Blueprint for Black Power-Maybe

Under increasing pressure, Smith decides to strike a deal

" It is a victory for moderation," beamed Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith last week. Standing on the sunny lawn of a red brick civil service building in Salisbury, Smith announced that he and three black nationalist leaders had reached agreement on a formula for black majority rule in Rhodesia. The proposal, which came after 2 1/2 months of almost daily negotiations, would bring to an end 90 years of white rule in the breakaway British colony, something Smith himself only a few years ago vowed would never happen "in a thousand years."

Many details, particularly on the makeup of a transition government, remain to be worked out. Moreover, the plan must be ratified in a referendum by Rhodesia's white voters. The proposal does, however, lay out the basic blueprint for a constitution, offering both new voting rights to the country's 6.4 million blacks and strong guarantees to its 268,000 whites. Chief among the stipulations is a new 100-seat Parliament, in which 28 seats would be reserved for whites for ten years, most to be elected under a formula that ensures domination by Smith's own Rhodesian Front Party.

The three black leaders--Bishop Abel Muzorewa, 52; the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, 57; and Senator Jeremiah Chirau, 54--are generally conceded to command a broad following among Rhodesia's blacks. Muzorewa, an American-educated Methodist minister and leader of the United African National Council, was welcomed back by a crowd of 200,000 in Salisbury last year, when he decided to return from his self-imposed exile to help work out a settlement. Sithole (who was traveling and thus was represented at last week's talks by a colleague, Elliot Gabella) does not enjoy Muzorewa's popularity, but he is considered to be a skillful political tactician. He also commands considerable financial resources from big London-based donors. Senator Chirau has the firmest political base among the conservative tribal chiefs, who still influence millions of the country's blacks.

A major difficulty, however, is the fact that the proposed settlement does not include representatives of the Patriotic Front, which has some 17,000 guerrillas in neighboring Mozambique and Zambia engaged in a war of attrition with the Smith government. As expected, Front Leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe castigated the internal settlement plan and vowed to step up the fighting. "We are going to hit each other hard," Nkomo said ominously after the announcement last week. "We intend to finish [Smith] up."

The settlement may pose a sticky dilemma for the U.S. and Britain, which have been trying to negotiate a transfer of power in Rhodesia that would include Nkomo and Mugabe. British Foreign Secretary David Owen, for example, has been sharply critical of the talks between Salisbury and the moderate black nationalists. But last week he responded to a barrage of Tory questions in the House of Commons by conceding that the agreement is "a significant step toward majority rule."

But America's U.N. Ambassador, Andrew Young, complained that the Smith plan does not address "the issues that have some 40,000 people fighting." Even so, Washington may eventually find itself facing an uncomfortable problem. How can it continue to push for a settlement that includes Nkomo and Mugabe if London decides to endorse Smith's accord with the moderates?

A looming danger noted by Young is that "there would be a massive commitment of Soviet weapons" to the Front that could touch off a brutal "black-on-black civil war." Indeed, the Front already gets most of its arms from Russia and China, and Moscow's eagerness to use African disputes to advance its own aims was demonstrated anew with its infusion of arms .and advisers into Ethiopia.

With mounting military pressures from the Patriotic Front, growing casualties and the increasing costs of fighting an expensive war, Smith had been forced to conclude that he could no longer maintain white minority rule. Thus last year he sent out feelers to the black leaders to come home to make a deal. It was and is a calculated gamble. The settlement could grow very shaky when Smith and the blacks actually sit down to try to form a transition government. For one thing. Smith has vowed to remain in control until after the white referendum, something that may not go down well with the blacks. For another, the government, whoever is in charge, will almost surely be faced with a step-up in the guerrilla war that will put new burdens on the hard-pressed Rhodesian army.

Smith hopes that his readiness to transfer power to Rhodesia's blacks will yield important dividends. By making his regime appear reasonable, for instance, the settlement could gain international recognition for Salisbury and an end to economic sanctions. There also could be a decline in guerrilla recruitment and a return of some black fighters loyal to the factions of Muzorewa and Sithole. If these hopes are fulfilled, the wily Smith will have finessed what has been perhaps the toughest challenge of his long political career. But if these hopes are false, then his settlement may prove to have been yet another wasted hour in Rhodesia's race against the clock.

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