apparently ready to intensify their military pressure, South Viet Nam surely faces a very bloody 1975.

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