A Week of Tough Talk

Soviet and U.S. leaders hurled bitter charges across the Atlantic. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks seemed all but stalled. NATO leaders put the final touches on plans to build up their forces. On many fronts and in many ways, it was an extraordinary week in foreign affairs, one in which numerous strands of tension wove together, pulling relations between the East and West to their lowest point in years.

Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev warned darkly about a "return, if not to the cold war, then at least to a 'chilly' war." Speaking in Prague, he accused NATO of accelerating the arms race. There may have been an element of grand standing in his statements, but they nonetheless signified that the Soviets were in no mood to budge on the issues that divide East and West. Said a veteran Western diplomat in Moscow: "It's the worst I've seen in a long time. They're not backing down an inch."

There was also tough talk in Washington as the Carter Administration stepped up its criticism of Moscow for meddling in Africa. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski harshly denounced the Soviets for violating the "code of detente" and for making a "shortsighted attempt to exploit global difficulties." Brzezinski and other U.S. officials maintained, in the face of Soviet and Cuban denials, that the rebels who invaded Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province last month had been trained by Cuban troops and equipped by Moscow. Insisted a White House aide: "We've got the goods on them. We've got a file three inches thick." The Administration was exploiting the issue of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Zairian crisis in order to make Carter look firm in dealing with the Soviet strategic threat (see WORLD).

Because of the heightened tensions, both sides overreacted to what normally would have been considered a rather minor incident. Two weeks ago, American construction workers discovered listening devices, including a dish-shaped antenna, in a chimney of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. At the base of the chimney, the workers found a tunnel, which they followed to a nearby Soviet apartment building. They caught a brief glimpse of a fleeing Russian, who had been monitoring listening equipment, then realized that they were on Soviet soil T--or, rather, beneath Soviet soil 5--and retreated. Administration officials called the incident "particularly nasty." Secretary of State Cyrus Vance protested personally to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Incredibly, Gromyko responded by complaining haughtily that the American workers had cut a Soviet cable--the one that connected the eavesdropping devices with the monitoring equipment.

While the two superpowers were exchanging salvos, the leaders of 15 NATO nations were in Washington to talk about rapidly growing Soviet military forces. To offset the threat to Western Europe, the NATO summit gave final approval to a 15-year program that will substantially increase the alliance's defenses. But despite their preoccupation with Europe, the NATO leaders wound up devoting much time to Soviet moves in Africa and President Carter's call for them to support the U.S. position. Said he: "Our alliance centers on Europe, but our vigilance cannot be limited to the Continent."

Carter's attacks on the Soviets represent a major policy change. Since entering office, the President has generally followed Vance's moderate approach of amiable cooperation with the Soviets. Indeed, Carter feels that he has gone more than halfway. He shelved the B-1 bomber. He deferred production of the neutron bomb. He toned down his human rights campaign a bit. He softened his initially tough SALT proposals.

Instead of reciprocating, Moscow, in the view of the Administration, got bellicose. Two weeks ago, after the crisis in Zaire, Carter decided that he had to speak out, both to voice his own frustration over dealing with Moscow and to end any suspicions at home and abroad that he was a weak leader on foreign affairs. Said a White House aide: "The U.S. has an interest, tactically and strategically, in letting the Russians know exactly where we stand. The NATO allies and the rest of the world also need to know that."

Thus, for the moment at least, Carter has adopted the hard-line stance that Brzezinski has been urging all along. Indeed, at this point even Vance is not far behind. Said a senior State Department official: "This is not a political reaction. It's not like Panama. This is a threatening situation, and it's coming from the guy [Brezhnev] who can really let us have it."

Besides, Administration officials figured, the strong talk might lay the groundwork on Capitol Hill for winning congressional approval of greater U.S. aid to friendly governments in Africa. In addition, the White House thought a firmer approach to Moscow might improve chances for Senate ratification of a new SALT treaty. Of course, by heightening American suspicion of the Soviets, this strategy might have the reverse effect.

Opposition to SALT has been growing in the Senate, partly because of fears that Carter has been too soft on the Soviets. As a result, the Administration is in no hurry to rush to an agreement, and is prepared to wait out the Soviets, at least until after the congressional elections. Said Brzezinski: "We have made, it seems to me, very proper, balanced proposals. If they are accepted, we could have an agreement within days. If they are not accepted, we will wait until they are accepted." The Soviets, however, are also in no mood to make concessions. When Vance and Gromyko emerged from a five-hour session in New York on SALT, they conceded that they had not moved any closer to agreement. Still, the Administration remains committed to seeking a new treaty. When the Washington Post reported last week that the U.S. had "decided effectively to freeze" the talks and would "reject any new Soviet proposals," Carter called an extraordinary press conference at which he angrily denounced the account as "totally inaccurate." He declared that U.S. policy was and is "to proceed aggressively with SALT discussions [and] to conclude a treaty as early as possible."

At the NATO conference, Carter's most difficult task turned out to be what seemed easiest at first: winning from Western leaders a measure of support on Africa. U.S. officials insisted that Carter was not pushing the alliance to get involved in Africa. Said State Department Spokesman Hodding Carter III: "Our basic concern is that Africa remain an African problem." Just what Western nations should do to prevent outsiders from interfering in African affairs was to be discussed at a meeting in Paris that was deliberately kept separate from NATO.

The Administration's criticism of Soviet activities in Africa received a hearty welcome only from Belgium and France.* The West Germans, who have been strong critics of Carter's Soviet policies in the past, were largely pleased. But Chancellor Helmut Schmidt cautioned the Administration against going too far. Said he: "Acute crises of the moment should not be allowed to cloud the overall horizon." However, British Prime Minister James Callaghan, a staunch supporter of Carter, was dismayed by the Administration's preoccupation with Africa. Said Callaghan: "There seem to be a number of Christopher Columbuses setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time. It's been there a long time."

Callaghan's sarcasm was directed mostly at Brzezinski, whom the British regard as having panicked over a part of the world he knows little about. Callaghan now sees himself in the role of a wise old uncle trying to steer the President back toward a more cautious approach to the Soviets. According to an aide, the Prime Minister fears that the West is "in a race with death to get a SALT agreement." Callaghan, explains the aide, believes that if Brezhnev, who is ailing, should die without having signed an arms accord, "the new Soviet leadership might become immobile on detente."

Behind closed doors, there was sharp debate among the NATO leaders over what stand the alliance should take on Africa. West Germany, France, Belgium and the U.S. were said to support some form of counteraction to the Soviet involvement, perhaps along the lines of the limited U.S. airlift that ferried Belgian and French paratroopers to Zaire and that last weekend began flying in Moroccan troops to take their place as a peace-keeping force. But in the end, the NATO leaders softened their final communique to a bland warning to the Soviets against exploiting "situations of instability and regional conflict in the developing world."

Despite the distractions of Africa, the conference devoted a considerable amount of its discussions to the Soviet Union's rapid military buildup. According to a NATO study, the U.S.S.R. will continue to strengthen its forces during the 1980s.

On the other hand, NATO analysts foresee growing animosity between Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies. The study urged the U.S. to persist in seeking closer ties with Eastern Europe at Moscow's expense. But one Soviet relationship, that with Prague, seems likely to stay firm for quite some time. Czech President Gustav Husak last week actually thanked the Soviets for their "unselfish assistance" in invading his country ten years ago and toppling the liberal Dubcek regime.

The NATO summit endorsed a long-term plan to improve the alliance's defenses. Pentagon planners estimate that the program will cost between $60 billion and $80 billion, with the U.S. paying a bit more than half. Carter also reaffirmed a longstanding policy to defend Europe with atomic weapons, if necessary. Proclaimed the President: "An attack on Europe would have the full consequences of an attack on the United States. Let there be no misunderstanding, the United States is prepared to use all the forces necessary for the defense of the NATO area."

While the Western leaders easily reached agreement on the defense program, they sidestepped another serious problem: the hostility between NATO members Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. One senior diplomat called the schism "a serious menace to NATO'S eastern flank, perhaps even to the alliance's future. It is a terrible wound." Making it even worse, in NATO'S eyes, is Congress's 1974 embargo on U.S. arms shipments to Turkey, which used weapons provided by the U.S. in Cyprus.

Last week Carter began an all-out effort at persuading the House to lift the ban later this month. Meeting at the White House with 14 Congressmen who favor repeal, Carter said that the embargo had "driven a wedge" between the U.S. and Turkey and "shaken very seriously the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance" (see WORLD). In a strategy memo distributed to the Congressmen, the Administration outlined a lobbying effort every bit as intensive as the one that preceded Senate approval of the Middle East plane deal.

All in all, it had been a critical fortnight in U.S. foreign policy, and one that U.S. officials figured had been highly successful. Carter had shown new vigor in handling challenges from overseas, and aides thought that he had gone far toward dispelling any notions, particularly in Moscow, that he was a pushover. They also argued that despite the fears of some NATO allies, the President had not gone too far. Noted a White House official: "We don't view all this as an inevitable escalation to another cold war. There is an ebb and flow in the competition and cooperation. That will continue, and we will compete when necessary."

*The U.S. did gain an ally at the U.N. when Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua said of the Soviet Union: "It is the most dangerous source of a new world war and is sure to be its chief instigator." Last weekend Hua visited Zaire, where he declared that the invasion had been part of the Soviets' aggressive world strategy.

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