Testing, Testing, Testing

For Jimmy Carter, the presidency must sometimes seem like an endless series of tests in which he is asked to prove that he is capable of leading the nation. In foreign policy particularly, the rambunctious 95th Congress is determined to judge every use of the authority that the Constitution grants him. Last week the Administration underwent two of these trials--on Turkey and Rhodesia--and while the results were mixed, Carter earned passing grades for leadership. But coming up this week: a new exam on foreign aid.

At his last press conference, Carter declared that "the most important foreign affairs subject Congress will consider the rest of this session" is the lifting of the 42-month-old embargo on U.S. arms shipments to Turkey. Ironically, Carter as a presidential candidate had vigorously backed the ban.

The controversial policy dates back to 1974 when Greek Cypriots overthrew the government of Cyprus, and Turkey invaded the island to protect the Turkish minority there. Using U.S. weapons that were specifically prohibited for other than defense purposes, the Turks eventually seized nearly half the island. They have been occupying it ever since.

The U.S. embargo was supposed to pressure the Turks to withdraw and accept a negotiated Cyprus settlement. Instead, the main result is that Western defenses have been weakened. Although a loophole in the embargo has enabled the Turks to receive some $425 million in U.S. arms, Washington officials are worried that the Turkish armed forces are seriously deteriorating. In addition, the U.S. wants to recover five key intelligence-collecting bases in Turkey, from which it had been electronically monitoring the Soviet Union, but which the Turks closed in retaliation against the embargo. As Carter summed up the problem, the embargo "has driven a wedge between Turkey and the rest of the NATO countries."

But getting the Senate to vote to lift the embargo was not simple. Senators were subjected to considerable pressure by the pro-Greek lobby. Democrat Paul Sarbanes of Maryland, for example, asserted that the embargo must remain because "at no point have there been concrete actions by the Turkish forces to return any of the fruits of their aggression." On the other side, the Administration applied more pressure than on any foreign issue since the Panama Canal treaties and the Middle East plane deal. Every Senator was reached at least once, and many met personally with Carter. The President had three breakfast meetings devoted to the topic and made scores of personal phone calls to press his cause. And private lobbyists for both sides of the issue were as busy as the White House.

Although the Administration wanted a total repeal of the embargo, Majority Leader Robert Byrd insisted that such a measure could not pass. Instead, he and George McGovern proposed a compromise. Deferring somewhat to the Greeks, the compromise called for an end to the embargo but kept some limits on arms sales to Turkey. The President would have to certify that any military or economic assistance to that country would contribute to peace in Cyprus. He would also have to report to Congress every 60 days on progress toward a settlement. When the Senate approved the measure 57 to 42, the State Department, with an almost audible sigh of relief, praised the legislators for "statesmanlike action."

Carter's victory in the Senate is only half the battle. The same issue comes up this week in the House, where the top leaders favor the embargo. Speaker Tip O'Neill has characterized his position on the issue as "up to the knees in cement." An Administration aide cautions: "It's winnable. But we don't have the votes yet."

The day following the Turkey vote, the Senate considered the economic sanctions voted by the U.N. in 1966 and 1968 to isolate the white Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith after it refused to share power with the black majority. The Administration wanted no change in U.S. policy. It views the sanctions as a powerful lever to prod Smith to accept an Anglo-American plan for a comprehensive settlement. This plan calls for participation by all black factions, guerrillas based outside the country as well as moderate nationalists inside. But there has been a growing feeling in Congress that the Administration's commitment to this formula does not pay enough attention to important developments in Rhodesia.

Earlier this year, Smith made a long overdue offer to begin sharing political power with the blacks immediately and to hold free elections, based on universal adult suffrage, by Dec. 31. This proposal was accepted by a number of Rhodesia's most prominent moderate black nationalists, who had long opposed Smith's regime. The popular Bishop Abel Muzorewa, for example, sees Smith's plan as a chance to establish black rule peacefully, although there is mounting evidence that this view is much too optimistic (see WORLD). Smith's plan has been rejected by the leaders of the radical Patriotic Front, guerrillas who have been waging an increasingly costly war against the Salisbury regime. Charging that the elections will be rigged and that the white minority would retain too much power, the Patriotic Front insists on being guaranteed a dominant role in the new government.

According to a growing number of Senators, U.S. sanctions favor the Patriotic Front's demands at the expense not only of Smith but also of the black moderates. Most outspoken of these Senators has been Jesse Helms, a conservative Republican from North Carolina. He sponsored a bill demanding that the embargo be ended unconditionally until the end of this year. As a middle way, New Jersey Republican Clifford Case, along with New York's two Senators, Republican Jacob Javits and Democrat Daniel Moynihan, drafted a compromise that would enable the President to lift the sanctions if 1) the Salisbury government tries in good faith to bring the Patriotic Front into negotiations for a settlement; 2) free elections, under international supervision, are then held. Said Case: "We want to give militant Rhodesian blacks a fair crack at participating in the government. But we don't feel that they should be allowed to shoot their way in." When the Senate adopted that reasoning by a vote of 59 to 36, the State Department once again sounded relieved. Said a spokesman: "We can live with that quite easily."

White House worries about the Rhodesian sanctions are still far from over. The issue now goes to the House of Representatives, which is believed to be more sympathetic to the hard-line position advocated in the Senate by Helms.

As tough as last week's tests were, they may pale when compared with what the Administration faces on foreign aid. This week the House plans to take up the $7.3 billion program that the President has called the "absolute minimum" needed to maintain the nation's global role. Though already down $1.1 billion from the Administration's original request, this sum is almost certain to be further slashed--even by some of those who complain that the U.S. is not exercising sufficient world leadership. Assessing the bill's chances, Wisconsin Democrat David Obey, a staunch aid advocate, could only mutter: "Hopeless." Added an Administration lobbyist: "There's no way we can avoid a cut."

Foreign aid, of course, is a legislative orphan without much of a constituency, and it has seldom had an easy time in Congress. But this year the ripples from California's Proposition 13 antitax referendum have converted nearly all Congressmen into professed cost-cutters. The grants and easy credit loans given to more than 100 countries make a tempting target. Even the bill's floor manager, Maryland Representative Clarence Long, plans to propose a $584 million cut this week. The way Jimmy Carter fights to save his foreign aid program may indeed be a telling test of his presidency. qed

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.