War of Words, Hope for Peace

"We shall not give even a single grain of the sands of the Sinai as a gift." --Israeli Premier Menachem Begin

"[Begin] is like a man who steals your cow. You ask for it back, and he demands a ransom." --Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

Never had the war of words between the Middle East's two outspoken protagonists been quite so bitter; never before had their personal animosity been so nakedly displayed. As Cairo's semiofficial daily al-Ahram put it last week: "The Middle East question has reached a peak of political and diplomatic confrontation that is no less ferocious than the October War." Nonetheless, Washington remained hopeful that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance might breech the gap a bit on his trip to the Middle East this week. Both sides, in fact, are expected to participate in another foreign ministers conference like the one the U.S. arranged in Britain last month.

The latest furor was touched off by the Israeli Cabinet's decision to reject Sadat's proposal, informally made to Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman in Austria, that the Begin government respond to his Jerusalem peace initiative with a small gesture of good faith. Sadat had suggested that Israel return El Arish, the capital of the Sinai, and historic Mount Sinai, site of the Greek orthodox monastery of St. Catherine's. If El Arish were returned to Egyptian sovereignty, the President hinted, it could be used as the site for new peace talks. As for Mount Sinai, Sadat hoped to lay the cornerstone for an ecumenical center containing a Christian church, an Islamic mosque and a Jewish synagogue on the fifth anniversary of the October War this fall.

At the Israeli Cabinet meeting, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan argued that Israel should not make such a unilateral concession. But instead of sending the Israeli rejection through private channels, Begin publicly announced after the meeting that "nobody can get anything for nothing, and this is going to be the policy of Israel." Sadat, who had never intended that his informal request should be publicized at all, was stung. When Begin's letter informing him of the decision arrived the next day, he rejected it. As a further sign of his fury, Sadat then ordered home the nine-man Israeli military mission that had remained in Egypt since the military talks broke off in February. Later in the week Sadat said in a speech in Alexandria that even though Begin was a "prevaricator," he wanted all Jewish people to know that he would not give up his peace initiative.

In Israel, meanwhile, the Labor Party opposition kept up its attack on Begin for his handling of foreign policy, his failure to halt inflation and even his physical and mental ability to carry on as Premier. "Clumsy," said former Foreign Minister Abba Eban of the handling of the Sadat request. Said another high-ranking political opponent after the Israeli mission was sent home: "This is the beginning of the end. We are heading toward the total collapse of the peace negotiations."

At last week's Cabinet session, the Premier, who has twice been hospitalized for a heart condition, conceded that "a month ago, I was very ill and could hardly function." He was as feisty as ever, though, at a stormy, seven-hour Knesset debate on foreign policy. The Premier's Likud-dominated coalition handily turned back a no-confidence motion introduced by the Labor Party by a vote of 70 to 35. But Israel's internal debate over its response to the Egyptian peace initiative continued. Last week TIME Jerusalem Bureau Chief Dean Fischer and Correspondent David Halevy interviewed Foreign Minister Dayan and Opposition Leader Shimon Peres concerning the differences in their positions on the major issues that face Israel. Their answers:

ON DISAGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT

Dayan: The main point of disagreement is the Egyptian concept that there should be a commitment by Israel before the five-year transition period starts by which Israel would undertake to withdraw settlements and soldiers and everything from the territories and that an Arab sovereignty would take its place there. Our concept is that we should have the right not only to keep the present Israeli settlements but to go on buying more land and establishing more settlements on the principle that we should not be considered foreigners in the West Bank and Gaza. It is not a question of Arab sovereignty. It was a [British] mandate, and it was taken by force by the Jordanians and the Egyptians, and then it was retaken by force by us [in 1967]. So we do not accept their claim that it is sovereign Arab land.

Peres: Although I feel that there is enough room to reach an agreement, I do not close my eyes [to the difficulties]. I know that there are major problems and that some are objectively difficult to solve. In my talks with President Sadat, I got the impression that there is no real call for the redivision of Jerusalem. Yet the Arab position is to demand their own flag raised in the city. Concerning changes on the frontiers, Sadat does distinguish between the Sinai, which has a recognized international border, and the West Bank, where all the lines resulted from wars. On [Israel's] military presence, I feel that it could be negotiable. On the settlements, the real call, and I disagree with it, was to remove the settlements in the Rafah area [in northern Sinai]. I did not hear similar language on the West Bank settlements.

ON LIKUD-LABOR DIFFERENCES

Dayan: We have agreements and disagreements with the opposition. The Labor Party does not accept a Palestinian state; they would not accept going back to the old lines; they would not accept negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization; they do not want to desert the settlements. They created settlements on the Golan Heights, in the Jordan Valley and in the Sinai. So we're in good company. As for the solution, they say they are for a territorial compromise [in the West Bank] but a meaningful one. If such a proposal is brought up by the other party, we shall consider it, negotiate over it, but this is not our plan. I think that there are better chances for the administrative autonomy that we proposed rather than trying to draw a partition line which just doesn't exist. And when [the Laborites] talk about a declaration of principles, what do they mean? When you want to face reality, you must say I want either this or that. Does a declaration relieve you of sitting down and talking point by point about what will happen on the ground?

Peres: I disagree with the Israeli government's attitude. The declaration of principles might even bring Jordan's King Hussein into the peace negotiations. If I were in power, I would tactically conclude first the declaration of principles about the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Afterward I would conclude the negotiations on Sinai. I do not believe we can reach agreement with the Egyptians on Sinai without having reached an agreement in principle on the future of the West Bank and Gaza. The next step would be to announce our preference for a territorial compromise that will comprise two major elements--the principle of withdrawal from sections of the West Bank on the one hand and secure boundaries for Israel on the other. I believe the principle of withdrawal would help other Arabs to come in and join the peace process, and the principle of defensible borders for Israel will cover the main concern of Israel. I already told President Sadat that we have no desire for foreign [peace-keeping] forces.

ON THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK

Dayan: We do not rule out negotiations and discussions over the sovereignty of the West Bank. What we say is, let's discuss it toward the end of the five-year transition period. During the five-year period, we are going to pay more than half the price the Arabs are asking for-- a down payment, a very substantial one--abolishing the military regime. I believe any Arab country, if it knows the other alternative is just to go on with things as they are, should accept that. We are not ready to make a precommitment. After five years, God knows where Sadat will be, where Begin will be, and who is going to be the President of the United States.

Peres: To force the negotiations to move, we will have to call the Jordanians into the peace negotiations and suggest that they share with us the administration of the West Bank for the duration of the interim period. I would not exclude joint patrols, joint police forces and all other types of practical cooperation. [The Labor Party] has already agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories. The Vienna document put forth by Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and drafted by Abba Eban is more clearly defined and carries many more commitments.

ON PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Dayan: I am not worried about the possibility that the Egyptians do not want to make any move, but I am worried about the main question of whether they are in a position to make a peace over the West Bank and Gaza. Sadat says the Palestinian issue is the heart of the problem. But in that case, he has to have King Hussein and the Palestinian Arabs sitting with him in his delegation. From what I hear and know, King Hussein is very reluctant to come into negotiations without Syria. And [Syrian President Hafez]Assad is saying "I cannot make peace without the P.L.O. and without the Russians coming." So the question is, what really is going on between us and Egypt? We can deliver the goods. We speak for Israel. But is the other partner in the position to make a peace treaty with us, or is he only putting forward demands and asking questions and requesting that we commit ourselves?

Peres: We are the opposition party. But we have to distinguish between two timetables: the political timetable and the foreign-policy timetable. The elections are due in another three years, and on that timetable we are in no hurry. Yet there is a foreign-policy calendar with its own dates. It is on that schedule that we should try to make our opinions heard very loud and clear and to add our own contribution to policymaking. There are times when the leadership has to represent the wishes of the people and other times when the leadership has to lead. The peace negotiations are the overriding consideration of our people, and this is guiding us. qed

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