Paving the Way for Consensus

A new strategy to separate a pragmatist from a zealot

"Better to jaw-jaw than war-war." So argued British Foreign Secretary David Owen, quoting the Churchillian maxim at the conclusion of the latest Anglo-American mission to southern Africa. The future of Rhodesia was as uncertain as ever last week as U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance completed his quick visit to Dar es Salaam, Pretoria and Salisbury and headed for Moscow. But Vance and his colleagues took comfort in the fact that the negotiating process was still alive. Moreover, the mission may have helped refine the Anglo-American strategy for trying to solve the Rhodesian mess.

Vance's immediate aim is to bring about a round-table conference between the two sides in what amounts to an ongoing civil war: Prime Minister Ian Smith and his three black partners in the so-called internal settlement, on the one hand, and the guerrilla leaders of the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, on the other. The chief failing of the Smith settlement is that its terms are unacceptable to the Patriotic Front leaders, who do not believe that it truly establishes majority rule in Rhodesia; hence they have vowed to continue fighting and accept Soviet and Cuban aid if necessary. Washington and London are pressing for a plan under which a British resident commissioner, with the help of U.N. peace-keeping forces, would run a transition government and supervise elections in which all parties would participate.

When Vance arrived in Africa in an effort to save the Anglo-American plan and broaden the base of the Rhodesian settlement, he was hopeful that both sides would agree to the round-table conference. After two days in Dar es Salaam, however, American negotiators complained that the Patriotic Front leaders were more adamant than ever about the role they want to play in a transition government and unwilling to say publicly that they would attend the round table. African observers insisted that Nkomo and Mugabe had merely adopted a tough negotiating posture and would make concessions later. Vance, however, was disappointed that he would not be able to tell the internal-settlement leaders flatly that the other side had agreed to attend the round table, and thus that Smith's group should do the same.

In Pretoria, Vance was encouraged that South African Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha tacitly urged him to carry on with his efforts for a broader Rhodesian settlement. Then, during five hours of talks in Salisbury, Vance and Owen tried to persuade Smith and his colleagues (sarcastically described by some observers as "the gang of four") that the Rhodesians had nothing to lose by attending a round-table meeting. Vance reportedly argued that the U.N. might be prepared to lift its economic sanctions against Rhodesia, at least partly, if the Salisbury regime would accept a U.N. supervisory force during the transition.

Smith did not flatly reject the notion of an all-parties conference, though he said later that he doubted that his black partners would see any value in such a meeting. U.S. officials were convinced, however, that the Rhodesians had listened carefully to at least two of the Vance-Owen arguments: that an accommodation with the Patriotic Front is necessary to stop the fighting and avert a larger war with Soviet and Cuban involvement; and that some kind of international presence would be desirable during the transition if the outcome of elections is to be globally accepted.

For public consumption, some members of the Salisbury coalition argue that they can end the guerrilla war without outside help. A spokesman for Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the principal black leader on the Executive Council, ridicules the idea of a round-table conference. He disclosed that the council is working on a new plan--something between an amnesty and a unilateral cease-fire--to induce the guerrillas to lay down their arms. The truth is, however, that one or two embarrassing cracks have already appeared in the two-month-old coalition, and it remains to be seen whether the government will be able to hold national elections as promised before the end of the year.

One fascinating aspect of the Rhodesian dilemma is the uncertain relationship between the two leaders of the Patriotic Front. Nkomo, a shrewd and experienced politician, favors a negotiated settlement and open elections because he thinks he has a chance of winning the presidency of an independent Zimbabwe, the African name for Rhodesia. Mugabe, the ideologue, is more committed to violent takeover and authoritarian rule thereafter. Unlike Nkomo, who has a base of political support among the Matabele tribesmen of southwestern Rhodesia, Mugabe is not widely popular at home and can only lose from an election. But if negotiations collapse and the fighting increases, Mugabe would probably be the chief beneficiary.

What intrigued Western observers last week was signs of tension between the two men. When Mugabe began to rave about how there could be no amnesty for war criminals and traitors after the liberation of Zimbabwe, Nkomo unceremoniously cut him off. When Mugabe told reporters he was a Marxist and would do his best to turn Zimbabwe into a one-party Marxist state, his more moderate colleagues appeared to be both embarrassed and annoyed. "Where is Robert?" demanded Nkomo irritably when Mugabe failed to show up at a press conference the two were supposed to give jointly. As it happened, Mugabe was upstairs preparing to give a press conference of his own.

Convinced that nobody except Mugabe has anything to lose from a round-table conference, American and British officials are pressing ahead with the plan for calling such a meeting within the next three months. One proposed site: Victoria Falls, with sessions alternating between the Rhodesian and Zambian sides of the magnificent border. Though they may be indulging in a bit of wishful thinking, Western officials suspect that the negotiating process would inevitably tend to separate the pragmatic Nkomo from the zealous Mugabe, and thus pave the way for a broader Rhodesian consensus.

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