A Sudden Vision of Peace

From the beginning it had been one of the most remarkable meetings of world leaders ever conceived, let alone enacted. In the end it turned out, against all expectations, to be a summit of astonishing and perhaps ultimately historic achievement. After 13 days of being cloistered with their closest aides at Camp David, President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin emerged Sunday night to sign before the television cameras and the watching world two documents that were giant efforts toward peace in the Middle East. Though considerable obstacles and hard bargaining remain, it was a major breakthrough in areas that have defied all the efforts of war and diplomacy for three decades. The outcome was substantially more than anyone except perhaps Host Jimmy Carter had believed possible before the summit began--and immensely more than had been anticipated right up to the Sunday on which the summit was to end, apparently in failure.

The first document was titled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East." As ambitious as its name, it envisaged in great detail the mechanics, if not all the solutions, that would enable Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians to work out over five years the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, a measure of autonomy for the Palestinians in those regions, and gilt-edged guarantees of security for Israel.

The second document was "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." Except on one critical point left unresolved, the status of Israeli settlements in the occupied Sinai, it was even more precise and explicit. It called for an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to be signed within three months, major Israeli withdrawals within three to nine months after that, the normalization of all relationships between the two countries within a year and complete Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory within three years. Though the two agreements were not contingent upon each other, the aim was clear: through their joint application they could create a climate and a context of progress toward peace that would bring along the more reluctant elements in the Middle East that were not represented at Camp David, upon whose ultimate cooperation any durable peace depends. That includes not only the other Arab nations and the Palestinians, but also those in Israel opposed to any return of Arab territories or dismantling of Israeli settlements in them.

The magnitude of their triumph was evident as the three leaders spoke in turn Sunday night in the gold and crystal East Room of the White House where some 400 Congressmen, Cabinet members and the trio's staff had hastily assembled. His face ashen with fatigue but punctuated by repeated smiles, Carter announced the broad outlines of the two agreements, declaring, "My hope is that the promise of this moment will be fulfilled." Sadat, initially somber, was almost reverential in his praise of Carter for calling the summit. Said he: "You took a gigantic step."

Begin, chatty at first, turned serious to sound the same note of praise. "It was really the Jimmy Carter conference ... the President of the U.S. won the day," he said. "Peace now celebrates a great victory for the nations of Egypt and Israel and for all mankind." Turning to Sadat, Begin recounted how they had become friends on first meeting, when Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem last November. Begin alluded to the difficulties (largely of his making) that had brought all progress to a halt in the intervening months, but waved them away, saying "Everything belongs to the past." He said he and Sadat were friends anew, and as a now smiling Sadat nodded in vigorous assent, he challenged Sadat and himself to sign their peace treaty even before the three-month deadline. Finished, Begin rose to embrace Carter. Then, in an emotional piece of theater as telling as anything the three men had said, Begin walked behind Carter to Sadat and the two men embraced, not once but twice. Not since Sadat had stepped from his plane into the klieg lights at Tel Aviv airport ten months ago had peace in the Middle East seemed so palpably possible.

Which is not to say it is at hand, for all the promise the Camp David agreements hold out. The aim at the summit was to reach some accord on questions that have blocked an Arab-Israeli peace settlement since the 1967 war: How is Israeli security to be assured? Who has sovereignty over the Jordan River's West Bank? What will be the status of the Palestinians? Carter Administration officials praised the dual agreement as marking the first time that a framework has been created to deal with the three fundamental issues that have prevented settlement: peace, Israeli withdrawal and security, and the Palestinians. But they readily acknowledge that some of the thorniest issues have been left for future resolution, as an analysis of the two agreements shows. Both are indeed frameworks, carefully and even ingeniously latticed in places, gapingly unfinished in others. A precis of each:

Framework for a Peace in the Middle East is designed to permit the progressive resolution of the Palestinian issue over the next five years--the transition period that Israel and Egypt agreed should precede the actual signing of a peace treaty for the entire area. The negotiations during the interim period are meant to enable the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, who are mostly Palestinians, to obtain full autonomy and self-government at the end of the five years. Ideally, those negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians living in the occupied lands, and will conclude with, among other things, a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. But getting Jordan and the Palestinians to participate in those negotiations may be no easy task, particularly since the agreement leaves it to the negotiations to determine the exact nature of the sovereignty of Gaza and the West Bank. Of help will be the fact that Israel has agreed that the settlement will be based on all the provisions and principles of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the 1967 war. That is a major Israeli concession: the West Bank and Gaza are among those territories.

In return, Israel will be permitted to maintain a military presence at specific locations in the occupied lands, during the transition, to ensure its security, and there are further, detailed provisions for demilitarized zones, early warning stations, an international (meaning U.N.) peacekeeping force, and the gradual creation of local police forces. No U.S. troops will be used. During the negotiations, Israel has promised not to build any new settlements in Gaza or the West Bank. Left unmentioned as too tricky for even a "framework" discussion was the status of East Jerusalem.

Framework for a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel affirms Israel's willingness to restore to Egypt sovereignty over the Sinai. It also affirms Egypt's willingness to make peace and establish normal relations with Israel. The document provides for security zones and for limitations offerees and armaments in the Sinai. It calls for the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the return of two of Israel's air bases in the Sinai to Egyptian civilian control. Much of that would take place within a year, assuming there is a signed peace treaty within three months.

Virtually the only important issue left unresolved is the status of the 17 Israeli settlements in the Sinai. Sadat had wanted, as Carter pointed out formally Sunday night, an Israeli agreement to remove the settlements as a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel, the President said, wanted to leave the issue for further negotiation. In an adroit move, Carter won a promise, which he pointedly aired in his report, that Israel's parliament, the Knesset, will come to a decision on the fate of the settlements within the next two weeks. The aim is to put world pressure on the Israelis not to be responsible for delaying peace with Egypt by continuing to insist the settlements are inviolable. Earlier in the week, a U.S. official had said of Israel's surprisingly strong stand on the Sinai settlements, where Israel has no sovereignty: "It's incredible. The Israelis are sticking Sadat right where it hurts him most." The issue is also a very heated one in Egypt; Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel was noticeably absent from the festivities in the East Room.

Never in the history of modern international negotiations have leaders been so isolated for so long in so single-minded an attempt to resolve the antagonisms that have divided their nations. They were working under highly unusual conditions. In contrast to the deadly serious items on the negotiating table was the bucolic setting of Camp David, with an enchanting hint of autumn in the air. The mood of informality was evident from the participants' attire. Instead of the pinstripe suits of traditional diplomacy, Carter wore faded denims, an old cardigan and comfortable sneakers. Sadat, in his elegantly tailored safari suits and sports coats, resembled a Continental taking the waters at a spa. Even Begin, whose sartorial formality is one of his trademarks, occasionally shed his coat and tie. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman sported windbreakers bearing the Camp David seal, and U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wore a submariner's jacket at several sessions.

Also unusual was the meeting's nearly total isolation from the probes of the world's press. It may well have been the rule of strict secrecy that enabled the conference to go on as long as it did, and thus make possible Sunday's dramatic turnabout. Not having to face a barrage of questions from newsmen, the participants had no need to posture or issue self-serving and sometimes inflammatory statements.

What was perhaps most unusual of all was the very cast of characters. Seldom has such an extraordinary trio of leaders gathered in common purpose: a Christian, a Jew and a Muslim, each a man of deep faith who believes that while he is responsible for the welfare of his people, he also serves a higher authority. This can humble a leader; but it can also encourage him to take worthwhile--or dangerous--risks. For Carter, a born-again Baptist, the strength of his faith may have helped inspire him to convene the summit, even while knowing its possible collapse would further dim hopes for peace. As Carter perhaps optimistically saw it, the potential benefit--a major step toward resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict--was greater than the risk.

Sometimes the marathon at Camp David resembled an eleventh-hour labor-management negotiation aimed at fending off a crippling strike. Sometimes the atmosphere recalled that of a religious retreat. In other respects, especially the near total seclusion, the conference resembled the recent conclave that elected Pope John Paul I--but in this case there were not even the periodic wisps of smoke from the Sistine Chapel to let the outside world know what was going on. Right until the end, Camp David was emitting no definitive signals.

As a result, nobody was ever sure whether what one high U.S. aide called Carter's "gigantic effort" was succeeding or if there was serious trouble. In fact, there were lots of both. Except for White House Press Secretary Jody Powell's terse briefings on nonsubstantive matters, there was nothing to go on, nothing for a frustrated worldwide press corps of some 350 to report. Meanwhile, an anxious and intently concerned globe waited ... and waited.

At one midweek point it seemed as if a conclusion--and not a very satisfactory one--was imminent. Powell announced that the talks had entered their "final stages." U.S. officials were making it known that they would like to wrap up the conference before the start of another weekend of triple sabbaths. But only a day after his statement, Powell retreated, explaining with prescience that "the final stage could be the longest stage." He added that "a framework for reaching peace" was still beyond grasp and that "more progress and more flexibility are essential." But as was to happen frequently in the following days, Carter refused to give up.

An Arab-Israeli settlement was becoming increasingly urgent because a number of other serious problems are endangering Middle East stability. Unrest and violence are rocking Iran, and war continues to rage in Lebanon. Said Israeli Acting Premier Yigael Yadin in Jerusalem: "The situation in Iran and Lebanon may help move things at Camp David. Often the best cure for a headache is to have someone kick you in the stomach." Another source of trouble is the increasing Soviet presence in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf areas and Soviet ventures in Africa.

With the stakes so high at Camp David, and the information quotient so low, it was understandable that rumor reigned. For every "highly placed" source predicting progress there was a "well-informed" source insisting that the talks were going grimly. Rumors on the course of the discussions described everything from major concessions to hopeless stalemate.

In fact, no one outside Camp David had any clear idea of what was happening at the bargaining tables. After advocating "open diplomacy" in his election campaign and first months in office, Carter proved himself a master of the old-fashioned art of secret negotiations. He even managed to get silence from the often leak-prone Israelis. Premier Begin, for example, told his colleagues in Jerusalem by telephone that he could not say much about the talks because Carter had asked him not to. When Defense Minister Weizman was asked by newsmen how the Israelis were doing, he cryptically responded: "We are doing."

The reason for the successful news blackout was that the Egyptians and Israelis agreed to allow Jody Powell to serve as the sole official outlet of information #151;surely one of the toughest assignments ever handed a White House press secretary. In his daily meetings with reporters inside the American Legion post at Thurmont, Md., six miles from Camp David, Powell kept his statements concise and skillfully avoided conveying anything substantive. He deflected questions about concessions on the part of Israel or Egypt by noting diplomatically: "There's been flexibility shown on both sides." To ensure that this modest observation did not unduly raise hopes for a successful outcome, he added that "substantial differences still remain in important areas" and cautioned against "strong optimism or pessimism."

If Powell's briefings did little more than confirm that a summit was in session, at least they provided a skeletal view of events inside Camp David. In the first days of the conclave, it was clear that the U.S. was feeling out the positions of both the Israelis and Egyptians. As part of this process, the three leaders met together three times, for a total of 6 1/2 hours. Although the three weekend sabbaths--Muslim, Jewish and Christian--slowed the pace of the talks somewhat, they gave the participants an opportunity to review what they had learned and analyze potential areas of compromise.

On the summit's first weekend, the participants took a respite from diplomacy when Carter, at military-buff Begin's request, organized a 3 1/2-hour excursion to Gettysburg's Civil War battlefield, some 17 miles north of Camp David. As the group viewed monuments and century-old cannons, Carter attempted to lighten the mood by joking that the gun had a range of three miles, vs. 300 to 400 yds. for the cluster bombs that the U.S. sold to Israel after the 1973 war. Sadat and Begin somehow managed a laugh. But reporters accompanying the entourage noticed a marked lack of warmth between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders; they barely spoke to each other during the excursion. When Sadat did talk to an Israeli, it was to Weizman, his favorite member of the Begin Cabinet.

As last week's sessions began, Powell indicated that the negotiations had become "even more intense." He stressed that Carter "has been an active participant in the discussions. He has felt free to offer suggestions as they seem to be appropriate." The style and tempo of the summit, in fact, recalled Carter's long pursuit of the presidency: a stubborn, dogged approach to tough issues and an assumption that sheer strength and determination must eventually triumph.

The review of the summit's opening days convinced the U.S. that Begin and Sadat were disagreeing so sharply on some basic issues that it would be wise to quit holding joint sessions. Instead, Carter began conducting what is known in diplomacy as "proximity talks." Because Sadat and Begin were in lodges less than 100 yds. apart, Carter was able to move easily from a bilateral conversation with one to a chat with the other. Meanwhile, trilateral meetings continued between ministerial-level officials, such as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan and Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel.

After several intense sessions between he Americans and Egyptians, Sadat telephoned Jordan's King Hussein in London. Since the King's cooperation is essential for any enduring Middle East peace, it was thought Sadat had heard something new from the Israelis and wanted to try it out on the Jordanian. Powell's disclosure of the phone call even triggered some speculation, which proved quite unfounded, that Hussein was planning to join the talks. Remarked one of the King's aides about the Sadat phone call: "His Majesty was very pessimistic about Camp David before the summit began and has heard nothing to change that view." At this point, word began circulating that the summit was deadlocked. Begin, Sadat and Carter had not formally met with each other since the preceding Thursday and had not even been together since the Gettysburg outing. The Arab and Israeli leaders had not exchanged a substantial word for days. Hearing of the deadlock speculation, Powell exclaimed: "There is not any 'stalemate'! Period."

On Wednesday Powell was more guarded than ever at his briefing. He talked of "final stages." He said so many meetings were taking place simultaneously that "I can't imagine any more intensive period of discussions." But he added, "There is still no basis for informed speculation as to the final outcome."

With the proceedings seemingly winding to a close as the weekend neared, Vance, Dayan, Kamel and other top officials from the three sides entered into a flurry of consultations and negotiations. Their task apparently was to draft some sort of statement. But Carter continued meeting separately with Begin and Sadat. One evening he dropped by Begin's lodge; the following morning he strolled with Sadat for more than an hour along Camp David's wooded trails.

The strange cycle of hopes and fears continued. At one point on Thursday, Carter was sufficiently optimistic to get in touch with Speaker of the House Thomas ("Tip") O'Neill Jr. to discuss imminent post-summit arrangements.

O'Neill was asked if the House leadership of both parties would be able to join Carter at the White House to discuss the results of Camp David on Friday, presumably after the summit would have ended. The President also inquired whether the House International Relations Committee would be able to meet privately on Friday with Begin and Sadat. O'Neill responded yes to both questions.

But when Carter wanted to know if he would be able to explain what happened at Camp David to a televised joint session of Congress on Monday, O'Neill had reservations. A noon address was out, advised Tip; it would interrupt the Congressmen's rush to clear the legislative calendar so that they could hit the campaign trail. And a 9 p.m. appearance, cautioned O'Neill, would conflict with the televised Monday-night football game. The Speaker suggested that the President consider delivering his address early on Monday evening, advice Carter would wind up taking when the summit ended.

But plans for the Friday conclusion were most premature. Thursday night, in fact, the talks nearly broke down. At that time, an Egyptian in touch with his country's delegation remarked: "Absolutely nothing is being achieved. Things are going badly on all points." While this was something of an exaggeration, his assessment was basically confirmed by an Israeli official who said on Friday: "Wednesday we were very close. But if we end today, we end in failure."

The problem apparently was Sadat's mounting frustration at Begin's adamant refusal to accept the principle of Arab sovereignty over the West Bank. It took a talk with Dayan and a long walk with Carter before Sadat cooled off and the crisis passed. Still the two antagonists were no closer to agreement.

With the talks bogged down, Carter finally wondered whether Sadat and Begin might not be holding a few concessions in reserve to play, if necessary, in the final, crucial stage of the talks. The President thus came to a vital decision: he would propose that the summit end Sunday, whether or not agreement had been reached. When Vice President Walter Mondale sounded out Begin and Sadat on this, they concurred. Among those pleased by the decision were the frustrated newsmen waiting at the Thurmont press center. When Powell told them the conference was ending Sunday, they cheered.

By this time there was surely cheering inside Camp David too. (One slogan proposed by junior staffers for a summit T Shirt: FREE THE CAMP DAVID THREE.) The combination of strain, crowded living and somewhat spartan surroundings was telling on everyone. On Friday Carter's aides described him as nearing mental and physical exhaustion. Said one: "He's really wiped."

The heavy demands Carter had set for himself gave him very little time to use Camp David's recreational facilities. He did, however, manage to fit in a few sets of tennis with Rosalynn and bicycle around the grounds, sometimes to negotiating sessions. Others fared slightly better. Among the most popular forms of relaxation at the summit were evening movies. With 60 or so films in the camp's library, Sadat saw some of his favorites. Among them: Shane and Treasure of Sierra Madre. Begin found time to challenge Brzezinski to a three-game chess match. The outcome: two wins for Zbig, one for Begin.

The camp's kitchens, run by the Navy, were able to whip up just about anything the three leaders wanted to eat. Carter and Sadat dined mainly in the privacy of their lodges, but Begin regularly took his meals at Laurel Lodge with his delegation. Lower-ranking officials found the cuisine far less satisfactory, with the U.S. staffers particularly put out to find their trays heaped with familiar G.I. stomach turners like creamed chipped beef on toast. Except for Carter's spacious Aspen Lodge, living quarters for the U.S. team were cramped. Vance shared a two-bedroom cottage with Mondale, who was shuttling between Camp David and the capital. When Defense Secretary Harold Brown came up for part of the talks, he and Vance had to room together and take turns in the bathroom.

It was only on the final Saturday that the possibility of a breakthrough began to take shape. While Begin observed the Sabbath, Carter met with Sadat for 2 1/2 hours. Once sundown came, Carter and Begin met for 4 1/2 hours. By that time their negotiators had narrowed success or failure for the summit to just two issues: the Palestinians and the Israeli Sinai settlements.

All day Sunday, the U.S. pressed hard on both. There was no dramatic turning point on the Palestinians, just "a lot of fine tuning and adjusting so all the jigsaw pieces would finally fit," said one U.S. official. Alternative proposals on language went back and forth for approval, options were accepted and rejected, but by mid-afternoon the compromise formula letting the Palestinians participate in the negotiations and have a say in the final status of Gaza and the West Bank had been adopted.

At 3 p.m. they turned to the Sinai settlements, and that took 2 1/2 hours, beginning with a brief Carter-Begin meeting, followed by a Carter-Sadat huddle of more than an hour and a half. Sadat was unhappy at letting Begin off the hook by passing the issue to the Knesset, and Carter's aides waiting outside the President's pine-paneled study grew more and more worried. Then, at 4:30, Carter looked out the window and flashed the thumbs-up sign. They had a deal. Begin got his copies of the proposed agreements in his cabin, Birch, read them carefully and told his aides: "If this is it, we're going to sign. I'm going to call President Sadat and then go see him." Outside, the rain was torrential. Begin told Sadat he would come over to his cabin, Dogwood, as soon as the rain stopped. Before he got there, Sadat sent over some autographed pictures of himself with Begin and Carter that he had dedicated to Begin's granddaughters. For 25 minutes Begin visited Sadat. A half-hour later, Sadat suddenly appeared, without warning, at the door of Begin's cabin to return the call. To reciprocate the gift of photographs, Begin presented Sadat with a medallion by Israeli Artist Yachov Agam. Its theme: "The Dream of Peace." Then Begin suggested, "Let's both go tomorrow night to hear President Carter address the Congress." Sadat agreed. Already, Carter's aides were making the arrangements for the trip down from the mountain to tell the world what the three leaders had wrought.

In some important aspects, Sadat had arrived at Camp David hazardously isolated. He had angered the Soviets by expelling their advisers, and annoyed Arab leaders by not consulting with them before he went to Jerusalem to launch his initiative. Because of his exposed position, he could look only to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia for major support in future international maneuvers, including any talks with the Israelis.

Begin, of course, also could ill afford to antagonize the U.S., which has been providing about $2 billion in aid annually to Israel. But in any disagreements with an American Administration, the Israelis could always count on considerable backing from the politically powerful U.S. Jewish community. American Zionist leaders had already been told by Begin's aides that after Camp David, they "might be called upon" to undertake a "massive" public relations campaign to defend Israel's position. But even with such backing inside the U.S., Begin, like Sadat, preferred not to face the uncertain political and diplomatic consequences of a Camp David failure.

Those consequences could well have caused a thorough reshuffling of the entire deck of Middle East cards. The arguments by Arab moderates would be badly tarnished. The Soviet Union and "rejectionist" Arab states such as Libya and Iraq would gloat that they had long condemned Sadat's solo initiative as foolish and had warned fellow Arab nations against looking to the U.S. for satisfaction in their conflict with the Israelis.

Now Sadat can offer the two "frameworks," signed as they are by Jimmy Carter, as evidence of the benefits of working with the U.S. Sadat will point out, moreover, that years of relying on Moscow did not help the Arabs regain a single inch of land from Israel. The Camp David achievements could enhance Washington's influence in the Middle East just at a time when Moscow was beginning to exploit the situation in the general area. Now there is no chance at all of a rapprochement between Sadat and the Soviets. As a Russian in Cairo remarked: "Even if Sadat turns against the U.S., we would not accept him again. We would prefer to see him overthrown and to deal with someone else."

As an attempt to counter what will be a storm of unfavorable Arab reaction to the summit, Carter is expected to dispatch Special Ambassador Alfred Atherton to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and perhaps Syria to explain what happened in the Catoctin Mountains. It is also likely that the Administration will demonstrate its continuing commitment to Sadat. One possibility is that Carter will boost economic and military aid to Cairo, and possibly even sell Sadat 800 of the 2,000 armored personnel carriers that he has requested. By bolstering Egypt's armed forces, the U.S. hopes to enable Cairo to play a more active role in African regional affairs, such as supporting neighboring Sudan. That country's pro-Western government is worried about the increased Soviet and Cuban influence in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.

Sadat's next steps in the Middle East will, to some degree, be influenced by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were the silent partners at Camp David, for neither the U.S. nor Egypt can afford to ignore their views. Their bulging treasury supports Egypt's crippled economy, and their petroleum and financial reserves have served U.S. interests by tempering oil price hikes and helping support the weakening international position of the dollar. Sadat's journey to Jerusalem was publicly praised by the Saudis, though they had reservations about his chances for success. Because they are worried about the mounting influence of radicals in the Middle East, however, the conservative Saudis reluctantly endorsed Sadat's participation at Camp David in the hope that any peace progress would bolster the position of the moderates. But prior to Sunday night, King Khalid & Co. were running out of patience. Said an Arab official in Cairo of the summit early last week: "It is Sadat's last hurrah."

Stunning as the Camp David results were, from the Arab view the summit may still be Sadat's last hurrah. Once again Sadat has demonstrated remarkable courage and statesmanship in promoting the cause of peace, but if his name was mud in much of the Arab world before Sunday night, it is something even worse now.

The Saudis will be torn between their interest in peace and moderation and their desire for Arab unity. There is nothing in the frameworks to please Syrian President Hafez Assad--Syria is hardly mentioned. A harsh critic of Sadat's peace moves, Assad earlier said Camp David was "the final striptease" in which the Israelis "won't even leave Sadat a fig leaf." Radio Damascus called the frameworks "a phony deal signed by two phony men. It represents American imperialism and a complete sellout of the Palestinians."

The frameworks fall far short of what King Hussein had previously demanded as his price for joining the talks. The P.L.O.--left, center and right--is sure to be outraged and even in Sadat's own camp there is contention and bitterness on the grounds that he had given up too much.

Even though on balance it was Begin who conceded the least, he, too, cannot expect a totally euphoric welcome home. Opposition Leader Shimon Peres was quoted as saying: "With such concessions we could have finished a long time ago. It's a hard thing to take." Geula Cohen, a member of Begin's own party in the Knesset, also found it hard to take: "Begin has always talked of living on both sides of the Jordan River. Now we will be living on both sides of the Yarkon (a little stream that flows through Tel Aviv). Begin has committed national suicide." Still, most Israelis in the end would likely go along with Begin.

Indeed, the first wave of reaction to the agreements confirmed, in a sense, the quality of the diplomacy achieved at Camp David. Like the result of any tough bargain struck in a complicated situation, there was a little something for almost everyone--and something to upset and chagrin almost everyone. Given the depth of antagonisms and the sharp clash of multiple interests in the Middle East, it could hardly be otherwise; that is precisely why peace has eluded the combatants for so long. It may again. Everything about the Middle East suggests the truth of the proverb that goes: "When you are 90% finished with a task, you are only halfway there."

Nonetheless, all the participants deserve high marks for the extraordinary effort the summit represented, and none more so than Jimmy Carter. Alone of the principals he should benefit at home from an unequivocal, sorely needed and well-earned rise in the esteem--and the opinion polls--of his countrymen. His summit, for all the hazards that lie ahead, moved the troubled Middle East a little closer to peace--and a little farther from war. qed

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