Intransigence as Policy

Jerusalem springs a surprise interpretation of 242

As he shuttled back and forth between Jerusalem and Cairo last week, U.S.

Ambassador Alfred ("Roy") Atherton suffered a rude shock. The man who administered it was Israeli Premier Menachem Begin. While discussing the stalled peace negotiations, Begin told Atherton that he believed United Nations Resolution 242, which, among other things, calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, does not apply to the West Bank. Begin's curious argument: under the terms of 242, the Israelis need withdraw only from territories whose sovereignty they recognize, and Israel has never recognized Jordan's sovereignty over the West Bank.

This represents a serious hardening of Israel's position. If the feisty Premier sticks to his guns, it will be a grave setback to the peace process. President Carter said as much when he observed at his press conference that the "abandonment" of 242 "would put us back many months, or years," since that ingeniously ambiguous resolution has been the framework for all Middle East peace negotiations during the past decade. Begin's new stand would make it almost impossible for the completion of a declaration of principles that Israel and Egypt could sign; it would almost rule out any chance that Jordan's King Hussein would then join the peace process because Begin's interpretation of 242 forecloses Hussein's hope of getting back the West Bank territory he lost in 1967. If Begin does not have a quick change of mind before leaving for Washington next week, his visit with Carter may be an unsmiling one.

Writing in the Jerusalem Post, former Foreign Minister Abba Eban attacked Begin's position as "judicially frivolous." Davar, the semiofficial voice of the opposition Labor Party, declared: "The Israeli attempt to undermine the sanctity of 242 is a perilous maneuver. It only strengthens the impression that the government is fleeing any attempt to deal with fundamental questions and prefers formalistic sophistry and settlement gimmickry."

More gimmickry was in evidence last week. The Begin Cabinet, after days of heated debate over whether to stop the expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, finally concluded that there was "no need at this time for any new decision." Jerusalem's announcement highlighted a serious dispute within the fractious Begin Cabinet, which has Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon pressing ahead with new settlements while Defense Minister Ezer Weizman calls for an end to that activity during the negotiations. Using his military authority to fight the Sharon policy, Weizman ordered that some 20 young farmers be barred from moving into a new settlement in the Sinai.

Meanwhile, disturbed by what has happened to the peace momentum, Britain's Prime Minister, James Callaghan, has embarked on a modest re-entry for Britain into the Middle East tangle. During a recent quick visit to the region, his Foreign Secretary, David Owen, reported finding the Israelis more intransigent than ever, not merely about the settlements but also about making any serious concessions. One Israeli newspaper quoted Owen as saying of Begin, "I just can't stand that man. He doesn't even talk to you, he just preaches on and on, and what's more, he treats you like a kid." British diplomats dismissed the paper's account as a "wicked lie," but in any case, Owen's purported comments were milder than those that some Israelis have been making. During the height of the settlements controversy last week, an influential Israeli official said: "This government is run by crazy people, and this policy is complete madness. Sharon will enter Jewish history as the man who caused the greatest damage to the Jewish state in the shortest time, and Begin should be blamed as the leader who let it happen."

Though neither may enjoy it very much, Carter and Begin will have a lot to talk about. By the time Begin arrives, Defense Minister Weizman will have visited Washington, where he is expected to say that the proposed sale of sophisticated U.S. warplanes to Egypt and especially to Saudi Arabia could tempt the Israelis to launch a pre-emptive strike against the Arabs some time before the planes are delivered in the early 1980s.

During Begin's visit, Carter will try to reason with the Premier over Resolution 242 and persuade him to agree that the Palestinian problem must be resolved "in all its aspects." Begin will undoubtedly refuse. He will probably urge Carter to keep U.S. attitudes on the negotiations private (lest they stir Sadat's hopes) and argue heatedly against the U.S.-Arab warplane sale. Carter's reply, says a U.S. diplomat, will be "that the Administration has made up its mind, and that's that." It may develop that more than one man can say no at a summit.

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